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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
APPLYING A POSITIVE THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCIES 
 
 
Why do American states organize as they do for environmental protection? According to 
Moe (1990), “a positive theory of organizations has two goals: 1) explain where institutions come 
from and why they take the forms they do, and 2) understand their effects for political and social 
behavior.”  This paper will examine Moe’s question in terms of state environmental agencies: 
What influences state adoption of a comprehensive environmental structure?  To address this 
question, I develop a theory of state adoption of organizational structure drawing on 
organizational theories of public organizations. The latest comprehensive examination of state 
agency structure in the literature was in 1994 (Jessup, 1994) and provides no analysis, only a 
summary description of each agency.  The most recent evaluation of states adoption of 
environmental agency structures was in 1975 (Beyle, 1975).  My analysis builds on these studies. 
 
This dissertation is structured in eight chapters.  I first review the history of state 
environmental protection agencies in the context of the development of federal and state 
environmental laws.   I also describe, in general, the federal and state government environmental 
structures and describe the comprehensive and incremental restructuring that states have 
undergone since 1960. 
 
The second part of the dissertation develops a theory of state administrative agency 
adoption through a review of the organizational and political literature.  Building on a model 
developed by Beyle (1975), this section describes how state environmental protection agencies 
develop in response to political motivations, administrative needs, socioeconomic 
characteristics, and environmental severity.  I then test two empirical models based on this 
theory to understand why states chose to adopt a comprehensive state environmental 
protection agency and a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure.   
 
 
 
The third part of the dissertation outlines the theory of state adoption of environmental 
policies, focusing on the role of decisional systems and specifically the state agency structure.  I 
apply this theory to explore the influence of structure on adoption of environmental policies to 
address second and third generation pollution problems.  These 12 policies are used to create an 
index of innovativeness. The final chapter summarizes the conclusions from the analyses, and 
future research prospects.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
State environmental protection agencies are relatively new compared to more 
traditional state agencies, such as transportation and agriculture.  What started in a 
handful of states as a patchwork of boards, commissions, and part of health and 
sanitation agencies, has grown into a national network of executive level agencies with 
approximately 50,000 employees spending over $4 billion per year.  While most states 
initially housed environmental regulation within public health departments (Health), 
most now house it within its own stand-alone agency (Mini-EPA) or in superagencies that 
can include agriculture, natural resources, and/or energy (Super-Agency).  Regardless of 
their location, these agencies develop, implement, and enforce environmental pollution 
laws.  These agencies report to the state governor and legislature, but also the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) regional and national offices as they 
implement and enforce both state and federal laws.  In addition, these agencies develop 
their own programs and policies for pollution control (Sapat, 2004).  Understanding how 
these agencies are organized and function is an important component of understanding 
the diversity of environmental regulations across states. 
State executive agencies are a key part of the decisional system component of a 
policy adoption model.  State administration has been described as a hidden component 
of state government (Jennings & Woods, 2007).  The structure that these agencies adopt 
directly influences their capacity.  In addition, the structure will affect the policy priorities, 
level of enforcement, and level of innovation within the agency.  While it is generally 
accepted that the structure of bureaucratic agencies can affect policy outcomes, few 
2 
 
studies include detailed measures of the agency itself in their models.  In environmental 
policy literature, the few studies that have examined state environmental protection 
agency structure found that the structure can have statistically significant effects on state 
environmental policies.  The most significant effect of structure on environmental policies 
is whether the environmental protection agency is housed within a public health 
department.  States that house their pollution control functions within the health 
department have lower levels of policy adoption, expenditures, and enforcement (A. 
Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Hoornbeek, 2011; Hunter & Waterman, 1996; J. Lester, 1980).   
Most of these studies examined data prior to 1990; many states have restructured their 
agencies since 1990.   It would be interesting to evaluate the impact on policy outputs 
and enforcement of those states that moved their programs out of the department of 
health after 1990. 
The current structures of state environmental protection agencies have evolved 
and developed over the past 50 years.  What started as dispersed across multiple agencies 
and independent boards and commissions has now evolved into primarily three main 
structures: (1) Mini-EPA, (2) Super-Agency, or (3) Health Department.  The environmental 
and health literatures have depended on this basic typology, shown by state in Figure 1 
below (Beyle, 1975; Jessup, 1988; Kotchian, 1997; Ringquist, 1993; Shepherd, West, 
Hargrove, Schoemaker, & St. Peter, 1999; Sinclair & Whitford, 2012).   Most states 
centralized all pollution control functions (water, air, and land) into one cabinet-level 
agency by the mid-1970s.  However, almost half of states initially centralized pollution 
control in the department of health.   Between 1975 and 2000, 14 states moved their 
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centralized pollution control functions into either the Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure 
(Comprehensive Structure). 
 
Figure 1: Current State Environmental Protection Agency Structures 
 
 
States seem to be continually evaluating and restructuring their pollution control 
and natural resource management functions trying to find the right fit (Koncelik, 2010; 
Shepherd et al., 1999).  Most commonly, states have added and removed the divisions 
within the environmental protection agency.  However, a few states have changed the 
type of Comprehensive Structure as well.  For example, the state of Michigan 
consolidated its environmental and natural resource functions into a Super-Agency in 
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2009 and subsequently in 2011 broke them back into separate agencies (via Executive 
Orders).   No state has moved the pollution control functions out of the Department of 
Health since 2000.  
 
Research Question 
Ideally, public bureaucracies, such as state environmental protection agencies, are 
designed to be as efficient and functional as possible with the appropriate horizontal and 
vertical specifications to meet the regulatory mission of the agency.  Early rational 
organizational theorists argued for this type of apolitical design, providing guiding 
management and structural principles (Gulick, 1937; Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1922).  
However, in practice, the design of these agencies is subject to the political motivations 
of those designing them, the sociological context of a state, and the economic constraints 
at the time of creation.  According to Moe (1990a), “a positive theory of organizations has 
two goals: 1.) to explain where institutions come from and why they take the forms they 
do, and 2.) understand their effects for political and social behavior (p 215).”  The purpose 
of this dissertation is to examine both of these questions in organizational theory in terms 
of state environmental protection agencies.  The first two empirical analyses address the 
first goal posed by Moe: 
 What factors influence state adoption of a comprehensive environmental 
structure? 
 What factors influence state adoption of a Mini-EPA versus Super-Agency 
structure? 
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To address these questions, I develop a theory of state adoption of organizational 
structure drawing on theories of public organizations.   
 
The third empirical analysis addresses the second goal posed by Moe: 
 Does a Super-Agency structure promote state development of innovative 
environmental policies? 
To address this question, I develop a model of policy adoption that draws on internal 
determinants and the innovation diffusion literature.   
 
Organization of Study 
This dissertation is structured in eight chapters.  These chapters outline the history 
of state environmental protection agencies, theories of state agency and state 
environmental policy adoption, and the three main empirical analyses.  This first chapter 
provides an introduction and overview of the dissertation. 
Chapter Two details the history of state environmental protection agencies in the 
context of the development of federal and state environmental laws.  This chapter also 
describes, in general, the federal and state environmental government structures.  Finally, 
this chapter provides a description of comprehensive and incremental restructuring that 
states have undergone since 1960. 
Chapter Three develops a theory of state administrative agency adoption through 
a review of the organizational and political literature.  Building on a model developed by 
Beyle (1975), this section describes how state environmental protection agencies develop 
6 
 
in response to political motivations, administrative needs, socioeconomic characteristics, 
and environmental severity. 
Chapters Four and Five present the empirical analyses that draw upon the theory 
developed in the previous section to understand why states chose to adopt a 
comprehensive state environmental protection agency and a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency 
structure.   
Chapter Six outlines the theory of state adoption of environmental policies, 
focusing on the role of decisional systems and specifically the state agency structure.  
Chapter Seven applies this theory to explore the influence of structure on adoption of 
environmental policies to address second and third generation pollution problems.  These 
12 policies are used to create an index of innovativeness. 
Chapter Eight is a summary of the conclusions from the analyses, and future 
research prospects.    
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCIES 
Every level of government in the United States (US) from cities to the federal 
government is involved in environmental pollution control in a system often described as 
environmental federalism.  This interrelated system of governance has developed both 
from the bottom up and top down since the first local pollution ordinances were passed 
in the mid-1800s and the first federal environmental pollution control legislation was 
passed in 1899.1  States lie in the center of this federal system, responding to pressure 
from their citizens, policies of their counties and cities, and federal mandates.  The level 
of authority and discretion exercised by cities, states, and federal government varies 
across the numerous regulations.  Each level of government has developed its own 
regulatory structures to protect environmental quality in response to political, 
administrative, and social pressure.  The focus of this dissertation is on the structures that 
have developed at the state level to manage pollution.  However, given the interrelation 
between the levels of government, it is important to understand how state agencies 
developed within the federal system.  This section outlines the history of environmental 
regulation, focusing on the changing roles of states and the federal government and the 
development of state environmental protection agencies.   
Pollution control has moved through three phases: (1) local control, (2) multi-
agency or dispersed state control, and (3) centralized state pollution control (Hines, 
1966).  As pollution control functions have been adopted at each higher level of 
                                                          
1 River and Harbors Act of 1899 
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government, the lower levels of government retain some responsibilities, creating an 
interrelated, intergovernmental system of governance.   
The first pollution control regulations, adopted in the late 1800s, focused on water 
pollution control.2  While a few municipalities had adopted air pollution control legislation 
prior to 19103, focus on air pollution developed after water pollution control.  During the 
initial phase, municipalities and counties developed ordinances, primarily focused on 
health impacts of pollution, in response to local concerns.   As the severity of pollution 
issues and cross-jurisdictional impacts increased, states began to respond with state 
legislation in a piecemeal fashion, placing authority for regulation in multiple agencies 
and boards.   
Finally, states centralized their management of pollution into a single agency.  
States were driven by two major influences toward a centralized pollution control system: 
(1) political pressure to develop more effective pollution control systems to address the 
complex pollution issues facing states; and (2) political pressure to improve the 
professionalism and efficiency of state government.  These two movements coincided 
with each other, driving states to move to the final phase of centralized state control.   
This chapter provides a description of the development of state pollution control 
structure in context of these two influences. 
 
                                                          
2 Initial water pollution laws prohibited dumping of “poisons” and dead animals and declared discharge of 
such material a “public nuisance.  But these early laws were not very strong or comprehensive.  Ohio in 
1893 and Pennsylvania in 1905 were first states to adopt a regulatory authority for (non industrial) water 
pollution (Andreen 2003).  
3 Municipalities first began adopting legislation that declared emissions of smoke to be a public nuisance 
in1881. Chicago and Cincinnati were the first two cities to adopt such legislation. 
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Environmental Federalism 
The nature of environmental pollution defies the logic of federalism.  The 
American federal system was developed to tie together different levels of government 
while maintaining “the existence and authority of both” (Elazar, 1984, p. 2).  At its heart, 
American federalism is the lack of centralization – the levels of government may be bigger 
or smaller, but they do not lie in a hierarchy (Elazar, 1984).  Within a federal system, states 
and localities respond to issues within their borders and are thought to best represent 
interests of their communities.  However, this structure can create obstacles to address 
environmental pollution, which may be created in one community (providing economic 
growth) and negatively affect another community.   When the first major federal air 
pollution control legislation was passed in 1955, the responsibilities of each level of 
government were clearly assigned with little overlap, like a ‘layer cake’ (USEPA, 1983).  At 
that time, no state had a comprehensive pollution control structure in place, but some 
states had begun to enhance and develop their pollution control programs.   The federal 
government became involved in pollution control regulation in response to a concern that 
states lacked the will or capacity to protect environmental quality.   Even initially, the 
federal government refrained from mandating state action, instead using financial and 
technical assistance to incentivize states.   
After the initial federal legislation, that was designed to empower states to 
develop a regulatory structure, failed to achieve significantly improved state capacity, the 
federal government increased its role in environmental protection.  Starting in 1970, the 
federal government assumed significant authority to regulate environmental pollution 
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through the passage of over 20 major federal statutes that cover air, water, and land 
pollution.  States, partly in response to federal regulation and political pressure, began to 
more quickly develop pollution regulatory structures, entering into the final phase of 
pollution regulation. Since 1970, the regulatory relationship between states and the 
federal government has been described as coercive federalism, cooperative federalism, 
creative federalism, creeping federalism, and new federalism. The current system 
resembles more of a ‘marble cake’ with overlapping responsibilities across governments 
that require cooperation between each level of government (USEPA, 1983) and often the 
private sector. 
This increased federal involvement created a hierarchy of regulatory control that 
runs counter to the traditional theory of American federalism.  Proponents of federal 
involvement argue the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides the authority.   
The question that has dominated environmental policy literature since the 1950s, when 
the federal government first became involved, is whether state or federal regulation of 
environmental pollution would lead to the socially optimal level of environmental quality 
across communities.  Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists have all examined 
environmental federalism over the past 40 years.  The primary focus for much of the 
literature has been an either-or-decision between federal or state control.  Proponents of 
a strong federal role in environmental protection argue that both the nature of 
environmental problems and types of state government incentives require centralization 
of control.  Without the federal intervention, states would compete in a race-to-the-
bottom in environmental regulations to maintain economic development while ignoring 
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the local and interstate externalities associated with environmental pollution.  Those 
scholars arguing for devolution of authority to states dispute that the nature of 
environmental problems require federal control, as many are local or regional in nature, 
and are best addressed at those levels where local conditions and public preferences are 
unique.   In contrast, states would not compete in a race-to-the-bottom, but instead as 
economic conditions improve, the public demand for environmental quality would 
actually increase.   
A ‘third generation scholarship’ is emerging now that argues that there is a 
jurisdictional mismatch in many environmental regulations where the federal 
government has control over local issues and local governments are assuming control 
over federal issues (Adler, 2005; Esty & Geradin, 2001).  Additionally, others are arguing 
for a ‘civic environmentalism’ that focuses on partnerships between multiple levels of 
government and industry and environmental groups to develop and implement 
regulations that fit the nature of the environmental problem (Durant, Fiorino, & O'leary, 
2004).  Esty and Geradin (2001) summarize the general consensus in current scholarship: 
“…regulatory systems should be set up with enough interjurisdictional cooperation (or 
harmonization) to ensure that transboundary externalities and other market failures are 
addressed, but with a sufficient degree of regulatory competition to prevent the resulting 
governmental structure from becoming an untamed, overreaching, or inefficient 
Leviathan” 
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Environmental Governance 
In exploring state environmental protection agencies, it is important to define 
what is meant by environmental protection and how that is different from natural 
resource protection.  Environmental protection policies are regulatory policies designed 
to affect environmental quality, specifically focused on pollution control.  Environmental 
protection policies include the Clean Air Act (CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that focus on reducing environmental pollution.  
The goal of natural resource protection, distributive policies, is to conserve resources and 
allocate public resources to specific groups (i.e. grazing access, mining rights, recreational 
use) (Kraft, 2007).  Generally, natural resource policies are developed to manage 
resources such as forests and lakes, with a focus on quantity and consumption (Brown & 
Marshall, 1996).  Natural resource protection includes parks and recreation, forest 
management, and water conservation.   
 
USEPA 
The mission of the USEPA is to “protect human health and the environment” 
(USEPA).  The EPA has a main headquarters office in Washington DC, but also has 10 
regional offices, adding another interesting layer in the complex intergovernmental 
relationship.  Other federal agencies that have responsibility for environmental 
governance include the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) in the Department of the Interior, 
the Public Health Service (prior to creation of USEPA), US Fish and Wildlife Services, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of State, Department of Transportation, Health 
and Human Services, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Council on 
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Environmental Quality, Homeland Security, Department of Labor, Department of Energy 
(DOE), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce.   
 
Figure 2: USEPA Organizational Chart 
 
 
In addition to the various administrative offices, the USEPA is structured around 
the type of pollution: water, air, solid waste, and chemical safety. 
 
State Environmental Protection Agency 
State environmental protection agencies manage pollution control for all major 
media (water, air, land).   Generally, the pollution control functions within a Super-Agency 
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and in a Mini-EPA are structured in a similar structure as the USEPA (the current structure 
of each state’s pollution control, energy, natural resources management, parks and 
recreation, and agriculture agencies is included in Appendix A).   According to Ringquist 
(1993), state activities in environmental policy fall into five categories: setting goals and 
standards, designing and implementing programs, monitoring and enforcement, research 
and development, and funding.   The USEPA was initially distrustful of states’ ability or 
capacity to manage environmental policy within any of these categories and did not freely 
devolve authority to states.  However, over time and in response to the general 
devolution in the 1980s and improvements in state capacity, the USEPA increased 
environmental devolution to the states (Ringquist, 1993).    Under authority granted in 
U.S. environmental laws, states have assumed primacy for the majority of federal statutes 
(see table in Appendix D).  Even in states that exercise delegated authority, the USEPA 
does spot inspections and monitoring.   
 
Development of State Pollution Control 
Jenks and Wright (1993) identify five stages of state agency development between 
1960 and 1990: first generation agencies, second generation agencies, third generation 
agencies, fourth generations, and emergent agencies.  The authors examined the 
agencies that existed in at least two-thirds of states at the start of each decade.  These 
agencies that the authors identify can be divisions within larger agencies or the agencies 
themselves.  I will use department to describe the larger department (i.e. Department of 
Environmental Protection) and division to describe subdivisions of the larger agencies (i.e. 
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mining, water resources, and air pollution).  States’ pollution control structures developed 
throughout this time period in a piecemeal fashion adding new divisions and boards to 
address new issues.  As states adopted new responsibilities and divisions, state leaders 
began consolidating pollution control functions into a Comprehensive Structure.  Figure 
3 below shows the decade that each state moved its pollution control functions into a 
Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure. 
 
Figure 3: State Adoption of Current Environmental Regulation Structure  
 
 
The following discussion outlines the history of environmental regulation, 
focusing on the changing roles of states and the federal government and the development 
of state environmental protection agencies.  I have divided the history of environmental 
regulation into five periods based on multiple sources in the literature (Eisner, 2007; Klyza 
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& Sousa, 2008; Kraft, 2007; J. Lester, 1995; Ringquist, 1993; USEPA, 1983; Vig & Kraft, 
2003).  The five periods are: State and Local Control (up to 1960), Creeping Federalism 
(1960-1969), Federal Activism (1970-1980), Devolution (1980-1990), and Evolving 
Federalism (1990–current).  A list of major federal laws is included in Appendix B. 
 
State and Local Control (Up to 1960) 
First generation state executive agencies, created prior to 1960, developed to 
serve the traditional functions of states, including health, budgeting, and police (Jenks & 
Wright, 1993). States were more focused on managing natural resources for human 
consumption through agencies such as agriculture, fish and game, mining, oil and gas, and 
forestry.  After the dust bowl events, states expanded their focus to soil conservation.  As 
the conservation movement gained momentum, state governments expanded to include 
water resources and parks and recreation divisions.   Each of these functions was often 
housed within separate agencies and/or independent boards with little coordination.  
Traditionally, state legislatures often created a board or commission to oversee the 
programs and agencies as an extra measure of maintaining control (Gargan, 1999, p. 17) 
 
Local Control 
Prior the 20th century, environmental pollution (air, water, land) was an issue 
primarily regulated (if at all) by cities and counties (Haskins, 1969; Hatchard, 1962; Melosi, 
2000; Stein, 1962; Stern & Professor, 1982).  Cities began to develop policies and 
programs to address smoke, sewage and sanitation issues at the end of the 19th century 
in response to health effects of pollution.  Between 1860 and 1896, over 3,000 public 
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water systems were constructed (Andreen, 2003; Goklany, 1998; E. Ringquist, 1993). The 
development and growth of the public health movement coincided with many of these 
local pollution regulations and services.  Cities began adopting departments of health, 
which often assumed responsibility for sanitation, air quality, and sewage.  It is important 
to note that the focus of sanitation programs was on pollution from sewage rather than 
industrial pollution (Andreen, 2003).  New York City established the first municipal health 
department in 1866 and by 1900 the majority of larger cities had a health department  
 
State Role 
States began to take a more active role in pollution control at the turn of the 
century because “localities were unable to control pollution coming from upstream and 
had no incentive to control their own pollution” (Davies III, 1970, p. 121).  The initial focus 
of state pollution control was on the health impacts of pollution.  Massachusetts created 
the first state board of health in 1869 and by 1909 all states had a board of health 
(Andreen, 2003).  In response to urban pollution concerns, many states began creating 
separate divisions or boards for water pollution control and air pollution control (Davies 
III, 1970).  By 1927, almost all states had a sanitary engineering division within their 
departments of health.  More than half of states (28) gave their boards of health 
regulatory authority for controlling water pollution by 1946 (Melosi, 2000).  By 1948, 
every state had assumed control of water pollution from local governments, placing the 
administration in the department of health or independent boards.  States began to 
actively develop environmental regulations in the 1950s (Davies III, 1970).  States also 
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gave regulatory authority for water quality pollution to other agencies, such as parks and 
natural resources (Andreen, 2003; Hines, 1966).    
Oregon, in 1952, was the first state to pass comprehensive statewide air pollution 
legislation and to establish a state air pollution control agency (Ringquist, 1993).  By 1960, 
15 states had passed some type of air pollution control legislation (Aborn & Axelrod, 1967; 
Hatchard, 1962; Stern & Professor, 1982).   In 1950, the US Public Health Service (USPHS) 
published a Suggested Water Pollution Control Act, to encourage states to strengthen 
their water pollution control laws.  Over half of states responded with strengthened state 
laws and agencies (Andreen, 2003). By 1956, 19 states housed water pollution control in 
an independent board, commission, or agency, seven states housed it within the 
department of health, and three states housed it within other existing agencies such as 
fish and game commissions. 
 
Federal-State Relationship 
Prior to the 1950s, states managed environmental pollution problems as part of 
their policing powers (Anderson & Hill, 1997; Percival, 1995; Ringquist, 1993).  The federal 
government intervened rarely and only if issues dealt with interstate commerce (such as 
the Refuse Act of 1899 that prevented refuse in interstate rivers).  States used the court 
system to address interstate spillovers of environmental pollution. The issue of 
environmental pollution was not a salient one in the public dialogue until the 1960s.   
The federal government began developing federal regulations to address 
environmental pollution starting with the Water Pollution Control Act in 1948 and the Air 
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Pollution Control Act in 1955.  These initial federal regulations primarily provided funding 
to states to encourage them to establish pollution control regulations and infrastructures.  
“The federal environmental programs…were premised on the notion that environmental 
problems were the responsibility of state and local governments” (Percival, 1995, p. 
1156).  The federal government tried to provide states with the tools to develop the 
capacity and infrastructure to implement a pollution control system while keeping 
authority and control at the state level.  While many states had created some capacity, 
either housed within health departments or independent air and water pollution control 
boards, no state had created a comprehensive state agency. 
 
Creeping Federalism (1960-1969) 
Second generation agencies developed in the 1960s in response to current issues 
of the day such as civil rights, citizen activism, “Great Society” policy initiatives, and 
environmental concerns.  The majority of states created an air quality division during this 
time period (Jenks & Wright, 1993).  By 1968, 44 states had passed some type of air quality 
legislation (Regens & Reams, 1988; Wang, Dennis, & Tu, 2007; Waterman & Meier, 1998).  
It was not until the late 1960s that states began to create independent agencies that 
combined air and water quality and solid waste regulation.  The majority of states still 
housed these functions either in independent boards or within the department of health.  
Eight states adopted a comprehensive structure for environmental regulation in the later 
part of this decade (1967-1969). 
20 
 
During the 1960s, increasing scrutiny of state pollution programs found four main 
faults: (1) inadequate statutory authority, (2) lack of forceful administration, (3) 
inappropriateness of the public health domain, and (4) lack of central authority (Reenock 
& Poggione, 2004).  While the initial focus of pollution control was on the health effects 
of biological contaminants, increasingly concern had grown for the effects on agriculture 
and recreation, and the effect of industrial pollution (Scorsone & Plerhoples, 2010).  
States began consolidating programs and increasing the effectiveness of these programs 
during this time period.  However, there was a wide variation in state administrative 
capacity in general and in terms of environmental regulation.  State spending for air 
pollution control was 0.0006 percent of total state expenditures in 1962; less than six of 
the 32 states that had some kind of air regulations were actually enforcing those 
regulations in 1963; and by 1970, over half of state air pollution control agencies had 
staffs of fewer than 10 people (Ringquist, 1993).    
While the initial federal legislation in the 1950s clearly maintained state 
responsibility for development and implementation of environmental pollution control 
laws, the amendments during the 1960s and 1970s ultimately established a federal role 
in pollution control. The FWQA of 1948 provided states with funding and technical 
assistance, but the Water Quality Act of 1965 granted the federal government authority 
to establish water quality standards for interstate waterways.  While intrastate 
waterways were still under state control, these amendments required states to develop 
water quality standards for interstate waterways within their borders.    The Clean Air Act 
of 1963 authorized the Public Health Service to develop emissions standards and the Air 
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Quality Act in 1967 authorized the PHS to enforce interstate air pollution standards.  
However, the process for implementation for these laws was complicated and difficult to 
enforce. 
 
Federal Activism (1970-1980) 
During the 1970s, the third generation agencies that developed, “constituted the 
administrative foundation stones for state resurgence in the 1980s” (Jenks & Wright, 
1993, p. 81).  These agencies included energy and environmental protection agencies.  
The burst of federal environmental regulations drove states to expand their capacity for 
environmental regulation.  States continued developing environmental protection 
agencies either as stand-alone agencies or as part of new superagencies combined with 
related functions, such as natural resource management.  The majority of the 23 states 
that adopted a Comprehensive Structure during this decade did so within the first three 
years after the creation of the USEPA.  
While the federal government had been incrementally increasing its role in 
environmental pollution protection since 1955, it drastically increased its role with a 
series of laws passed in the early 1970s.  As described in the literature, policies generally 
increase incrementally unless there is some punctuation or focusing event to drive a more 
dramatic change (Birkland, 1997; True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007).  The dramatic 
change was propelled by a “quite phenomenal rise in public concern for the environment” 
(Jones, 1974, p. 78).  One public opinion poll found that the number of people concerned 
about air pollution between 1965 and 1970 jumped 41 percent (Jones, 1974).  
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Kingdon (1995) argues that there are streams in agenda setting: problem, policy 
and politics. The beginning of the 1970s was an unusual time when the “problem, policy 
and politics streams converged” (Kraft, 2007).  First, problems captured the attention of 
policy makers, scientists and public health officials who became aware of the negative 
health and environmental consequences of water, air, and land pollution.  The federal 
government, during the 1950s and 1960s invested millions of dollars to identify the 
“problem” of environmental pollution. Second, the policy makers developed policies to 
address this problem.  The federal government passed increasingly more aggressive 
policies throughout the 1960s to address the problem.  However, the final policy stream 
of politics did not fall into place until 1970 when the problem captured the attention of 
the public.  This section describes how the final policy stream of public opinion converged 
to dramatically increase the federal role in environmental regulation. 
Public opinion was driven by increased availability of information, major 
environmental disasters, and a nationalization of media, especially television.  Major 
popular works were published about the effects of environmental pollution such as 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, in 1962 and Paul Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, in 1968.  These 
books not only identified the effects of pollution, but also highlighted the limits of the 
planet to manage human development.  In January of 1969, an error on an offshore 
drilling rig caused up to 100,000 barrels of oil to spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, 
California.  In June of 1969, an oil slick on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio caught 
fire.  While the Cuyahoga River had caught fire previously, a picture appeared on the cover 
of Time magazine that same year (ironically of a previous fire).  These two events angered 
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the public and generated public support for environmental regulation.  The national 
media brought images into the homes across the country of the Cuyahoga River on fire 
and the Santa Barbara oil spill, generating public opinion support for environmental 
groups (Adler, 2004).  The first Earth Day was celebrated in April 1970, drawing even more 
public attention to the problem of environmental pollution.  There was strong bipartisan 
political support in the US Congress and in the White House to respond to the problem.  
President Nixon created the USEPA in 1970 via executive order. 
It is important to clarify that there was public support not just for a government 
response to environmental pollution, but more specifically for a federal government 
response to this problem.  The argument at the time was that federal intervention was 
required to account for the “regional and interstate nature of environmental pollution” 
and address the concern that variations in state programs could “threaten economic 
equity and efficiency” (USEPA, 1983).  The environmental movement followed the Civil 
Rights movement and the New Deal, where confidence in the federal government was 
high; the variation in state response to the Civil Rights Movement had weakened public 
opinion of the efficacy of state control (Anderson & Hill, 1997).  The federal government 
had given states almost two decades to respond to the problem and the argument was 
made that the states did not have the ability or will to respond. At this time, only eight 
states had a comprehensive environmental protection agency to implement regulations. 
Many scholars have also highlighted the influence of environmental and industrial 
interests.  In general, at the end of the 1960s, there were no “well-defined” interests 
lobbying for environmental pollution control (Butler & Macey, 1996).  The Sierra Club and 
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Audubon Society had been established in 1892 and 1905 respectively, but focused on 
conservation, not environmental pollution.  The first interests to focus on environmental 
pollution, Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources Defense Council were 
established in 1967 and 1970, respectively (J. Lester, 1995).  In response to public opinion, 
the Sierra Club and Audubon Society were able to expand their mission to include 
pollution control (Percival, 1995).  As a result, the Sierra Club, which had 35,000 members 
in 1970, had over 180,000 by 1980 (J. Lester, 1995).  Finally, as states with the 
administrative and financial capacity began developing environmental regulations, 
industry groups pushed for national regulations to reduce their costs of compliance.  For 
example, in response to state vehicle emission standards, the automobile industry pushed 
for national emission standards (Adler, 2004). 
Driven by public opinion and support, the federal government assumed control 
over pollution control across air, land, and water.  Nine major environmental laws were 
passed and amended many times during this decade.  These federal laws increased the 
federal role in regulating pesticides, mobile and stationary air pollution sources, water 
pollution sources, noise pollution, mining operations, chemical manufacturing, and 
hazardous waste management and disposal.  The Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act 
(CWA) established a regulatory relationship in which the Federal government establishes 
standards and the states may then develop and implement a plan to achieve those 
standards.  If USEPA approves the state water quality plan, the state may then assume 
primacy for enforcement of those standards.  States can assume authority for standard 
setting and enforcement authority if their standards are at least as stringent as the 
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Federal standards.  In addition, under the CAA, each state that wants enforcement 
authority must develop and update State Implementation Plans (SIP) describing how they 
will meet the NAAQS that the USEPA must approve.  If a state does not submit a SIP, the 
USEPA will impose a Federal Implementation Plan on that state.  The SIP process is an 
evolutionary process in which states submit plans for specific pollutants, or metropolitan 
areas, or category of emission sources (Ringquist, 1993).   
 
Devolution (1980-1990) 
The high productivity of the Congress in the 1970s in passing environmental 
legislation faced a threatening political response in 1980 with the election of President 
Ronald Reagan.  In general, President Reagan felt that the federal government was too 
large, inefficient, and negatively affected economic development.  Environmental 
pollution control was part of the President Ronald Reagan’s New Federalism push to 
devolve authority over regulatory programs back to the states (Percival, 1995; Stewart, 
1976). Reagan’s New Federalism included (1) administrative initiatives to reduce the 
burden of current regulations, decrease the number of future regulations, and return 
power to the states for enforcement of many laws; and (2) consolidation of block grants 
to provide states more autonomy (Zimmerman, 1991).  One strategy used to return 
power to the states was to push states to assume primacy delegation under the major 
environmental laws (Crotty, 1987).  During the 1980s, states transformed their 
institutional capacity, including their environmental administrative capacity (J. Lester, 
1995; Stewart, 1976).  Although the executive branch was working to reduce federal 
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control, Congress enacted many new laws and amendments to the first wave of 
environmental laws in the 1970s, often strengthening federal control (some speculate 
this was in response to New Federalism) (Percival, 1995).  
States adopted less than 10 new types of divisions during the 1980s (fourth 
generation) because states focused more on consolidation than creation. (Jenks & Wright, 
1993)  Again, activities at the federal level impacted state division creation as federal laws 
related to hazardous waste passed in the late 1970s pushed states to create new related 
agencies.  States created divisions for hazardous waste, groundwater management, and 
underground storage tanks.  Six states adopted a Comprehensive Structure during this 
decade, and many states applied for and were granted primacy to enforce various federal 
environmental regulations. 
 
Evolving Federalism (1990-current) 
Between 1970 and 1990, states significantly developed their capacity to develop, 
manage, and enforce environmental laws. By the mid-1990s, seven more states adopted 
a Comprehensive Structure for environmental regulation.  More states were willing to 
apply for primacy and the USEPA was forced to acknowledge this capacity and facilitate 
more devolution of authority to states.   Within these overlapping responsibilities across 
governments, like marble cake, states and the federal government have had to evolve in 
their relationship to cooperate (cooperative federalism) (USEPA, 1983).   Since 1990, the 
relationship between the levels of governments has continuously evolved through 
cooperation and conflict.   
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Cooperation 
By the mid-1990s, a majority of states had assumed primacy over at least one 
aspect of the CWA and CAA implementation (See Appendix D for state primacy 
information).  While states pushed for more authority, the USEPA attempted to improve 
the relationship with the states.  During the 1990s, the focus was on improving the 
working relationships between the federal and state agencies.  As states enhanced their 
capacity during the 1980s and assumed more responsibility for enforcement of federal 
regulations, tension developed between the USEPA and state environmental protection 
agencies.  States pushed back against “unfunded mandates” that gave states additional 
regulatory responsibilities without additional funding necessary to implement.  The 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA) was passed in 1995 to reduce the ability of the 
federal government to impose additional mandates and responsibilities on states without 
adequate funding.  While the UMRA has not completely eliminated unfunded mandates, 
it has reduced their number and increased focus on to the fiscal effects of federal 
legislation on state and local governments (Dilger & Beth, 2014).  In addition, the USEPA 
developed the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) to 
improve federal-state relations.  This program was supposed to focus on achieving 
measurable outcomes, providing states with greater flexibility, and enhancing 
accountability.  Performance Partnerships Agreements (PPAs) were entered into between 
the federal and state governments; and states were provided with block grants and able 
to direct that funding toward their own priorities  In addition, OSM adopted the REG 8 
Directive to improve federal-state relationships in surface mining regulation 
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implementation and enforcement (Scheberle, 2004).  Governance literature has 
examined the impact of these various management activities on environmental policy 
outputs and outcomes. 
 
Type and Efficiency of Regulations 
In addition, an increased focus in the 1990s on the efficiency of environmental 
regulations, developed in response command and control regulations of the 1970s, led to 
more cost benefit analyses and new types of regulations (Clean Air Act Amendments 
1990).   After the early 1990s, very few major federal environmental laws were passed.  
Under President Clinton, the USEPA began to create and market voluntary programs, such 
as the lead and radon programs.   
 
Second and Third Generation Pollution Problems 
The focus began to shift from first generation pollution problems to second and 
third generation problems.  The environmentally-related divisions created since 1990 are 
focused on more state-specific characteristics and addressing these types of pollution 
problems, such as coastal zone management and mining reclamation.  States also began 
to adopt more collaborative management policies and ecosystem management.    
“Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that 
cannot be solved by single organizations” (O'Leary & Bingham, 2009).  Collaborative 
government promotes coordination and cooperation across multiple levels of 
government, multiple government agencies, interests, and private stakeholders.  States 
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have adopted collaborative management techniques to address environmental policies 
that span jurisdictions, are generated by multiple dispersed sources, and cross 
environmental media. 
The focus of environmental and natural resource policy evolved during the 1990s 
from  controlling pollution from a single source or managing a single resource, such as a 
lake or a park, to a more ecosystem-focused management.  This evolution was founded 
in an understanding that individual resources were part of a larger ecosystem and 
changes in one part of that ecosystem can affect the whole ecosystem.  The USEPA began 
a transition to ecosystem management in 1993 by convening a working group to 
investigate “if the agency could use ecosystem management to solve some intractable 
problems facing it” (Brown & Marshall, 1996).  The first comprehensive work on 
ecosystem management, Ecosystem Management for Parks and Wilderness, by James 
Agee and Darryll Johnson, was published in 1988.  This book was a summary of a 
workshop on the topic cosponsored by the National Park Service and the USDA Forest 
Service.  Since the early 1990s, at least 20 states have adopted a watershed management 
approach, which is founded in the concept of ecosystem management.   
 
Conflictual 
The relationship between the federal and state governments is often conflictual 
with some states pushing back on some federal regulations and other states moving 
forward to address pollution problems that the federal government has not addressed.  
Examples include the conflict over hazardous waste facility siting in the 1990s and the 
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recent court battles over CO2 regulations that will have a severe impact on coal (“War on 
Coal”).   On the other end, many states have moved forward aggressively with climate 
change and renewable energy legislation in response to lack of action at the federal level. 
 
Development of the Professionalism and Efficiency of State Government 
Since the early 1900s, multiple waves of structural, constitutional, and 
management reforms have transformed state governments into a more competent, 
efficient, active, and professional level of government (Bowman & Kearney, 1986; Jenks 
& Wright, 1993).  The reforms did not happen at once, but instead in four distinct waves, 
with different driving factors and outcomes.  The first three waves, driven by reports of 
federal commissions, focused solely on the executive branch in 1917, 1937, and 1945.  
The fourth, and longest wave, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, has encompassed 
reforms to all three branches of the government (Bowman & Kearney, 1986).  The 
executive branch reforms during this time have included reforms to the governor’s office 
and the state bureaucratic structure (Berkman & Reenock, 2004; Bowman & Kearney, 
1986; Jenks & Wright, 1993).  Bureaucratic reforms include reorganization and 
consolidation of existing functions, creation of new functions, and increased 
professionalization.  States have made incremental changes since this last wave of reform.  
One major bureaucratic reform, adopted by over 20 states, was to give the governor 
power to reorganize the executive branch through Executive Order.  
State environmental protection agencies developed within this fourth wave of 
reforms, and like all other reforms, reflect the characteristics of the state, the existing 
31 
 
structure of the bureaucracy, funding available, federal mandates, and changing social 
pressures (Jenks & Wright, 1993).  State environmental protection agencies have 
developed and changed as part of comprehensive state reorganizations, incremental 
state reorganizations, and focused environmental regulation reorganizations.  It is 
important to understand the history of state executive branch reorganization and 
restructuring to understand why states have adopted the different environmental 
structures.   
 
Comprehensive State Agency Restructuring 
Prior to the 1960s, the state executive branch had very little power or authority.  
Many executive branch officials, in addition to the governor, were elected positions, 
including the attorney general and secretary of state.  While many states still have a 
number of elected executive branch officials, the strength of the governor’s office has 
increased across all states in terms of appointment power and veto power.  State 
legislatures often established a governing board or commission to oversee programs and 
agencies, and often these members reported to the state legislature and not the governor 
(Garga, 2000).  Initially, many state environmental regulation functions were housed 
within these types of boards and commissions. 
Between 1965 and 1979, the executive branch in 21 states underwent a 
comprehensive reorganization (See Appendix C for list of states and reorganization).  
Twelve states during this time adopted a comprehensive environmental structure during 
the reorganization.  Reforms were directed at addressing duplication and overlap of 
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functions, inefficiency, and a weak executive branch (Garga, 2000).  The reorganizations 
significantly reduced the number of agencies in many states from up to 300 to less than 
20 (Conant, 1992).  Some factors that drove this reorganization included significant 
growth in state expenditures, reapportionment of state legislative districts, expansion of 
state regulatory activities, and federal pressure for improved administration of federal 
programs (Garga, 2000).   
The general goals of reorganization efforts were to increase the strength of the 
government, and consolidate the executive agencies into departments by function 
(Garnett, 1980).  State executive branches have undergone either comprehensive or 
incremental bureaucratic restructuring along three types of models: the traditional 
model, the cabinet model, and the secretary/coordinator model (Bell, 1974; Berkman & 
Reenock, 2004; Garga, 2000).  Table 1 lists the main characteristics of each of these 
models. 
 
Table 1: Models of State Government 
 Cabinet 
Secretary/ 
Coordinator Traditional 
Number of agencies Low Very low Moderate 
Degree of functional consolidation High 
Low/ 
moderate 
Moderate 
Gubernatorial appointment of department 
heads 
High Moderate Low 
Number of departments with single executive High High 
Low/ 
moderate 
Department executive’s control over 
consolidated department 
High Low  low 
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The traditional or standard model of government required less restructuring and 
maintained a large number of agencies.  Under this structure, many of the boards and 
commissions that developed to support and manage agencies are maintained.  The 
agency heads can be appointed by the governor, but many are still elected (commissions 
and boards) (Bell, 1974; Garnett, 1980).  In the cabinet model, the governor appoints the 
heads of each agency and those managers are responsible to the governor.  Divisions tend 
to be grouped into a smaller number of agencies that manage a wide range of activities 
(Bell, 1974).  Agencies in the secretary/coordinator model incorporate a broad set of 
divisions and activities and a secretary is appointed by the governor to manage the 
multiple divisions within the agency (Bell, 1974).  This third model consolidates many 
smaller agencies and generally has the fewest number of agencies. (See Appendix C for 
state reorganization dates, types, and models used).  
Another major wave of state reorganizations during the 1980s was driven more 
by fiscal stress than duplication or limited executive branch authority and focused on 
reducing employment and spending (Conant, 1992).  Five states underwent 
reorganizations during the 1980s.  While some of these states’ reorganizations were 
driven by the desire to reduce duplication, many were also trying to reduce the size of 
state budgets. 
 
Incremental State Agency Restructuring 
Between 1900 and 1975, approximately 44 percent of state reorganizations were 
partial or incremental reorganizations (Garnett & Levine, 1980).  A partial or incremental 
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reorganization only focuses on one or two departments at a time.   For example, Oregon 
reorganized a few departments over the course of a few years in the late 1960s and 1970s, 
including their pollution control functions.   An environmentally-focused reorganization 
would be considered an incremental reorganization.  Over time, the incremental 
reorganization reduces the number of agencies and restructures the executive 
government through focused agency consolidations and reorganizations.  However, the 
size of the reduction of executive branch entities is less under these incremental 
restructurings than under a comprehensive restructuring (Berkman & Reenock, 2004).  
The initial states to adopt the Comprehensive Structure (1967-1975) did so as part of an 
(incremental) environmentally-focused reorganization (Beyle 1975).  Sometimes, state 
leaders find it more politically viable to push through restructuring in an incremental 
process over a longer period of time (Berkman & Reenock, 2004; Garnett & Levine, 1980).   
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CHAPTER 3: A THEORY OF STATE AGENCY ADOPTION 
The literature examining state adoption of environmental protection agency 
structures is very sparse (Beyle, 1975; Claveria & Kaito, 1985; Haskell & Price, 1973; 
Shepherd et al., 1999; Sinclair & Whitford, 2012).   The general findings in the literature 
are that that state environmental protection agencies were initially created to manage 
the increased magnitude of environmental programs administered by states, meet 
political demands for change, consolidate power, and respond to increased federal 
actions and other states’ adoption of similar agencies.   Many states also adopted the 
Comprehensive Structure as part of an overall state executive branch reorganization 
(Beyle, 1975).  This section, drawing on these studies and political and organizational 
theory, develops a theory of state adoption of state agency structure.  The theory can be 
applied to state adoption of a comprehensive environmental protection agency and the 
specific type of that agency (Mini-EPA or Super-Agency).  This theory can also be applied 
to adoption of other types of state agencies including higher education, health, and 
transportation. 
While early rational organizational theorists argue that public bureaucracies are 
designed with a focus on efficiency and function, in practice, political motivations, 
economic constraints, and socioeconomic characteristics of states often drive the 
development of these agencies.  The literature on design of public bureaucracies is 
primarily theoretical (Hammond, 1986; Moe, 1984, 1990a, 1990b; Williamson, 1981, 
1999).  The empirical literature that does exist has primarily focused on design of federal 
and not state bureaucracies (McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989; Wood & Bohte, 2004; 
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Wood & Waterman, 1993).  The general theory argues that “administrative design reflects 
the efforts of enacting coalitions to maximize future political benefits while minimizing 
future potential losses” (Wood & Bohte, 2004). 
 
Agency Structure 
Structure is an important component of institutional capacity.  Institutional 
capacity is the “capability of an agency to make and implement policy, net partisan and 
ideological differences” (Krause & Woods, 2014).  This capacity includes financial, capital, 
and human resources; constitutional and legal authority; and management expertise 
(Jennings & Woods, 2007).  Another way to consider bureaucratic capacity is as resources 
(budgetary, clientele, and reputational) and structure/processes.  Resources provide the 
input and the structure and processes provide the formal organizational context (Krause 
& Woods, 2014).  According to Honadle (1981), capacity is the ability to: 
1. Anticipate and influence change. 
2. Make informed, intelligent decisions about policy. 
3. Develop programs to implement policy. 
4. Attract and absorb resources. 
5. Manage resources. 
6. Evaluate current activities to guide future actions. 
This framework suggests that agency budgets alone are not the only measure of 
capacity.  Instead an agency with high capacity must also be able to manage those 
financial and human resources to implement policy.  An agency’s organizational structure 
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and mission will influence an agency’s ability to implement these components of the 
framework.  “State government capability has at its core the selection and development 
of institutional arrangements to carry out a broad range of activities” (Hawkins Jr., 1980).   
Organizational structure is a normative construction of rules and roles specifying 
who does what, how they do it, and how each relates to the other (Peters & Pierre, 2003; 
Scott & Davis, 2007).  Organizational structures vary by: size, horizontal and vertical 
specialization, demography, locus, and level of institutionalization. Of special interest for 
this analysis is the variance in horizontal and vertical specialization. Horizontal 
specialization refers to how different specializations (i.e. environmental regulation and 
natural resources or water quality and water conservation) are coupled or decoupled 
together (Gulick, 1937).  Agencies can be organized by: clientele served, territory, 
purpose, or function.  Vertical specialization describes the level of centralization of the 
hierarchical structure and the levels of hierarchy within an organization.   
Seidman (1970) proposes that public institutions also vary in terms of the directing 
authority (single headed or multi headed) and existence of an advisory or regulatory 
council or committee. Many state environmental protection departments report to a 
regulatory commission.  These commissions range from five members to 15 members and 
include governor appointed experts, citizen representatives, and elected officials.  Most 
of these commissions provide final approval of agency regulations and arbitrate appeals 
of agency permitting and enforcement decisions.  In most states, state agency directors 
report to the commission; however in Virginia and California, the boards are located 
within the agency structure. 
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Model of State Adoption of Structure 
Beyle (1975) hypothesizes a relationship between political and administrative 
motivations and the type of organizational structure chosen by a state.  In his model, 
socioeconomic and demographic factors also provide an indirect effect.  Finally, Beyle 
found that the general innovativeness of a state, as defined by Walker (1969), also 
seemed to affect adoption.  States that were considered more innovative were also some 
of the first to create a comprehensive agency.   
 
Figure 4: Beyle (1975) Model of Agency Design 
 
 
I have added magnitude of the policy problem to the model to reflect the influence of the 
environment pollution problems within a state.  Public bureaucracies are designed 
ultimately to address a perceived public governance issue.  While political, administrative, 
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and socioeconomic factors can influence that final design, ultimately the problem itself 
must be considered.  
  
Political Motivation 
According to Moe (1990a), “political institutions arise from politics of structural 
choice.”  Politicians play a similar role to the entrepreneur in the private sector in 
designing political agencies.  However, where the private entrepreneur is motivated by 
efficiency and profit, the political entrepreneur is motivated by reelection.  Politicians 
strive to serve their constituencies, reward financial and political supporters, avoid 
conflict, and take symbolic stands (Moe, 1984).  The political motivations driving policy 
outputs can be described as political pressure from constituents and interests and 
individual politician’s desire for political control. 
Politicians want to be reelected and can respond to pressure from interests and 
citizens to ensure reelection.  Elected officials can also take symbolic stands on issues to 
appear responsive.  Some governors were motivated, initially, to take a symbolic stand in 
support of environmental protection when they created a new comprehensive 
environmental protection agency (Haskell & Price, 1973; Rabe, 1986).  State 
environmental policy is driven by competing pressure applied by relevant interests, 
including manufacturing and mining groups, that want to minimize environmental 
regulations and environmental groups that want to maximize regulations. Many 
politicians were partially motivated by a growing environmental movement.  “It should 
be emphasized that the present situation (creation of comprehensive agency) has come 
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about…from intense  public concern expressed for the environment recently” (Beyle, 
1975).  Many of the first states to adopt a Comprehensive Structure were more 
environmentally-conscious states. 
Political control is an area not examined as thoroughly, but should have a 
significant effect on agency structure.   In designing agencies, politicians strive for control 
over the current system and also future coalition changes.  Under new economics of 
organization and transaction cost theories, agency structure results from strategic choices 
and political comprises of rational individual actors.  The actors include the executive, 
legislators, and outside interests.  The structure of the agency will reflect the level of 
political uncertainty at the time of creation, share the goals of the enacting coalition 
(including outside interests), and include controls for bureaucratic drift (McCubbins et al., 
1989; Moe, 1984, 1990a, 1990b; Williamson, 1999).   In addition, the capacity, power, and 
professionalism of the legislature and executive branch (bureaucracy and governor) will 
affect agency design (Krause & Woods, 2014; Reenock & Poggione, 2004). 
Ultimately the goal of the enacting coalition is “to maximize policy benefits, given 
various uncertainties at the time of policy benefits” (Wood & Bohte, 2004).  The enacting 
coalition will put ex post and/or ex ante controls on agency design (and policies for that 
matter) to control against future coalitional changes (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; 
McCubbins et al., 1989; Wood & Bohte, 2004).  For example, a primary goal of the state 
of Washington in creating a comprehensive agency in 1970 was to reduce the power of 
the existing independent water and air quality boards whose appointees were not under 
the control of the governor (Haskell & Price, 1973).  Agencies are ultimately designed by 
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the winners who are concerned about creating an effective organization, but also 
protecting that organization from an uncertain future (Moe, 1990b).   
 
Administrative Motivations 
As stated earlier, state adoption of comprehensive environmental protection 
agencies was often part of larger state reorganizations.  Even if the creation of the new 
agency was a single agency-focused reorganization, both processes are influenced by 
similar administrative motivations.  According to Mosher (1967),  reorganization can be 
motivated by a poor fit between administrative values and actual organizational 
structure, a changing belief as to the proper role of government in the policy area, and/or 
changes in organizational programs and tensions about organizational purpose.  
According to contingency theory, organizations are in a constant process of adjusting to 
changes in the organizational environment, such as the increase in state responsibility for 
environmental regulation (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  The sheer size of environmental 
programs and responsibilities that state governments assumed during the 1960s and 
1970s required many states to reorganize to increase their institutional capacity to 
implement these programs (Beyle, 1975).   As states assumed more responsibility for 
environmental regulation, the lack of fit between environmental regulation and public 
health became more obvious.   At the same time the federal government was passing 
environmental legislation, it also created the Medicare and Medicaid programs which also 
placed a new and large administrative responsibility on states.  The focus of health 
departments became divided between public health and healthcare management 
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(Gordon, 1998; Kotchian, 1997).   Many states began combining departments of health 
with departments of public welfare to manage Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, social 
security, senior programs, and other welfare programs from one agency. 
Institutional theory proposes that organizations facing the same environmental 
conditions will resemble one another through coercive isomorphism (in terms of public 
organizations this could be regulatory pressure) and mimetic and/or normative 
isomorphism (state-to-state).  Mimetic isomorphism results from similar responses by 
organizations to similar levels of uncertainty (technical, environmental).  States often 
have to develop agency structures in response to uncertain and changing information.  
The level of uncertainty associated with both environmental regulation and healthcare 
regulation during the 1970s was very high.  States were still gathering information about 
the complexity and nature of environmental pollution problems and the best regulatory 
solutions to those problems.  Mimetic isomorphism describes a process by which 
organizations begin to resemble each other as they respond to uncertainty (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  In addition, states interact through professional organizations, chief 
executive organizations, such as the National Governors Association, and through border-
related environmental issues and could therefore begin to adopt similar structures 
through normative isomorphism.  Beyle (1975) identified by region leader states, which 
were the first states to adopt a Comprehensive Structure that influenced other states. 
Many later adopters in those regions adopted similar structures (Mini-EPA or 
superagencies).  According to the theory, organizations will imitate organizations that 
share similar traits and/or those that have had positive outcomes.    
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Organizations also develop in response to formal and informal pressures (coercive 
isomorphism) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  States developed their environmental and 
health agency structures in response to increasing federal control and mandates.   
Formally, states must receive approval from the USEPA to assume primacy for 
implementation and enforcement of federal environmental mandates.  Informally, states 
function within a regional USEPA system where they interact regularly with their regional 
USEPA office.   It seems likely that this relationship between the USEPA and state 
environmental agencies would influence states choice to adopt the Mini-EPA structure. 
 
Socioeconomic Factors  
Organizations are affected by the broader socioeconomic processes outside the 
organization itself (Hannan & Freeman, 1986).  Socioeconomic characteristics of a state 
indirectly affect agency design by constraining and enhancing state administrative and 
political motivations. Wealthier states have greater resources available to support 
smaller, more focused agencies that poorer states may not be able to afford.  Urban, 
wealthier states tend to be more liberal and supportive of environmental regulation.   
 
Policy Problem 
Generally, the environmental literature has found a fit between environmental 
policies and environmental pollution issues facing the state (Blomquist, 1991; Lowry, 
1992).  The same fit should exist in terms of a state’s choice to create a comprehensive 
environmental protection agency.  States that adopt environmental policies are 
responding to a need within the state.  States with higher levels of groundwater 
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contamination are more likely to adopt groundwater regulations (Blomquist, 1991).  
States that face more severe environmental pollution issues should be more likely to 
adopt a comprehensive environmental protection agency to address those issues.   
The fit can also be defined as a resource to protect.  For example, states that rely 
more heavily on groundwater for their water supply are more likely to adopt groundwater 
regulations (Blomquist, 1991).  States with higher levels of agricultural land are more 
likely to adopt innovative NPS programs (Lowry, 1992).  States that have greater amounts 
of natural resources may be more likely to adopt a Super-Agency structure than those 
with less. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: WHERE INSTITUTIONS COME FROM: PART 1 
States made a conscious decision to move their environmental regulation 
functions out of health departments and/or independent boards into either a Mini-EPA 
or Super-Agency structure between 1967 and 2000 (Comprehensive Structure). A few 
states adopted this Comprehensive Structure prior to the environmental movement of 
the 1970s, while the majority of states adopted the structure during the 1970s.  Since the 
1970s, 15 states have moved their environmental regulation programs from the state 
health department into either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure.  Generally, once a 
state adopts a Super-Agency or Mini-EPA structure, they retain that structure over time 
although the individual divisions within the agency may change.  However, a few states 
have changed their structure over time.  For example, Mississippi originally created a 
Super-Agency in 1978, which was separated into a Mini-EPA and natural resource agency 
in 1989.  Michigan has moved between a Mini-EPA and Super-Agency structure five times 
since the first creation in 1963.  Figure 5 below shows the decade that each state moved 
its environmental protection functions into a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure. 
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Figure 5: State Adoption of Comprehensive Environmental Regulation Structure  
 
 
States are driven by two major influences to centralize the pollution control 
system. Starting in 1970, political pressure to develop more effective pollution control 
systems to address the complex pollution issues facing states increased dramatically. The 
majority of states (29) adopted a comprehensive environmental agency structure 
between 1967 and 1975, when the federal government passed a series of environmental 
laws and public support for pollution regulations increased dramatically.  Starting in 1965, 
political pressure to improve the professionalism and efficiency of state government also 
drove 26 states to significantly reorganize and consolidate their executive branch 
agencies (1965-1995).  Almost one-third of states that adopted a Comprehensive 
Structure between 1967 and 1975 adopted the structure through a comprehensive 
executive branch reorganization.  Additionally, another 10 states that underwent a 
comprehensive executive branch reorganization later adopted a Comprehensive 
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Structure (two of the five states that still house pollution prevention in the health 
department also underwent a comprehensive executive branch reorganization).  
However, most states that have adopted this structure have not done so as part of a larger 
state restructuring. 
The goal of this chapter is evaluate both of these major drivers, in addition to other 
characteristics of states, to determine what factors drove states to consolidate their 
pollution control functions into a comprehensive agency.  My analysis will draw on theory 
described in the previous chapter and build on the existing literature on state 
environmental and health organizational structure (Beyle, 1975; Burke, Shalauta, Tran, & 
Stern, 1997; Claveria & Kaito, 1985; Haskell & Price, 1973; Kotchian, 1997; Shepherd et 
al., 1999; Sinclair & Whitford, 2012).  These previous analyses are mostly descriptive in 
nature and do not provide a comprehensive analysis of state adoption of environmental 
agency structure over the 34 years that states have reorganized their pollution control 
function.  Beyle (1975) evaluates survey data about states that consolidated their 
programs between 1967 and 1974.   Haskell and Price (1973) rely on detailed case studies 
to describe the process six states underwent to consolidate their pollution control 
programs.    Two of the studies are descriptions of agency functions and structures (Burke 
et al., 1997; Jessup, 1988, 1990, 1994).  Two studies were conducted for individual states 
to evaluate the feasibility of moving environmental functions from the Health 
Department to a Comprehensive Structure (Claveria & Kaito, 1985; Shepherd et al., 1999).  
The most recent study, (Sinclair & Whitford, 2012) estimates state health and 
environmental agency structures based on 1965 data using MLN models. 
48 
 
Model 
The goal of this event history analysis is to determine what factors influence a 
state adoption of a comprehensive environmental agency structure between 1967 and 
2000. The empirical model is based on the model of Organizational Type Adoption 
described in the previous chapter and includes 49 states and 34 years.4   
 
P(adopt) = f(POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, SOCIOECONOMIC, POLICY PROBLEM,) 
 
State adoption of a Comprehensive Structure should be driven by political factors, 
including political control, political uncertainty, and political preferences; internal and 
external administrative pressures, the socioeconomic characteristics of a state, and the 
pollution problems faced by the state.  Figure 6 below shows state adoption of a 
Comprehensive Structure over time. 
 
                                                          
4 Nebraska is excluded from analysis because it has a unicameral legislature and so does not have turnover 
or unified government data. 
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Figure 6: State Adoption of Comprehensive Structure 
 
 
There was an initial burst of state adoptions between 1967 and 1975.  From 1975 to 2000, 
states adopted the Comprehensive Structure at a slower pace.  The majority of states had 
adopted a Comprehensive Structure by 1975. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, or risk set, is the probability that a state i will adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure in a given year t or not.  Once a state adopts the Comprehensive 
Structure, it is dropped out of the risk set.5  The adoption data was compiled from a 
number of sources, including reviewing states websites, documents, and archives (Haskell 
                                                          
5 Two states adopted Comprehensive Structure and then returned pollution control functions back to 
the department of health.  South Carolina adopted a Mini-EPA structure from 1971-1973, but 
returned functions to the Department of Health.  New Mexico adopted a Mini-EPA structure in 1970, 
but returned pollution functions to the Department of Health in 1977.  In 1991, New Mexico then 
readopted a Mini-EPA Structure.  In the model, these states are dropped out of the model after their 
initial adoption.  
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& Price, 1973; Hunter & Waterman, 1996; Jessup, 1988, 1990, 1994; Reenock & Poggione, 
2004; Ringquist, 1993) (See Appendix E for list of sources used to develop adoption data). 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables in the model measure political motivations, 
administrative motivations, socioeconomic characteristics, and policy problem measures.  
Summary statistics for each variable are listed in Table 2.  The following section describes 
these variables in more detail. 
 
Political Motivations 
Political motivation variables evaluate the effect of the political entrepreneur in 
both the executive and legislative branch on state adoption of a Comprehensive 
Structure.  Both branches of the state government play an important role in designing 
state agencies and so the model includes measurements of both as it pertains to 
measuring levels of political uncertainty during this time period.  Governors and 
legislators are influenced by political support from competing interests impacted by 
pollution control policies and both strive to maintain political control.  Finally, each policy 
maker has their own political motivations and ideologies that drive their choices.   
 
Political Uncertainty 
The theoretical literature proposes that politicians respond to the level of political 
uncertainty in the current government and controlling for future uncertainty (Moe, 
1990b).  Politicians are less likely to adopt significant policies when the level of 
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uncertainty is high.  States in which the executive and legislative branches are controlled 
by the same political party are more likely to undergo an executive branch reorganization 
(Garnett, 1980).  Executive-legislative conflict (Unified Government) measures whether 
the governor and the legislative bodies are under control of different parties (0), or same 
party (1).  The level of uncertainty is reduced when there is lower executive-legislative 
conflict and preference alignment (Volden, 2002; Wood & Bohte, 2004).  States with a 
unified government will be more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  In addition, 
higher turnover of individual members of the legislature can also increase the level of 
uncertainty. Legislative Turnover measures the percent of the legislature that changes 
over time.  States with high membership turnover will be less likely to adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure. 
 
Political Control 
Designing a state agency structure involves strategic decisions by the controlling 
coalition to maximize control over policy outcomes.  More professional legislatures are 
less likely to impose ex post controls on an agency (Reenock & Poggione, 2004).  In 
addition, legislators are more likely to delegate more authority to the executive branch 
when they have confidence in the capacity of the agency (Krause & Woods, 2014).  During 
the time period of this study, the power and professionalism of the governor and 
legislature increased.  Governors in 26 states gained the power to reorganize executive 
branch agencies through an executive order (see Appendix D for list of states).  The 
strength of the governor’s office (Governor Power) is an institutional score of governor’s 
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overall power.  States with more powerful governors, will be more likely to adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure.  This measure includes an average of scores for tenure 
potential, appointment powers, budgetary power, and veto power.  Legislative 
professionalism is measured by the Squire Index, which includes three variables: legislator 
pay, staff per legislator, and total days in session.  States with more professional 
legislatures will be more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  
 
Political Pressure  
Politicians are ultimately motivated by reelection and will respond to both the 
interests that supported them and the constituencies that elected them.  Political 
pressure is measured as the percentage of gross state product (GSP) of three relevant 
interests: manufacturing, mining, and agriculture (Manufacturing GDP, Mining GDP, and 
Agriculture GDP).   These three interests are directly affected by pollution control 
legislation.  It is unclear what effect groups representing these interests will have on 
consolidation of pollution functions.  Industry groups tend to favor more uniform 
legislation (often pushing for federal control to unify across states).  However, 
consolidating functions into a single agency could increase the strength of pollution 
control regulations.   In addition, the model includes a measure of Environmental Group 
Strength as the number of members of the Sierra Club per 1000 people in a state.  
Environmental group membership and influence increased significantly during this time 
period.   The model also includes a dichotomous variable that indicates data that was 
obtained directly (electronically) from the Sierra Club (Personal Communication Sierra 
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Club information@sierraclub.org May, 5, 2015).  The Sierra Club data before 1982 was 
extrapolated from membership data retrieved from the Colby Library at University of 
California – Berkley, which houses the Sierra Club files.  The membership data was listed 
by club name (which initially included many states).  I assigned membership to each state 
based on the overall proportion by state in the data from 1982-2012 provided by the 
Sierra Club electronically.    
Constituency pressure is measured using a Citizen Ideology index. This index 
ranges on a scale from zero to 100 with the higher scores indicating a more liberal 
citizenry (W. D. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998).  Sinclair and Whitford (2012) 
found that more liberal states were more likely to adopt separate agencies for 
environmental protection and health.  It is expected that more liberal states would prefer 
a consolidated pollution agency. 
 
Politicians’ Preference 
Finally, politicians also have their own ideology and political preferences, which 
influence their choices.  Political preferences is measured by the Berry et al (1998) 
Government Ideology index.  Similarly to the citizen ideology index, this index ranges on 
a scale from zero to 100 with higher scores indicating a more liberal legislative and 
executive branch (W. D. Berry et al., 1998).   As with the Citizen Ideology, it is expected 
that states with a more liberal government will prefer adoption of a comprehensive 
agency. 
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Administrative Motivations 
Politicians are also influenced by both internal and external administrative 
concerns in designing state agencies.   Organizations are in a constant process of adjusting 
to changes in the organizational environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).   The 
organizational environment for pollution control and public health/healthcare has 
changed drastically over the past 60 years.  States have responded to internal 
administrative pressures, but also states often respond to choices neighboring or similar 
states have made.  In a report analyzing whether the state of Kansas should move their 
pollution control functions out of the health department, Shepherd et al. (1999) described 
five states of similar environmental and agricultural issues to help in the decision-making 
process.   
 
Internal Administrative 
Based on his survey data, Beyle (1975) found that states adopted a comprehensive 
agency structure partly in response to the increased state administrative and regulatory 
responsibilities for states in terms of pollution control.  Between 1970 and 1980, the 
federal government passed nine major environmental laws that instituted major 
regulatory responsibilities on states.  During this same time period 26 states 
comprehensively reorganized the executive branch. A dichotomous variable (Executive 
Reorganization) is included in the model to measure whether a state created the 
comprehensive environmental agency structure as part of an overall state restructuring 
event (1) or as an incremental environmentally-specific organization (0).  States that have 
undergone an executive reorganization will be more likely to adopt a Comprehensive 
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Structure.   Many states reorganized individual agencies or functions over this same time 
period in response to changing demands and financial constraints.  A measure of the 
Fiscal Health of a state is include as measured by the annual difference  (measured in 
$100,000) between total expenditures and total revenues (Wang et al., 2007).   States 
may be more likely to consolidate functions and reduce the size of the bureaucracy as a 
way to save money if they are under fiscal stress.  States with better fiscal health may be 
more likely to adopt a comprehensive structure as a way to maintain that fiscal health as 
well.  Thus, it is unclear what the effect of fiscal health will be on a state’s adoption of a 
Comprehensive Structure.  
As states were restructuring their pollution control functions, they were also 
restructuring their health departments into either independent public health 
departments or health superagencies that included public health, welfare, and healthcare 
management.  The focus of public health has changed drastically with the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid (Gordon, 1998). States assumed the regulatory responsibility to 
manage these programs.  While environmental health was initially a primary focus of 
state health departments, over time managing of healthcare began to divide the focus of 
health departments (Kotchian, 1997).  States either created independent agencies for 
public health, welfare, and healthcare or created a health super-agency to manage both 
health and welfare.  State creation of a Health Superagency should increase the likelihood 
that a state would move pollution control functions out of the Health Department.   This 
is a dichotomous variable measuring whether a state has a Health Superagency (1) or 
not (0).   
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External Administrative6 
In addition, there was regulatory pressure from the federal government to 
implement environmental regulations that could have contributed to states reorganizing 
their environmental regulation functions (Beyle, 1975; Mosher, 1967). The majority of the 
28 states that adopted a Comprehensive Structure between 1967 and 1975 adopted the 
structure following the creation of the USEPA.  In the American federal system, states face 
both horizontal and vertical influences in their policy and structural choices.  The model 
measures the percentage of a state’s contiguous neighbors that have adopted a 
Comprehensive Structure to measure horizontal influences (Neighbor Adoption).  The 
federal government has a huge influence on state environmental policy and would likely 
influence state adoption of a comprehensive environmental agency.  Federal influence is 
measured by the federal share of overall state revenue measured as a percentage 
(Federal Revenue).   Measuring federal influence is difficult because of availability of data.7 
 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors 
Socioeconomic and demographic factors can have an indirect influence on state 
agency design by providing constraints and resources to the state.  The state policy 
diffusion literature has found that socioeconomic factors can influence the ideology and 
policy priorities of a state, including adoption of environmental policies (A. Bacot & 
                                                          
6 External administrative pressures are vertical and horizontal administrative pressure, due to mimetic and 
normative isomorphism.  These pressures are traditionally considered political pressures in policy adoption 
models.  I include them here to be consistent with organizational literature – in describing how 
organizations respond to other organizations in the same organizational field.  
7 An earlier version of the model included a measure of EPA Region to capture USEPA influence on state 
structure.  However, this measure was not statistically significant and a little skewed in that some regions 
only included 2 states, while others included more than five states.  
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Dawes, 1996; A. H. Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Bromley-Trujillo, 2012; E. Ringquist, 1993).   
Beyle (1975) found that urban (Urbanization) and wealthier states (Per Capita Income in 
thousands) were more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  Many initial state 
pollution control regulations originated as a response to urban smoke and sewage, so 
likely more urban states.  Sinclair and Whitford (2012) found that states with larger 
populations (Population in millions) and larger physical size (Land Area in thousand square 
miles) were more likely to adopt separate health and environmental agencies.  Larger and 
wealthier states likely have more resources available to develop more independent 
agencies.  The wealth of a state might also indirectly influence adoption of a 
Comprehensive Structure as poorer states might increase the level of Medicaid recipients 
and more demand for a separate health agency. 8 
 
Policy Problem 
Ideally, the model would include a measure of environmental quality or pollution 
severity.  Unfortunately, no consistent and reliable measure exists for the time period of 
the data.  I have included a measure of the total vehicle miles (in thousands) driven per 
capita per state as a proxy measurement of air pollution (Vehicle Miles).  
In addition, the model includes measures of natural resources within a state and 
consumption of those resources to try to capture the policy problem within a state.  The 
following resource variables are included in the model: Water area of each state 
                                                          
8 In 2016, 11 states housed Medicaid/Medicare in a Health Superagency (Health and Welfare), seven states 
housed them within the Health Department, 13 were within a Department of Human Services, and 19 had 
stand-alone agencies. However, these structures have evolved over time and initially many states housed 
Medicaid/Medicare in the Department of Health.   
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measures the percentage of a state that is covered with surface water.  The model also 
includes a measure of Surface Water Usage and Groundwater Usage, both in billion 
gallons per day, to capture resource demand of states.  It is assumed that states that use 
more water will also be more likely to adopt a comprehensive agency structure. 
Table 2 below lists the summary statistics for the explanatory variables and the 
expected influence on state adoption of a Comprehensive Structure.  The dataset includes 
49 states and 34 years of data. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for Comprehensive Structure  
Variable 
Expected 
Direction Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Political Motivations      
Political Control Variables      
Governor power (+) 3.609 0.700 1.800 5.000 
Legislative professionalism (+) 20.878 12.002 3.400 65.900 
      
Political Uncertainty Variables      
Unified Government (+) 0.480 0.500 0 1 
Legislative Turnover (-) 0.178 0.272 0 2.183 
      
Political Pressure Variables      
Manufacturing (%) (+/-) 19.179 8.554 1.957 44.772 
Mining (%) (+/-) 3.607 7.109 0 49.656 
Agriculture (%) (+/-) 3.232 3.722 0.151 37.193 
Sierra Club Members (#/100 
pop) 
(+) 1.070 1.022 0 8.110 
Sierra Club Dummy  0.559 0.497 0 1 
Citizen ideology (+) 46.681 16.156 4.261 93.912 
      
Political Preference Variable      
Government ideology (+) 48.501 23.095 0 97.917 
Administrative Motivations      
Internal Administrative Variables      
Fiscal Health ($) (+/-) 0.953 2.041 -1.614 24.655 
Executive Reorganization (+) 0.043 0.202 0 1 
Health Superagency (+) 0.356 0.479 0 1 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for Comprehensive Structure (continued) 
Variable Expected 
Direction 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
External Administrative 
Variables 
     
Adoption by Neighbors (%) (+) 0.594 0.347 0 1 
Federal Revenue (%) (+) 0.225 0.051 0.062 0.567 
      
Socioeconomic Variables      
Urbanization (%) (+) 0.679 0.146 0.321 0.944 
Per capita income (thousands) (+) 13.587 8.154 2.052 42.198 
Population (millions) (+) 4.760 5.090 0.278 33.988 
Size of a state (square miles) (+) 71.831 91.720 1.212 656.424 
Policy Problem Variables      
Vehicle Miles Per Capita (in 
1000s) 
(+) 7.854 1.965 3.063 16.730 
Resource Variables      
Water area (%) (+) 0.054 0.078 0 0.719 
      
Resource Demand      
Surface water usage (mgd) (+) 6.406 6.089 0.069 35.777 
Groundwater usage (mgd) (+) 1.501 2.850 0.024 21.000 
 
Results 
Table 3 below includes the results of the event history model.  As the results show, 
state adoption of a comprehensive model is driven by political motivations, 
administrative motivations, socioeconomic conditions, and the policy problem. 
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Table 3: Effect of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy Problem Variables 
on Adoption of Comprehensive Agency Structure (Event History Model Hazard Ratios 
and Standard Errors)9 
 Model 
Specific Measure Hazard Ratio Standard Error 
Political Motivations    
Political Control Variables    
Governor power -0.810  0.277 
Legislative professionalism 1.027  0.029 
    
Political Uncertainty Variables    
Legislative Turnover -0.177 * 0.164 
Unified Government 3.274 *** 1.325 
    
Political Pressure Variables    
Manufacturing (% GDP)  1.094 *** 0.037 
Mining (% GDP) -0.958  0.049 
Agriculture (% GDP) 1.085  0.058 
Citizen ideology 1.024  0.017 
Sierra Club Membership (per 1000 residents) 1.692  0.602 
Sierra Club Dummy -0.909  0.685 
    
Political Preference Variables    
Government Ideology -0.990  0.010 
Administrative Motivations    
Internal Administrative Variables    
Fiscal Health (per $100,000) -0.711  0.244 
Comprehensive State Restructuring 5.123 *** 2.281 
Health Superagency 2.330 * 1.022 
    
External Administrative Variables    
Adoption by Neighbors (%) -0.628  0.516 
Federal Revenue Share -0.986  0.043 
Socioeconomic Motivations    
Urban Percentage (%) -0.983  1.809 
Per Capita Income ($) -0.896  0.080 
Population 1.258 ** 0.114 
Area of a State (sq miles) 1.008 *** 0.003 
    
 
  
                                                          
9 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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Table 3: Effect of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy Problem 
Variables on Adoption of Comprehensive Agency Structure (Event History Model 
Hazard Ratios and Standard Errors) (continued) 
 Model 
Specific Measure Hazard Ratio Standard Error 
Policy Problem    
Vehicle Miles Driven 1.153  0.240 
    
Resource Variables    
Water Area -0.249  0.598 
    
Resource Demand Variables    
Groundwater usage -0.695 *** 0.084 
Surface water usage -0.933  0.054 
    
Constant -0.0000 *** 0.00008 
    
p (time dependence in the Weibull distribution) 2.547   
    
Wald Χ2 (24) 78.62   
Prob > Χ2  <0.001   
Log Likelihood -31.374   
 
The model overall is statistically significant (Wald Χ2 (24) =78.62, ρ<0.0001).  The 
estimated Weibull shape parameter, p, shows an increasing hazard over time (ρ=2.547), 
which is statistically significant (ρ<0.001).  Variables within almost all categories are 
statistically significant supporting the Model of Agency Design.   Table 4 shows the 
marginal effects of the explanatory variables to help facilitate comparison of effects.  
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy 
Problem Variables with Respect to Estimated Average Duration until Adoption of a 
Comprehensive Structure10 
 Model  
Specific Measure dydx  Standard Error z 
Political Motivations     
Political Control Variables     
Governor power 1.508  2.505 0.600 
Legislative professionalism -0.193  0.210 -0.920 
     
Political Uncertainty Variables     
Legislative Turnover 12.398 * 7.527 1.650 
Unified Government -8.492 ** 3.667 -2.320 
     
Political Pressure Variables     
Manufacturing (% GDP)  -0.643 ** 0.271 -2.380 
Mining (% GDP) 0.304  0.372 0.820 
Agriculture (% GDP) -0.584  0.381 -1.530 
Citizen ideology -3.767  2.856 -1.320 
Sierra Club Membership (per 1000 
residents) 0.686 
 
5.368 0.130 
Sierra Club Dummy -0.173  0.117 -1.470 
     
Political Preference Variables     
Government Ideology 0.074  0.069 1.070 
Administrative Motivations     
Internal Administrative Variables     
Fiscal Health (per $100,000) 2.437  2.577 0.950 
Comprehensive State Restructuring -11.698 *** 4.721 -2.480 
Health Superagency -6.057 * 3.461 -1.750 
     
External Administrative Variables     
Adoption by Neighbors (%) 3.335  5.413 0.620 
Federal Revenue Share 0.098  0.309 0.320 
Socioeconomic Motivations     
Urban Percentage (%) 0.119  13.171 0.010 
Per Capita Income ($) 0.787  0.636 1.240 
Population -1.644 ** 0.765 -2.150 
Area of a State (sq miles) -0.057 ** 0.024 -2.420 
     
 
                                                          
10 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy 
Problem Variables with Respect to Estimated Average Duration until Adoption of a 
Comprehensive Structure (continued) 
 Model  
Specific Measure dydx  Standard Error z 
Policy Problem     
Vehicle Miles Driven -1.022  1.611 -0.630 
     
Resource Variables     
Water Area 9.952  17.253 0.580 
     
Resource Demand Variables     
Groundwater usage 2.607 ** 1.184 2.200 
Surface water usage 0.493  0.428 1.150 
 
The marginal effects show the increased probability of a state adopting a 
Comprehensive Structure, at the means of all other explanatory variables.   For example, 
the probability of a state adopting a Comprehensive Structure is 11.698 greater for a state 
that has undergone an executive branch comprehensive restructuring process.  
The Political Motivation variables that are statistically significant include: unified 
government, legislative turnover, and manufacturing interests.  States with a unified 
government and higher dependence on manufacturing and agriculture are more likely to 
adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  States with a high legislative turnover are less likely to 
adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  The Administrative Motivations variables that are 
statistically significant include: comprehensive restructuring and Health Superagency.  
States that have undergone a comprehensive restructuring and have a Health 
Superagency (including welfare) are more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  The 
percentage of contiguous neighbors with a comprehensive structure was not a 
statistically significant factor in state adoption, nor was federal share of revenue.  The 
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socioeconomic variables that were statistically significant were population and size of 
state.  Larger states with larger population were more likely to adopt.  Finally, of the 
variables measuring the magnitude of the policy problem, only groundwater was 
statistically significant.  States with a higher reliance on groundwater are less likely to 
adopt a Comprehensive Structure.   
 
Discussion 
In general, the results support the model of state agency design described above.  
This section includes a general discussion of the results, while highlighting areas where 
the model could be improved.  The choice to adopt a Comprehensive Structure is driven 
by both administrative and political motivations.  Internal motivations and factors exert a 
greater influence on state adoption of a Comprehensive Structure than external 
pressures.  A state’s socioeconomic characteristics also affected state choices to adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure. 
 
Political Motivations 
Of the political motivation variables, the political uncertainty and political 
pressure variables have statistically significant influence on state adoption.  The political 
preference variable of government ideology was not statistically significant.  A measure 
of this variable that is focused more on political preferences for environmental regulation, 
such as the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) Scorecard rating, might better capture 
this variable.  Overall, however, the analysis supports the theoretical literature that 
agency design is a heavily political process.    
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States with high levels of political uncertainty, those without a unified government 
and with high legislative turnover, are less likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.  
This result is in the expected direction, supporting the conclusion that it is easier to pass 
major restructuring legislation with a unified government.  What is more interesting is 
that states with a higher percentage of GDP from manufacturing are more likely to adopt 
a Comprehensive Structure.  This data could be capturing more of a response to policy 
problem than political pressure.   Another possibility is that manufacturers benefit from 
a more comprehensive and consolidated pollution control program.   Literature has found 
that industry interests tend to support federal control of regulatory programs because it 
provides consistency across states.  This concept could be at work here, in that industry 
prefers to have one agency to regulate pollution, rather than multiple agencies. 
 
Administrative Motivations 
Looking at internal administrative motivations, the financial health of a state did 
not statistically significantly influence whether a state adopts a Comprehensive Structure.  
However, as predicted, whether a state had undergone an executive branch 
reorganization did influence state adoption of a Comprehensive Structure.  States that 
have undergone an overall state restructuring, are more likely to adopt a Comprehensive 
Structure than states that have not reorganized their government.  States that adopted a 
Health Superagency (including welfare) are also more likely adopt a Comprehensive 
Structure.   
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States were not influenced by external administrative motivations to adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure.  Neither the measure of neighbor adoption nor the federal 
revenue share was significant. It is surprising that none of the external administrative 
measures were statistically significant; however, perhaps the measures used are not the 
best measures of federal influence or neighbor influence in a state.   
 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors 
The socioeconomic or demographic factors that were statistically significant in 
adoption were size and population of a state.  The first pollution control laws at the state 
and local level were in response to problems in urban areas, so it is surprising that the 
level of urbanization did not have a statistically significant effect on adoption.    In Beyle’s 
model, these factors are indirect effects, so it is likely that the effects of these 
characteristics are captured through more direct measures in the model. 
 
Policy Problem 
As discussed above, a policy problem can be defined by environmental quality and 
as a resource to protect.  The model does not include a measure of environmental quality 
because such a measure does not exist for the entire time period of the analysis.  The 
measure we included in the model to try to capture environmental quality, Vehicle Miles 
Driven, was not statistically significant.  However, there are a few measures of resources 
that had a statistically significant influence on state adoption of a Comprehensive 
Structure including groundwater and surface water withdrawal.   States with a higher 
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reliance on groundwater are less likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.   Western 
states are more reliant on groundwater than eastern states.   
 
Conclusion 
What influences state adoption of a comprehensive environmental agency 
structure?  The analysis in this chapter tells us that a little bit of everything affects state 
adoption.  While political motivations do influence the choice of structure, overall 
administrative drivers also affect that choice.  The analysis supports the adapted model 
of state organizational type – that administrative, political, socioeconomic, and policy 
problem all influence the selection of agency structure. States were driven by three major 
influences toward a comprehensive environmental agency: (1) political pressure to 
develop more effective pollution control systems to address the complex pollution issues 
facing states; (3) administrative pressure to manage the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, and (2) political pressure to improve the professionalism and efficiency of state 
government.  While state environmental agency design is not a strictly apolitical process 
as early  rational organizational theorists supported (Gulick, 1937; Taylor, 1911; Weber, 
1922), it is not a strictly political process either.  In addition, as organizational theorists 
propose, state agencies are responding to their organizational environment.  This section 
highlights a few key points from the analysis, highlights areas where the model could be 
improved, and future research to build on the analysis in this paper.  
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Comprehensive Reorganization 
States that have undergone a comprehensive reorganization are 85 percent more 
likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure than those states that have not.  Clearly, the 
choice to consolidate environmental programs is being made in the larger context in state 
government organization overall.   Choices made in other areas of government can affect 
pollution control.  The overwhelming influence of comprehensive reorganization could 
help explain why the ideology variables were not statistically significant. 
 
Interest Pressure 
Surprisingly, states with a higher dependence on agriculture and manufacturing 
were more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure.   These are two industries that 
would be most affected by enhanced pollution control regulations and enforcement that 
could accompany a consolidated regulatory agency.   It could be that interests’ preference 
for a consistent and central regulatory authority rather than multiple regulatory agencies 
overpowers their desire to minimize regulations. An alternative explanation is that the 
size of the interest in a state indicates the magnitude of the environmental pollution 
problem in a state. 
 
Improvements to Analysis 
The empirical analysis could be enhanced with additional or alternative variable 
measures and addressing limitations to the current model 
 Administrative Response to Federal Regulation:  Currently, the model does not 
have a measure that captures the increased responsibilities placed on states 
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between 1967 and 2000.  Over 20 federal laws were passed with additional 
amendments requiring compliance from states.  
 Environmental Quality: Not having any consistent measure of environmental 
quality makes it difficult to assess to what extent the severity or nature of the 
pollution problem affect state adoption of agency structure.   
 Environmental Group Pressure: Presumably, one of the main drivers of state 
centralizing their pollution functions and adopting a Comprehensive Structure of 
any type was political pressure from environmental groups.  I include a measure 
of Sierra Club membership per state, but the literature suggests this may not be 
the most valid measure of environmental group membership (Andrews, 1998; 
Bosso, 2003; Wikle, 1995).  A measure that includes membership of a number of 
environmental groups would be more robust, as would other measures of 
mobilization. 
 Influence of other states: Beyle (1975) found in his analysis that states were 
influenced by their neighbors.  In a study for the State of Kansas about whether 
to move pollution programs out of the state health department, Shepherd et al. 
(1999), described the agency structures other states with similar populations, 
economies, and levels of urbanization had adopted.  In the mid-1980s, the State 
of Hawaii looked at what other structures other states adopted to determine 
whether to move their pollution programs out of the Department of Health 
(Claveria & Kaito, 1985)  A better measure of the influence of other states on a 
70 
 
state agency design could be found using a dyad analysis (comparing each state 
to each state).  
 Board/Commission:  As discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, 34 states still 
have a board that serves either in a regulator or an advisory role. Initially, the 
majority of states had either independent pollution control boards or these 
boards were connected to the department of health.  The model could be 
enhanced by an inclusion of these boards, and even might help explain the 
influence of the citizen ideology variable. 
 Exceptions to the model: One of the main limitations of the model is that it does 
not capture the changing structures within two states (South Carolina and New 
Mexico).  While these two states should not substantially change the results, the 
fact that their changes between a Comprehensive Structure and health are not 
captured means the model is not complete 
Adding these measures to the model could provide a clearer picture of what has 
influenced state adoption of environmental agency structures.   
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: WHERE INSTITUTIONS COME FROM: PART 2 
Just as states made a conscious decision to move their environmental regulation 
functions out of health departments or stand along boards into a Comprehensive 
Structure over the past 50 years, they have also chosen the type of comprehensive agency 
to house the environmental protection functions.  The primary two Comprehensive 
Structures used by states are:  (1) Mini-EPA and (2) Super-Agency.  The environmental 
and health literature have depended on this basic typology, shown by state in Figure 7 
below noting those states that changed their type of Comprehensive Structure (Beyle, 
1975; Jessup, 1988; Kotchian, 1997; Ringquist, 1993; Shepherd et al., 1999; Sinclair & 
Whitford, 2012) 
 
Figure 7: State Environmental Protection Agency Structures 
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Typology 
Today, the majority of states have moved their environmental protection divisions 
into either a stand-alone Mini-EPA organization or within a larger Super-Agency.  Most 
states have adopted a structure for the pollution control agencies and not changed that 
structure over time.  However, there are a few exceptions.  Figure 7 above shows those 
states that have adopted more than one structure since 1967.  Five states initially adopted 
a Super-Agency structure, but later adopted a Mini-EPA structure (Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).  Michigan has reorganized its 
environmental agencies multiple times since it first adopted a Super-Agency structure in 
1973.  It has fluctuated between a Mini-EPA structure (1995-2009, 2011-current) and a 
Super-Agency structure (1975-1995, 2009-2011).  North Carolina, New Mexico, and South 
Carolina have fluctuated between a Comprehensive Structure and a health department.  
Kentucky, Nevada, and South Dakota initially adopted a Mini-EPA structure and then 
changed to a Super-Agency.  Each of the three structures to house pollution control 
functions has strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Mini-EPA 
Mini-EPA agencies are generally called “Department of Environmental Quality” or 
“Department of Environmental Protection.”  Proponents of this structure argue that a 
state agency that is structured similarly to the federal agency facilitates state-federal 
coordination.  In addition, having a smaller, more focused agency allows that agency to 
address the relevant issues without competing with other divisions.  A Mini-EPA structure 
allows for a clearly-defined mission as a purely regulatory agency.   However, separating 
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pollution control from other environmentally-focused agencies can hinder integration 
and coordination with those agencies.  States with a Mini-EPA structure may not be able 
to successfully implement ecosystem management programs.  Environmental quality 
outcomes could be affected if one agency is managing water development and another is 
trying to regulate water pollution control, for example. Since the mid-1980s, most states 
have adopted the Mini-EPA structure. Currently, 27 states use this structure.   
 
Super-Agency 
The Super-Agency structure is used by 18 states to combine environmental 
protection functions with other functions, such as natural resource management, 
agriculture, and/or energy.  These agencies house divisions with differing missions, which 
could either complement or compete, depending on the issue.  Proponents of this 
structure argue that it promotes integration and coordination for a more “ecological 
perspective” (Haskell & Price, 1973).   Opponents argue that housing pollution control 
functions into larger natural resource agencies could minimize the effectiveness of these 
programs.   The resource management (e.g., forestry, recreation, and mining) focus of the 
agency could take priority over pollution control.   
 
Health Department 
Only five states still house their environmental regulation functions in the 
Department of Health.  Proponents of this structure argue that there is an overlap in 
programs between public health and environmental regulation that support this 
structure.  “The public health model is critical to environmental issues because all 
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environmental issues are environmental health issues” (Shepherd et al., 1999, p. 27).  
Figure 8 shows that environmental health activities overlap both programs. 
 
Figure 8: Environmental Regulation: Public Health Overlap (Shepherd et al., 1999) 
 
Many health departments grew out of state sanitation departments that managed 
solid waste disposal within the state.  As population and urbanization levels increased, 
the responsibilities were expanded to include air and water quality.  “Historically, public 
health and its environmental component were inseparably interwoven” (Gordon, 1998, 
p. 32).  The fit seemed reasonable initially because public health departments had a 
monitoring and enforcement structure that could be useful to environmental regulations.  
However, state health departments shared responsibility for healthcare, disease 
prevention, and health promotion, which increasingly consumed the focus of state health 
departments.  Public health employees tended to be physicians, while environmental 
regulatory agencies relied on engineers (Beyle 1975).  
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Model 
Initially, states adopted the Super-Agency and Mini-EPA structure at similar rates. 
However, as is clear in Figure 9 below, over time, more states have adopted the Mini-EPA 
structure than the Super-Agency structure.  Between 1975 and 1985, more states used 
the Super-Agency structure, but since 1986, the majority of states now use a Mini-EPA 
structure.  
 
Figure 9: State Adoption of Super-Agency Structure vs. Mini-EPA Structure 
 
 
The empirical model is based on the model of Organizational Type Adoption described in 
the previous chapter and includes 49 states and 34 years.11   
P(adopt) = f(POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, SOCIOECONOMIC, POLICY PROBLEM) 
                                                          
11 Nebraska is excluded from analysis because it has a unicameral legislature and so does not have turnover 
or unified government data. 
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The analysis looks at state adoption of agency structure (Mini-EPA and Super-
Agency) from 1967 to 2000.  The analysis relies on two models, with two different 
dependent variables.  
 
Dependent Variables 
In Model 1, the dependent variable or risk set is the probability that a state i will 
adopt a Super-Agency structure in a given year t or not.  Once a state adopts the Super-
Agency structure, it is dropped out of the risk set.  The dependent variable in Model 2 is 
the probability that a state i will adopt a Mini-EPA structure in a given year t or not.  Once 
a state adopts the Mini-EPA structure, it is dropped out of the risk set.12 The adoption 
data was compiled from a number of sources, including reviewing states websites, 
documents, and archives (Haskell & Price, 1973; Hunter & Waterman, 1996; Jessup, 1988, 
1990, 1994; Reenock & Poggione, 2004; Ringquist, 1993). 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables in the model measure the same explanatory variables 
as the model described in Chapter 4: political motivations, administrative motivations, 
socioeconomic characteristics, and policy problem measures.  Summary statistics for each 
variable are listed in Table 4.  The following section describes how these explanatory 
variables will affect the adoption of either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure.  
 
                                                          
12 Model does not account for states that have changed their structure between a Mini-EPA and a 
Super-Agency structure over time.  Once a state adopts one structure it is dropped out of the risk set.  
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Political Motivations 
Similarly to the model in Chapter 4, political motivation variables evaluate the 
effect of the political entrepreneur in both the executive and legislative branch on state 
adoption of a specific structure: Super-Agency or Mini-EPA.  The level of political 
uncertainty, struggle for political control, strength of political pressure, and individual 
politician’s preferences should influence the design of pollution control agencies into a 
stand-alone regulatory agency (Mini-EPA) or a division within a larger natural resources 
or recreation agency (Super-Agency).   
 
Political Uncertainty 
Executive-legislative conflict (Unified Government) measures whether the 
governor and the legislative bodies are under control of different parties (0), or same 
party (1).   A unified government reduces political uncertainty.  States with a unified 
government were more likely to adopt a Comprehensive Structure in the previous 
analysis.  It seems logical then, that states with a unified government will also be more 
likely to adopt either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure.  However, many governors 
chose to adopt a Mini-EPA initially as a political statement (Beyle, 1975; Haskell & Price, 
1973).   I expect that states will be more likely to adopt a Mini-EPA structure than a Super-
Agency structure under a unified government.  In addition, higher turnover of individual 
members of the legislature can also increase the level of uncertainty. Legislative Turnover 
measures the percent of the legislature that changes over time.   
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Political Control 
The strength of the governor’s office (Governor Power) is an institutional score of 
governor’s overall power.  This measure includes an average of scores for tenure 
potential, appointment powers, budgetary power, and veto power.  Legislative 
professionalism is measured by the Squire Index, which includes three variables: legislator 
pay, staff per legislator, and total days in session.  Neither political control variable was 
statistically significant in the previous model.   However, placing pollution control 
functions in a stand-alone regulatory agency versus as part of a larger Super-Agency 
would provide governors and legislators differing levels of control.  In addition, legislators 
are more likely to delegate more authority to the executive branch when they have 
confidence in the capacity of the agency (Krause & Woods, 2014).   
 
Political Pressure  
As in the previous model, political pressure is measured as the percentage of gross 
state product (GSP) of three relevant economic interests: manufacturing, mining, and 
agriculture (Manufacturing GDP, Mining GDP, and Agricultural GDP).   These three 
interests are directly affected by pollution control legislation.  It seems that industries 
would likely prefer a Super-Agency structure, where the mission of the regulatory agency 
could be diluted by the overall mission of the agency (mining, forestry, agriculture).  In 
addition, the model includes a measure of Environmental Group Strength as the number 
of members of the Sierra Club per 1000 people in a state.  I have also included the 
dichotomous variable, Sierra Club Dummy, that indicates data retrieved prior 1982 (0) and 
after 1982 (1) to indicate the source of membership data described in previous chapter.    
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While Environmental Group Strength was not statistically significant in the last model, I 
expect states with higher environmental group membership are more likely to adopt a 
Mini-EPA structure than a Super-Agency structure.  Constituency pressure is measured 
using a Citizen Ideology index. This index ranges on a scale from zero to 100 with the 
higher scores indicating a more liberal citizenry (W. D. Berry et al., 1998).  It is expected 
that more liberal states would prefer a Mini-EPA structure.   
 
Politicians’ Preference 
Finally, politicians also have their own ideology and political preferences, which 
influence their choices.  Political preferences are measured by the Berry et al (1998) 
Government Ideology index.  Similarly to the citizen ideology index, this index ranges on 
a scale from zero to 100 with higher scores indicating a more liberal legislative and 
executive branch (W. D. Berry et al., 1998).   As with the citizen ideology, it is expected 
that states with a more liberal government will prefer adoption of a Mini-EPA structure. 
 
Administrative Motivations 
Politicians are also influenced by both internal and external administrative 
concerns in designing state agencies.  Just as administrative motivations influenced state 
adoption of a Comprehensive Structure, they also should affect a state’s adoption of a 
specific type of Comprehensive Structure (Mini-EPA or Super-Agency).  Likely internal 
administrative pressures should drive states toward adopting a Super-Agency structure, 
while external administrative pressures should push states toward a Mini-EPA structure. 
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Internal Administrative 
A dichotomous variable (Executive Reorganization) is included in the model to 
measure whether a state created the comprehensive environmental agency structure as 
part of an overall state restructuring event (1) or as an incremental environmentally-
specific organization (0).  States that have undergone an executive reorganization will be 
more likely to adopt a Super-Agency structure, as the goal of most reorganizations was 
consolidation of agencies.   A measure of the Fiscal Health of a state is include as 
measured by the annual difference, in $100,000, between total expenditures and total 
revenues (Wang et al., 2007).   States may be more likely to consolidate functions and 
reduce the size of the bureaucracy as a way to save money if they are under fiscal stress.  
Therefore, states with poorer fiscal health are more likely to adopt a Super-Agency 
structure.  Finally, states that adopted a Health Superagency would be more likely to 
adopt a Super-Agency (environmental pollution and natural resources).  Again, as in the 
previous chapter, the dichotomous variable indicates a state does have a Health 
Superagency (1) or it does not (0). 
 
External Administrative 
In the American federal system, states face both horizontal and vertical influences 
in their policy and structural choices.  The model measures the percentage of a state’s 
contiguous neighbors that have adopted either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure to 
measure horizontal influences.  The federal government has a huge influence on state 
environmental policy and would likely influence state adoption of a comprehensive 
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environmental agency.  Federal influence is measured as the federal share of state annual 
revenue (Federal Revenue).   
 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors 
Socioeconomic and demographic factors can have an indirect influence on state 
agency design by providing constraints and resources to the state.  Beyle (1975) found 
that larger (Size in thousand square miles) and wealthier states (Per Capita Income in 
thousands) were more likely to adopt a Super-Agency structure.  More Urban states were 
equally likely to maintain pollution control in a health department or to adopt a Super-
Agency structure.  In addition, larger states and wealthier states likely have more 
resources available to develop more independent agencies.   I expect states with more 
people (Population), measured in thousands, will also be more likely to adopt a Super-
Agency structure 
 
Policy Problem 
Ideally, the model would include a measure of environmental quality or pollution 
severity.  Unfortunately, no consistent and reliable measure exists for the time period of 
the data.  I have included a proxy measure of Vehicle Miles, measured in thousands, driven 
by population to try to capture pollution levels.  In addition, the model does include 
measures of natural resources within a state and consumption of those resources to try 
to capture the policy problem within a state.  The following resource variables are 
included in the model: Water area of each state measure the percentage of a state that 
is covered with surface water.   The model also includes a measure of Surface Water 
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Usage and Groundwater Usage, both in billion gallons per day, to capture resource 
demand of states.   
Table 5 below lists the summary statistics for the explanatory variables and the 
expected influence on state adoption of a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency Structure. 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics 
Variable 
Expected 
Direction Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Political Motivations      
Political Control Variables      
Governor power (+) 3.61 0.69 1.8 5.00 
Legislative professionalism (+) 2.09 1.20 0.34 6.59 
      
Political Uncertainty Variables      
Unified Government (+) 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Legislative Turnover (-) 0.18 0.27 0 2.18 
      
Political Pressure Variables      
Manufacturing (%) (+/-) 19.18 8.55 1.96 44.77 
Mining (%) (+/-) 3.61 7.11 0.00 49.66 
Agriculture (%) (+/-) 3.23 3.72 0.15 37.19 
Sierra Club Members (#/100 
pop) 
(+) 1.07 1.02 0 8.11 
Sierra Club Dummy  (+/-) 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Citizen ideology (+) 46.68 16.16 4.26 93.91 
      
Political Preference Variable      
Government ideology (+) 48.50 23.09 0.00 97.92 
Administrative Motivations      
Internal Administrative 
Variables 
     
Fiscal Health ($) (millions) (+/-) 0.95 2.04 -1.61 24.66 
Executive Reorganization (+) 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Health Superagency (+) 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
      
External Administrative 
Variables 
     
Adoption Super by Neighbors 
(%) 
(+) 0.31 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Adoption Mini by Neighbors 
(%) 
(+) 0.28 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Federal Revenue (%) (+) 22.47 5.09 6.00 57.00 
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Table 5: Summary statistics (continued) 
Variable Expected 
Direction 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Socioeconomic Variables      
Urbanization (%) (+) 0.68 0.15 0.32 0.94 
Per capita income (1000s) ($) (+) 13.59 8.15 2.05 42.20 
Population (per 1000 people) (+) 4.76 5.09 0.28 33.99 
Size of a state (square miles) (+) 71.83 91.72 1.21 656.42 
Policy Problem Variables      
Vehicle Miles per Person 
(1000s) 
(+) 7.85 1.97 3.06 16.73 
Resource Variables      
Water area (%) (+) 5.35 7.79 0.04 71.86 
      
Resource Demand      
Surface water usage (bgd) (+) 1.50 2.85 0.02 21.00 
Groundwater usage (bgd) (+) 6.41 6.09 0.07 35.78 
 
Results 
Table 6 below includes the results of the event history model.  As the results show, 
state adoption of a Super-Agency or Mini-EPA Structure is driven by political motivations, 
administrative motivations, socioeconomic motivations, and policy problem.   
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Table 6: Effect of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy Problem Variables 
on Adoption of Super-Agency (Model 1) and Mini-EPA Adoption (Model 2)13 
 Model 1 (Super-Agency) Model 2 (Mini-EPA) 
Specific Measure Hazard Ratio 
Standard 
Error Hazard Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Political Motivations       
Political Control Variables       
Governor power -0.666  0.276 1.488  0.611 
Legislative professionalism 1.335  0.574 1.059  0.305 
       
Political Uncertainty Variables       
Legislative Turnover -0.157  0.195 -0.121 * 0.134 
Unified Government 2.905 ** 1.530 4.648 *** 2.320 
       
Political Pressure Variables       
Manufacturing (% GDP)  1.085 * 0.054 1.062  0.045 
Mining (% GDP) 1.001  0.007 1.015  0.045 
Agriculture (% GDP) 1.022  0.097 1.103  0.069 
Sierra Club Membership 
 (per 1000 people) 
-0.160 * 0.156 1.707 * 0.547 
Sierra Club Dummy -0.762  0.807 3.666 * 2.834 
Citizen ideology 1.037  0.024 1.019  0.020 
       
Political Preference Variables       
Government Ideology -0.993  0.015 -0.971 *** 0.010 
Administrative Motivations       
Internal Administrative Variables       
Fiscal Health -0.729  0.192 -0.685  0.220 
Comprehensive State 
Restructuring 
6.712 *** 4.249 5.613 *** 3.035 
Health Superagency 4.494 ** 3.198 1.292  0.600 
       
External Administrative Variables       
Super Adoption by Neighbors (%) -0.597  0.759 -0.397  0.544 
Mini Adoption by Neighbors (%) 3.942  4.878 1.056  1.230 
Federal Revenue 1.062  0.083 -0.968  0.047 
Socioeconomic Motivations       
Urban Percentage (%) 1.133  3.003 -0.824  1.788 
Per Capita Income ($) 1.094  0.138 -0.873 * 0.077 
Population 1.337 ** 0.187 1.169  0.107 
Area of a State 1.000  0.006 1.008 ** 0.003 
       
 
                                                          
13 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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Table 6: Effect of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy Problem 
Variables on Adoption of Super-Agency (Model 1) and Mini-EPA Adoption (Model 2) 
(continued) 
 Model 1 (Super-Agency) Model 2 (Mini-EPA) 
Specific Measure Hazard Ratio 
Standard 
Error Hazard Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Policy Problem       
Vehicle Miles Driven -0.625  0.215 1.195  0.254 
Resource Variables       
Water Area 1.007  0.029 -0.992  0.030 
       
Resource Demand Variables       
Groundwater usage -0.903  0.183 0.807 * 0.095 
Surface water usage -0.893  0.090 0.963  0.059 
       
Constant -0.00003 ** <0.001 -0.00004 ** <0.001 
       
p (time dependence in Weibull 
distribution) 2.619 
 
 1.819 
 
 
       
Wald Χ2 (26) 64.83   53.33   
Prob > Χ2  0   0.0008   
Log Likelihood -30.890   -41.323   
 
Both models overall are statistically significant (Model 1: Wald Χ2 (25) = 64.83, 
ρ>0.0001; Model 2: Wald Χ2 (25) = 53.33, ρ=0.0008).  The estimated Weibull shape 
parameter, p, shows an increasing hazard over time for both models.  Variables within 
each category are statistically significant supporting the Model of Agency Design.  Table 
7 below lists the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the estimated average 
duration until adoption of the two agency structure.  
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy 
Problem Variables with Respect to Estimated Average Duration until Adoption of a 
Super-Agency and Mini-EPA Structure14 
 Model 1 (Super-Agency) Model 2 (Mini-EPA) 
Specific Measure dydx 
Std 
Error z dydx 
Std 
Error z 
Political Motivations         
Political Control Variables         
Governor power 7.402  8.559 0.860 -8.601  10.154 -0.850 
Legislative professionalism -5.254  8.461 -0.620 -1.242  6.255 -0.200 
         
Political Uncertainty Variables         
Legislative Turnover 33.672  28.636 1.180 45.590  33.466 1.360 
Unified Government -19.402  13.777 -1.410 -33.222 * 20.653 -1.610 
         
Political Pressure Variables         
Manufacturing (% GDP)  -1.488  1.213 -1.230 -1.305  1.009 -1.290 
Mining (% GDP) -0.249  1.216 -0.210 -0.324  0.974 -0.330 
Agriculture (% GDP) -0.397  1.751 -0.230 -2.115  1.538 -1.380 
Sierra Club Membership 
 (per 1000 people) 
33.311  27.784 1.200 -11.560  9.370 -1.230 
Sierra Club Dummy 4.950  19.158 0.260 -28.090  25.657 -1.090 
Citizen ideology -0.666  0.543 -1.230 -0.416  0.424 -0.980 
         
Political Preference Variables         
Government Ideology 0.135  0.274 0.490 0.646 * 0.368 1.760 
Administrative Motivations         
Internal Administrative Variables         
Fiscal Health 5.762  5.656 1.020 8.168  8.352 0.980 
Comprehensive State 
Restructuring 
-34.634 * 21.212 -1.630 -37.302 * 22.272 -1.670 
Health Superagency -27.336  21.348 -1.280 -5.547  9.912 -0.560 
         
External Administrative Variables         
Super Adoption by Neighbors (%) 9.381  21.200 0.440 19.965  27.608 0.720 
Mini Adoption by Neighbors (%) -24.952  29.962 -0.830 -1.176  25.438 -0.050 
Federal Revenue -1.094  1.609 -0.680 0.713  1.146 0.620 
Socioeconomic Motivations         
Urban Percentage (%) -2.270  48.072 -0.050 4.178  47.032 0.090 
Per Capita Income ($) -1.627  2.743 -0.590 2.928  2.406 1.220 
Population -5.281  3.601 -1.470 -3.376  2.629 -1.280 
Area of a State -0.002  0.105 -0.020 -0.176  0.115 -1.520 
         
                                                          
14 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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Table 7: Marginal Effects of Political, Administrative, Socioeconomic, and Policy 
Problem Variables with Respect to Estimated Average Duration until Adoption of a 
Super-Agency and Mini-EPA Structure (continued) 
 Model 1 (Super-Agency) Model 2 (Mini-EPA) 
Specific Measure dydx 
Std 
Error z dydx 
Std 
Error z 
Policy Problem         
Vehicle Miles Driven 8.553  7.127 1.200 -3.845  5.653 -0.680 
         
Resource Variables         
Water Area -12.815  52.777 -0.240 16.608  64.974 0.260 
         
Resource Demand Variables         
Groundwater usage 1.860  3.707 0.500 4.628  3.536 1.310 
Surface water usage 2.058  2.007 1.030 0.815  1.392 0.590 
 
Model 1: Super-Agency 
The Political Motivation variables that are statistically significant include: unified 
government, Sierra Club membership, and manufacturing interests.  States with a unified 
government and higher dependence on manufacturing are more likely to adopt a Super-
Agency structure.  States with more Sierra Club members are less likely to adopt the 
Super-Agency structure.  The Administrative Motivations variables that are statistically 
significant are comprehensive restructuring, Health Superagency.  States that have 
undergone a comprehensive restructuring and/or have adopted a Health Superagency 
were more likely to adopt a Super-Agency structure.  Of the Socioeconomic Factors, the 
size of the population is statistically significant, increasing the likelihood of state adoption.  
Urbanization does not have a statistically significant impact on state adoption of a Mini-
EPA or Super-Agency structure.  Finally, none of the variables measuring the magnitude 
of the policy problem were statistically significant.   
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Model 2: Mini-EPA 
The Political Motivation variables that are statistically significant include: unified 
government, legislative turnover, Sierra Club members, and government ideology.  States 
with a unified government, larger numbers of Sierra Club members, and a liberal citizenry 
are more likely to adopt a Mini-EPA structure.  States with more liberal governments and 
high legislative turnover are less likely to adopt a Mini-EPA structure.  The Administrative 
Motivations variable that is statistically significant is comprehensive restructuring.  States 
that have undergone a comprehensive restructuring were more likely to adopt a Mini-
EPA structure.  The Socioeconomic Factors that affect the likelihood of state adoption of 
the Mini-EPA structure include per capita income and the size of the state.  Of the 
variables measuring the magnitude of the policy problem, only groundwater usage was 
statistically significant.  States with a higher reliance on groundwater are less likely to 
adopt a Mini-EPA.  Adoption by neighbors was not statistically significant. 
 
Discussion 
In general, the results support the model of state agency design described above. 
This section includes a general discussion of the results, while highlighting areas where 
the model could be improved. The choice to adopt a Super-Agency structure appears to 
be strongly motivated by administrative pressures in the executive branch.  Political 
uncertainty, pressure and preference had a greater influence on the adoption of a Mini-
EPA structure than a Super-Agency Structure. 
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Political Motivations 
States with a unified government were more likely to adopt either a Mini-EPA or 
a Super-Agency structure.  This result, as in the previous chapter, confirms what has been 
found in the literature – that it is easier to reorganize the executive branch when one 
political party controls both branches of government.  While government ideology does 
not affect adoption of a Super-Agency structure, it does affect adoption of a Mini-EPA 
structure.  In addition, states with higher legislative turnover are less likely to adopt a 
Mini-EPA structure; but legislative turnover does not affect adoption of a Super-Agency. 
This difference could be due to the more political nature of a Mini-EPA structure.  Counter 
to what was expected, states with more liberal governments are less likely to adopt a 
Mini-EPA structure.  Perhaps, environmentalists and liberals support the Super-Agency 
model more than the Mini-EPA model.   Those states that adopted a Mini-EPA after 1980 
tended to be more conservative states, which may be adopting the Mini-EPA structure in 
hopes of better gaining approval to manage their own programs.   
As in the previous chapter, industry groups influence agency design.  However, 
the manufacturing variable is only statistically significant in the Super-Agency model.  
States with greater dependence on manufacturing were more likely to adopt a Super-
Agency structure.  This result seems to confirm the idea that locating pollution control 
functions in a larger agency could dilute the overall power or mission of the pollution 
control functions.  Further supporting this idea, states with more Sierra Club members 
were less likely to adopt a Super-Agency structure, but more likely to adopt a Mini-EPA 
structure.  
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  The fact that the Sierra Club membership affects the adoption of the Mini-EPA 
confirms finding in the literature that many states adopted the Mini-EPA structure to 
make a political statement of the state’s commitment to environmental protection (Beyle, 
1975; Haskell & Price, 1973) 
 
Administrative Motivations 
As in the previous model, the financial health of a state did not statistically 
significantly influence whether a state adopts either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency 
structure.  However, as predicted whether a state had undergone an executive branch 
reorganization did influence state adoption of both a Super-Agency and Mini-EPA 
structure.  States that have undergone an overall state restructuring, are more likely to 
adopt both types of structure than states that have not reorganized their government.   
States that adopted a Health Superagency were, as expected, more likely to adopt 
a Super-Agency structure, but not a Mini-EPA structure.  This result makes sense because 
as a state combined health with welfare, it is logical to then move environmental 
protection out to another agency.    
States do not appear to be influenced by external influences in choosing between 
a Super-Agency and a Mini-EPA structure.   The federal share of state revenue does not 
have a statistically significant effect on adoption.  In addition, a state’s likelihood of 
adoption of either structure does not increase as the percentage of its neighbor’s 
adoption increases.    
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Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors 
Of all the socioeconomic or demographic factors, only the population was 
statistically significant in state adoption of a Super-Agency Structure and PCI and state 
size were statistically significant in the adoption of a Mini-EPA.   It is unclear why state 
size would affect Mini-EPA adoption but population would affect Super-Agency adoption.  
The fact that PCI only affects the adoption of the Mini-EPA makes sense in that states with 
higher PCI more likely are wealthier states that are able to create more focused agencies. 
 
Policy Problem 
As discussed above, policy problem can be defined by environmental quality and 
as a resource to protect.  The model does not include a measure of environmental quality 
because such a measure does not exist for the entire time period of the analysis.  The 
proxy measure, vehicle miles driven, was not statistically significant.  However, there are 
a few measures of resources that had a statistically significant influence on state adoption 
of either a Mini-EPA or Super-Agency structure.  States that rely on groundwater are less 
likely to adopt a Mini-EPA structure.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to not only determine what influences state adoption of 
either a Super-Agency or Mini-EPA environmental agency structure, but also evaluate if 
the factors are significantly different between the two structures.  The analysis supports 
the Agency Design model - that administrative, political, socioeconomic, and policy 
problem all influence the selection of agency structure.    The results are especially 
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interesting in the highlighting the differences between states that adopted a Super-
Agency Structure and those that adopted a Mini-EPA structure.   The choice to adopt a 
Super-Agency Structure seems to be more influenced administrative motivations, while 
the Mini-EPA adoption is more influenced by political motivations.  States are more 
influenced by their neighbors in adopting the Super-Agency structure than in adoption of 
the Mini EPA structure.  The level of uncertainty in the legislature reduced the likelihood 
of a state adopting a Mini-EPA, but not in adopting a Super-Agency.  This result is likely 
due to the more political nature of the Mini-EPA structure.  
 
Improvements to Analysis 
The empirical analysis could be enhanced with additional or alternative variable 
measures and addressing limitations to the current model.  These enhancements are 
similar as in the previous chapter.  
 Administrative Response to Federal Regulation:  Currently, the model does not 
have a measure that captures the increased responsibilities placed on states 
between 1967 and 2000.  Over 10 federal laws were passed with additional 
amendments requiring compliance from states.  
 Environmental Quality: Not having any consistent measure of environmental 
quality make it difficult to assess to what extent the severity or nature of the 
pollution problem affect state adoption of agency structure.    The model includes 
a measure of vehicle miles driven, which is an indirect measure of environmental 
emissions. 
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 Environmental Group Pressure: One of the main drivers of state centralizing their 
pollution functions and adoption of a Comprehensive Structure of any type was 
political pressure from environmental groups.   The model includes a measure of 
the Sierra Club membership, which may not be the most completely measure of 
environmental group activity (Andrews, 1998; Bosso, 2003; Wikle, 1995) 
 Influence of other states: Beyle (1975) found in his analysis that states were 
influenced by their neighbors.  It is surprising that neighboring states had no 
effect in the previous chapter or in these two models. A better measure of the 
influence of other states on a state agency design could be found using a dyad 
analysis (comparing each state to each state). 
 Board/Commission:  As discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, 34 states still 
have a board that serves either as rulemaking or advisory entity. Initially, the 
majority of states had either independent pollution control boards or these 
boards were connected to the department of health.  The model could be 
enhanced by an inclusion of these boards, and even might help explain the 
influence of the citizen ideology variable. 
 Exceptions to the model: One of the main limitations of the model is that it does 
not capture the changing structures within many states.  While the number of 
states that changed their structure between a Super-Agency and Mini-EPA is 
small, the model could be enhanced by inclusion of a measure of these changes 
Adding these measures to the model could provide a clearer picture of what has 
influenced state adoption of environmental agency structures.   
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CHAPTER 6: STATE ADOPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
In describing his theory of public organizations, Moe (1990) argued that the design 
of agencies and the impact of that design are linked, in that, politicians design agencies 
to implement their political goals.  In the late 1960s, as states were facing increased local 
and federal pressure to address environmental pollution, scholars argued that the 
existing organizational structures were not adequate to address the pollution problem 
(Haskell & Price, 1973; Hines, 1966).  The next two chapters explore the second goal of a 
positive theory of organizations: understand the effect of the structure on policy 
adoptions.   The small literature that has examined the role of state environmental 
protection agency structure has found that it does have a statistically significant impact 
on policies, enforcement, and expenditures of a state (A. Bacot & Dawes, 1996; A. H. 
Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hoornbeek, 2011; Hunter & Waterman, 1996; J. Lester, 1980).  The 
goal of this chapter is to place the environmental agency structure within the context of 
the wider environmental policy adoption literature and develop theory of how 
bureaucratic structure affects policy adoption.  The next chapter tests that theory 
empirically.   
States policy adoption is influenced by internal characteristics of states and 
external influences outside of states.  Internally, state policies develop through 
interactions between system resources, demand patterns, and decisional systems 
(Salisbury, 1968).  A state’s socio-economic, political, and ideological characteristics 
impact state policy outputs.  (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990, 1991; Gray, 1973; Volden, 2006; 
Volden, Ting, & Carpenter, 2008; Walker, 1969).  States also respond to policies adopted 
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by other states (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973).  The effect of political, economic, 
and ideological characteristics of a state is mediated through the decisional system of that 
state, as is shown in Figure 11 below.  This model is developed from a model of policy 
adoption first proposed by Salisbury (1968) and later amended by Lester (1980) and 
Ringquist (1993a).    
 
Figure 10: Model of Environmental Policy Adoption (J. Lester, 1980; Ringquist, 1993; 
Salisbury, 1968) 
 
 
Environmental policy adoption literature has generally focused on the effect of 
system resources, demand patterns, and environmental problem severity influences on 
policy outputs (Bromley-Trujillo, 2012; Daley & Garand, 2005; Hays, Esler, & Hays, 1996; 
E. Ringquist, 1993).  Ultimately, the adoption of an environmental policy is made within 
the decisional system of a state that includes the executive and legislative branches of the 
government.  Decisional systems describe the structure and capacity of the executive and 
legislative branch to use system resources to translate demand patterns and 
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environmental severity into policy outputs (J. Lester, 1980).  When studies do include a 
measure of the decisional system, the measure focuses on the capacity of the legislative 
branch, rather than the agency design.    
 
Environmental Severity 
Public policies are designed to address a perceived policy problem.  The primary 
intention of environmental regulation is to reduce levels of environmental pollution.   
Environmental severity can be described as the quality of state physical resources (air, 
land water) and as the threat of contamination to a resource.  Studies have found that 
there is a level of “matching” in state environmental policy making, even controlling for 
the socioeconomic, political, and structural systems within a state (A. Bacot & Dawes, 
1996; Daley & Garand, 2005; J. P. Lester, Franke, Bowman, & Kramer, 1983; Lowry, 1992; 
Sapat, 2004).  In addition, studies have found that states adopt certain types of 
environmental policies in response to the importance of a resource within a state. For 
example, states that have adopted groundwater protection innovations tend to have 
larger quantities of groundwater supplies (Blomquist, 1991).  Hoornbeek (2011) found 
that coastal states are more likely to have active nonpoint source pollution programs.   
 
System Resources (industrialization, urbanization, income, education) 
System resources describe the resources available to a state.  The socioeconomic 
conditions within the state will influence policy adoption (Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Dye, 
1979; Jennings, 1979).  Socioeconomic conditions include citizen characteristics such as 
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income and education, and macro-economic conditions including gross state product and 
unemployment rates.  Walker (1969) argued that there are leading or pioneering states 
that are constantly innovating and developing new solutions to policy problems.  He 
found that leader or innovating states were more industrialized and urban (Walker, 1969).  
Analysis in environmental policy literature has found that states with more wealthy, 
educated, and liberal citizens are more likely to adopt environmental protection policies 
(Ringquist, 1993, 1994).  Wealthier states have the financial resources to manage more 
robust environmental programs (A. H. Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Bromley-Trujillo, 2012; Daley 
& Garand, 2005; Konisky & Woods, 2012).  Bromley-Trujillo (2012) found that states with 
a higher per capita income were more likely to adopt innovative environmental policies.   
 
Demand Patterns (party organization, political leaderships, interests) 
Demand patterns describe the political demand for policies within a state.  As 
stated earlier, elected officials are motivated by reelection and can be influenced by 
political pressure from constituents and interests. This demand is measured by citizen 
ideologies and level and types of interests active within a state.  More liberal governments 
and citizens generally demand more environmental regulations.  Citizen demand can be 
measured by general citizen ideology indices or by public opinion surveys.  Many studies 
of how public opinion about environmental quality is translated to policy focus on 
national level surveys, with few examining the process at the state level.  National studies 
have found that, unlike other issues, environmental issues are not generally ‘wedge 
issues’ in that they determine who an individual votes for in an election (Davis & Wurth, 
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2003; Guber, 2001).  Using data from the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
(CCES), (Konisky, Milyo, & Richardson, 2008), found that public opinion about the 
environment varies based on the geographic scale of the environmental issue.  The public 
cares more about national and local issues (drinking water quality, smog) than global 
issues (climate change, ozone depletion) and the majority would support either ‘a lot’ or 
‘a little bit more’ government effort to address various environmental issues (Konisky et 
al., 2008). 
In addition, the power of environmental and the affected industry interests will 
also influence the adoption of environmental protection policies (Oates, 2004).  Theories 
of political economy propose that interests could impact the stringency of state 
environmental regulations as elected officials try to assess public opinion.  The two main 
interests that could influence environmental regulations are industry groups and 
environmental (green) groups.  In addition, theories of political control argue that 
bureaucrats are motivated to increase their budget and maximize political support from 
elected officials.  Many studies have attempted to determine the level of influence that 
these groups (interests and elected officials) have on regulators.  These studies include 
surveys of interests, elected officials, and state environmental regulators; and cross-
sectional and panel data analysis of state regulatory decisions.  For example, (Potoski, 
2001) found that the number of environmental groups per 1000 residents in a state had 
a statistically significant impact on state decisions to exceed USEPA criteria pollutant 
standards, while the power of industry did not. 
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Decisional Systems 
“Public policy is made by institutions within the political system” (E. Ringquist, 
1993).  The decisional systems component of a policy adoption model measures the 
institutions within the state.  The decisional system describes the capacity of the 
legislative and administrative branches, which is measured as resources (financial, capital, 
and human) and the structure.  Figure 11 below, shows how the executive and legislative 
branches of the government affect policy adoption. 
 
Figure 11: Bureaucratic Structure Direct and Indirect Effects 
 
 
Each branch of government can directly adopt new policies; and indirectly 
influence the adoption of policies. Both branches of government influence policy 
adoption, but are not always included in models of environmental policy adoption.   
 
Legislative Capacity 
The primary measure of the decisional system in environmental policy literature 
is one of legislative capacity.  The majority of major policies are adopted by the legislature 
rather than administrative agencies, so the capacity of that branch of government should 
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have a significant impact on the types and number of policies adopted.  Legislatures with 
more resources and “professional capacity” are more likely to adopt more innovative 
policies (Huber, Shipan, & Pfahler, 2001; Walker, 1969).  Legislators have more time and 
staffing support to process more information and consider more policy options.  Studies 
have found that legislative professionalism can affect the level of environmental 
commitment among states (Bromley-Trujillo, 2012; Hays et al., 1996; Konisky & Woods, 
2012).  
 
Bureaucratic Capacity 
Bureaucratic capacity matters.  While the legislature is the primary policy adopter 
in states, many state agencies also adopt new policies outside of the legislature and 
influence legislative decisions.  Capacity has been measured as agency staffing levels, 
financial resources, and agency design.  While Bacot and Dawes (1996) found no statistical 
relationship between the capacity of the agency, as measured by number of employees 
and level of environmental expenditures, Sapat (2004) found that agencies with more 
hazardous waste employees adopted more hazardous waste policies.   The focus of the 
empirical analysis in the next chapter is on agency structure.  The level of influence of 
bureaucratic structure on state policies varies based on agency, culture, and capacity 
(Barrilleaux, Feiock, & Crew Jr, 1992; Jennings & Woods, 2007; Krause & Woods, 2014).  
While much of the bureaucratic agency literature evaluates the effect of structure at the 
federal level, there has been some analysis at the state level.  Much of the literature at 
the state level has focused on higher education structures and their direct effect on policy 
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outputs (Knott & Payne, 2004; Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003; Volkwein & Tandberg, 
2008). A small number of scholars have found that agency structures affect 
environmental policy adoption, enforcement, and outcomes (A. Bacot & Dawes, 1996; A. 
H. Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Hoornbeek, 2011; Hunter & Waterman, 1996; J. Lester, 1980).  
The structure of public agencies has a direct effect on the capacity of agencies to enforce 
and implement policies.  It makes sense, then, that studies have found that the structure 
of environmental protection agencies can affect the level of enforcement activities and 
environmental quality (Hoornbeek, 2011; Hunter & Waterman, 1996).  In addition, many 
agencies have flexibility to develop innovative programs to address broader pollution 
issues, such as hazardous waste, climate change, and nonpoint source water pollution.  
However, studies have found that agency structure can affect more than just direct 
actions by the agencies themselves.  Agency structure can also affect legislative policy 
adoption and levels of environmental expenditures (A. H. Bacot & Dawes, 1997; 
Hoornbeek, 2011).  Legislators respond to agency capacity and structure in designing 
policies (Jennings & Woods, 2007; Krause & Woods, 2014).   
 
Direct Impact 
Bureaucratic structure directly impacts how resources are allocated, how 
information is processed, and what priorities are pursued.  In addition, public 
organizational structures can also determine the level of influence of special interests and 
legislators.  For example, the greater the centralization of an agency structure, the lower 
the transaction costs for individuals seeking to influence that agency (Nicholson-Crotty & 
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Meier, 2003).  In terms of environmental policy, the impact of structure can be seen in 
level of enforcement activity, development of innovative programs, and environmental 
quality outcomes.  Previous studies generally found that horizontal specialization does 
impact policy outputs and outcomes. States that located their environmental regulation 
programs within health departments had lower environmental innovation (J. Lester, 
1980), had lower levels of nonpoint source pollution activism (Hoornbeek, 2011), and 
fewer number of enforcement actions (Hunter & Waterman, 1996).  Hunter and 
Waterman (1996) also found that states that located environmental regulations in a 
health department had lower water quality outcomes.  Interestingly, when delving 
deeper into specific regulatory permit stringency, Hoornbeek (2011) found that non-
health agencies actually had less stringent water permits related to whole effluent toxicity 
(WET) policies than health agencies.  He theorized that this difference could be attributed 
to the fact that WET is more common in the health field than in environmental fields.  
WET describes the aggregate toxic effect of a water sample, or its impact on the health of 
an organism. 
 
Indirect Impact 
Legislators respond to agency capacity and structure in designing policies 
(Jennings & Woods, 2007; Krause & Woods, 2014).  Legislators, rational individuals 
motivated by reelection and maintaining power, design and support policies that align 
with their own political views, please their constituencies, and are effectively 
implemented by the executive agency (Moe, 1990a).  Depending on how specifically a 
103 
 
statute defines a policy and implementation, the agency may have a lot of discretion in 
implementation which leads to uncertainty.  Structural design is especially influential in 
reducing the level of implementation uncertainty, or ability of  an agency to coordinate 
and implement specific policies (O’Toole Jr & Meier, 2003).  Structural design can improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of an agency. Therefore, more effective agencies with 
high levels of capacity will likely have more discretion in implementation and also be 
delegated more complicated or innovative policies.  Under the agency theory, legislators 
have to protect against bureaucratic drift and a more centralized agency structure 
reduces the chances of bureaucratic drift (Moe, 1990a).  In a state where the executive 
and legislative branches are managed by different political parties, legislators will 
consider how politically insulated an agency is in terms of management appointments, 
existence of oversight boards and commissions, and funding.  (Krause & Woods, 2014).   
 
Horizontal and Vertical Diffusion 
Horizontal and vertical influences from outside of the state will also influence 
policy adoption. Diffusion of innovations in public institutions occurs as a process of 
learning and conformity (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1991) and competition.  States seek to 
simplify the complex processes of decision making by looking at how other states are 
addressing problems and learning lessons (Shipan & Volden, 2008).  States are influenced 
by other states through national communications networks (Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969) 
and regional influences (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990).  The adoption of an innovation by a 
state’s neighbors can influence the probability that a state will also adopt it (Balla, 2001; 
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Mintrom, 1997).  In addition to these various forms of horizontal diffusion patterns, states 
will also implement innovations under mandated or implied pressure from the federal 
government in a vertical diffusion pattern (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1990).   
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CHAPTER 7: EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS ON POLICIES: ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION 
The structures of public agencies “set the rules of the game…advantage some 
groups over others” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier, 2003).  By its very nature, organizational 
structure shapes the goals pursued and policy choices considered relevant.  The structure 
creates information networks based on who is located where on the hierarchy.  
Hammond (1986) proposes that public bureaucratic structure functions in the same way 
a legislative agenda acts by defining “what options [are] to be compared, in what 
sequence, and by whom.”  Moe (1990) argued that politicians select an agency structure 
to further their political goals.  Therefore, the choice to place pollution prevention within 
a stand-alone agency or house it within a health agency or other natural resource agency 
is made with policy goals in mind.  
Each agency will have its own mission statement, internal hierarchy, and strengths 
and weaknesses.   These agency characteristics will either facilitate or hinder its ability to 
respond to pollution challenges within the state – whether from large stationary polluters 
or from small dispersed sources that span geographic and political boundaries.   The later 
types of pollution, called second and third generation pollution problems, require 
innovation, flexibility, coordination across government agencies (horizontally and 
vertically), and collaboration with the private sector.  Those states with Mini-EPAs should 
be better able to innovate because there are no other conflicting missions and demands.  
However, if a Super-Agency is functioning as envisioned, with integration and cooperation 
between the pollution control and natural resource functions, it might be more able to 
respond to pollution challenges that span geographic areas. 
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The focus of this analysis is on policy outputs, rather than policy outcomes.  The 
theory in the literature is that policy outputs lead to policy outcomes.  Environmental 
policy outcomes include environmental outcomes, political outcomes, and economic 
outcomes.  Environmental outcomes are changes in environmental quality within a state, 
such as improvements in air quality or reduction in asthma rates.   Political outcomes 
include effects on political participation (civic engagement), political power of various 
interests (environmental groups vs. industry groups), the electoral well-being of elected 
officials and political parties, and effects on interagency and intergovernmental dynamics 
(state agency cooperation and state-federal cooperation). Finally, economic outcomes 
measure effects of policies on state economic and financial conditions (J. Lester, 1995; 
Ringquist, 1993).  The focus of environmental literature is generally on policy outputs, 
often due to data limitations for measuring outcomes.   Ringquist (1993) found a 
connection between policy outputs and environmental outcomes.  States with a stronger 
regulatory air quality and water quality program reduced the concentration of many 
common air and water pollutants. 
 
Literature Review 
The few studies that have explored a relationship between agency structure and 
policy adoption have found conflicting results, but these studies have also used different 
policy indices to measure policy adoption.  Bacot and Dawes (1997) used the Fund for 
Renewable Energy and the Environment (FREE) index of environmental policies and found 
no effect of agency structure on state ranking along this index.  However, Lester (1980), 
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using an Index of Environmental Control (he created), found states that retained pollution 
control in their health department were less likely to adopt the policies included in his 
index (i.e. adoption of wetlands management, adoption of floodplain management 
legislation, and severity of requirements for statewide environmental impact 
statements).  Most recently, Hoornbeek (2011) found that states that housed their 
pollution control functions outside of the department of health were more active in 
adopting nonpoint source (NPS) policies (measured by an index he created).  
Each of the three studies discussed above developed their policy indices from data 
measuring state policy adoption during different time periods (1967-1975; 1987; 1997-
2002).  The number of states that had not adopted a Super-Agency or Mini-EPA structure 
varies across these time periods, as do the policies included in the indices.   In addition, 
these studies each used cross-sectional data, rather than time-series.  This chapter will 
build on these early studies to explore the impact of agency structure on state policy 
adoption over time.   Specifically, I want to evaluate what effect agency structure has on 
state adoption of environmental policies that address second and third generation 
pollution problems. 
 
First Generation vs Second and Third Generation Pollution Problems. 
The original environmental pollution control regulations in the 1970s tended to 
address first generation pollution problems.  First generation environmental problems 
primarily deal with clean air and water and are caused by pollutants that remain in one 
medium (i.e. water, air)  and often come from large, concentrated sources (Fiorino, 2006; 
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E. Ringquist, 1993).  This type of pollution can be described as smokestack and water pipe 
types of problems that are generally addressed with pollution control technology on the 
pipe or stack.  The Mini-EPA and USEPA structures developed primarily to address first 
generation pollution problems that fell within a specific category (air, water, land) and 
were regulated at the source through the permitting process.    
Second generation pollution problems are caused by pollutants that easily move 
through multiple media and stem from small, dispersed sources.  Groundwater pollution 
from poor hazardous waste disposal would be an example of these types of problems. 
Regulating underground storage tanks and solid waste programs (such as electronics 
recycling) target both land pollution and potential groundwater contamination. Reducing 
contamination from lead paint targets millions of individual homeowners rather than a 
few large private companies. These externalities “require a coordinated and integrated 
approach to environmental protection” not considered when the traditional 
environmental regulations were developed  (E. Ringquist, 1993).  The regulations that 
have been passed to address these issues have incorporated partnerships with private 
industries and local governments.  Both public and private green building standards are 
developed to target the millions of buildings, rather than specific industries.  
Finally, third generation environmental problems are problems that have cross 
media impacts, but also can have an effect at regional, national, and global levels.  These 
problems include acid rain, tropical deforestation, and climate change (E. Ringquist, 
1993).  Many of the energy-related polices adopted by states since the 1990s are primarily 
driven by concern for climate change.   Many scholars argue that second and third 
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generation problems require a new federal-state relationship that could also include 
partnerships with private industry to address these problems more “cooperatively, 
holistically, and cost-effectively in the long-run” (Durant et al., 2004).    The USEPA and 
states have adopted and promoted ecosystem-based and watershed management 
programs to address the regional nature of many pollution issues.   
 
Model 
To evaluate the effect of agency structure on environmental policy adoption, I use 
a regression model with state fixed effects.15  I develop two indices of environmental 
policy:  an Index of Environmental Policy Adoption and a Dispersed Sources Pollution Policy 
Index.   These indices are developed around 12 different environmental policies adopted 
by states between 1988 and 2012.  These policies were adopted to address second and 
third generation pollution problems.  Using a fixed-effects regression, I test two internal 
determinants models to determine the effect of agency structure on policy adoption.  In 
this analysis, I am interested in the level of policy adoption by a state.  I am examining the 
question of whether the structure of the agency facilitates policy adoption.   Future 
analyses that could build on this model would pull out individual policies to examine the 
effect of structure on adoption of those policies using a Hazard Model.    
 
  
                                                          
15 My model has heteroskadasticity and therefore, I use robust standard errors. While some of the variables 
are collinear, this multicollinearity does not pose a significant issue due to my large sample size.   
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The empirical model is based on the Model of Environmental Policy Adoption 
described in the previous chapter and includes 49 states and 25 years.16  The dependent 
variable ADOPTION, is a categorical variable measuring the policy adoption index for a 
state i in year t.    
ADOPTIONit = β1SEVERITYit + β2RESOURCESit + β3DEMANDit + β4SYSTEMit +αi + μit 
In this regression model, β’s are estimated coefficients;  SEVERITY measures the 
problem severity, RESOURCES, measures the system resources available in a state; 
DEMAND measures citizen and interest group demand; finally SYSTEM measures the 
decisional system within a state. α is the unknown intercept for each state (i) and μ is the 
error term.  I am assuming that the error terms across states are not correlated.  
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in this analysis are additive indices of policy adoption.  I 
have developed two individual indices, based on a factor analysis, to evaluate the effect 
of agency structure on policy adoption: Policy Adoption Index and Dispersed Pollution 
Sources Policies Index.  Table 8 below describes the policies included in these indices.   
The Policy Adoption Index includes all 12 policies in the table.   Based on the factor 
analysis, seven policies loaded especially strongly together with a very high alpha.   
Therefore, I created an additional index the capture the unique characteristic of these 
policies.  The Dispersed Pollution Sources Index only includes the first seven policies.  I 
chose to use indices, rather than individual policies, because I wanted to measure a wide 
                                                          
16 Nebraska is excluded from analysis because it has a unicameral legislature and so does not have turnover 
or unified government data. 
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range of environmental policies that would benefit from different types of departments 
and look at overall innovation rather than just an individual policy. 
 
Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies 
Policy Description 
Number of 
States Media 
Time 
Period 
Electronics 
Recycling 
State have adopted mandatory 
electronics recycling statutes. 
24 Land 2003-2011 
Mercury Ban 
State has adopted at least one 
statute banning either sale, use, or 
disposal of a mercury-containing 
product (i.e. thermometers, lighting, 
switches) 
29 Land/ Water 1992-2011 
Net Metering 
For electric customers who generate 
their own electricity, net metering 
allows for the flow of electricity both 
to and from the customer – typically 
through a single, bi-directional 
meter.  
42 Air 1983-2010 
Public Benefit 
Funds 
Developed during the electric 
restructuring to ensure continued 
support for renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and low-income 
energy programs. Funds are 
supported through a very small 
surcharge (systems benefits charge) 
on electricity consumption  
28 Air/Equity 1994- 2011 
Renewable 
Portfolio Standards 
Mandates that electric utilities 
generate a certain percentage of 
electricity from renewable or 
alternative energy sources by a 
certain date 
39 Air 1994-2011 
Vehicle 
Emissions17 
State has adopted a mandate that 
new vehicles reduce emissions by 
given percentage by a target year 
15 Air 2002-2012 
 
  
                                                          
17 Two states, Arizona and New Mexico, initially adopted these standards but in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively, they choose not to pursue these vehicle emission standards. 
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Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies 
Policy Description 
Number of 
States Media 
Time 
Period 
Green Public 
Building Standards 
Energy standards for public 
buildings that include green building 
standards, energy-reduction goals, 
equipment-procurement 
requirements, and/or the use of on-
site renewable energy.  
50 
Land/ water/ 
air 
1996-2012 
Authorized Lead 
Program 
State has authorization from USEPA 
to train and certify lead abatement 
providers  
39 Air 1988-2011 
Underground 
Storage Tanks 
States have USEPA-approved UST 
programs. 
38 Land/ Water 1991-2012 
Environmental 
Justice 
State has adopted an environmental 
justice program, either through 
Executive Order or statute. 
32 other 1993-2007 
Groundwater 
Quality Statute 
State has some type of groundwater 
quality statute (i.e. state-wide 
monitoring, quality standards, or 
permit system) 
46 Water 1967-2004 
Radon 
Requirements 
State requires disclosure of radon 
testing and/or certification of radon 
professionals 
20 Air 1988-2011 
 
I selected these policies to represent a cross-section of environmental health, 
pollution, and resource management policies adopted by states over the past 25 years.  
In addition, the policies have been adopted by agencies, legislatures, or through the 
governor’s executive order.  States have adopted some of these policies in response to 
federal mandates, but other policies are in response either to USEPA promotion (via 
information and financial incentives) or in response to political pressure from citizens and 
lack of federal action.18  Finally, these policies address second and third generation 
pollution issues that affect land, water, and/or air.   
  
                                                          
18 The model does not control of federal mandates or promotion of policies.  
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Developing the Indices 
To test the effect of structure on policy adoption, I wanted to develop valid and 
reliable indices.  I used statistical analyses to evaluate the relationship between a set of 
policies to test the reliability and validity of my index.  I set out to answer three questions:  
1. Are these policies correlated with each other (Tetrachoric Correlation 
Analysis)? 
2. What is the relationship among the policies (Factor Analysis)? 
3. What is the best way to group these policies to measure environmental policy 
adoption (Factor Analysis)? 
Based on the analyses, I developed two indices. The Environmental Policy 
Adoption Index and Dispersed Pollution Sources Index were developed based on the 
correlation and factor analysis. 19  While I used the factor analysis to analyze and test the 
validity of my indices, I do not use the factors generated as my dependent variable in my 
model.  I am interested in the total number of policies not a level of “environmentalism”.   
An index using the factor scores would pull out the “environmentalism” that is shared 
among the policies and not necessarily the total adoption of the policies themselves.  In 
addition, the previous studies that have used an index of policy adoptions have used an 
additive index, and not a factor score.  As I am building on these studies, I wanted to be 
consistent with these other studies.  However, I felt that it was important to ensure that 
the policies I have chosen share some common factors and have some relationship with 
                                                          
19 Two policies: Watershed Management and energy efficiency codes for private buildings were removed 
from the analysis based on these analyses because they were so statistically different than the rest of the 
policies.  
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each other.  I used the factor analysis to confirm the policies I chose have some common 
factors, which they do.  But I am more interested in the effect of structure on adoption of 
these main policies, promoted by USEPA, that address second and third generation 
pollution problems.  In the future, if I am interested in measuring the innovativeness or 
level of “environmentalism of a state, I will use the factor scores.20  In addition, the 
previous studies that I am building upon, use additive indices to measure the effect of 
structure on policy adoption.  Therefore, I use an additive index or the sum of the total 
policies (1-12). 
 
Policy Correlations 
There is a large variation in the level of correlation among the 12 policies.  Table 9 
below shows the tetrachoric correlations among the individual policies.21 The correlations 
among policies range from 0.01 to 1.0.  Every policy is at least moderately correlated with 
at least one other policy.  I have highlighted those correlations that are close or equal to 
one.    
                                                          
20 I ran an alternative analysis using the factor scores and found that some of the results varied, the 
variables of interest: Decision System variables do not change. 
21 I use the tetrachoric correlations rather than Pearson correlations because I am looking for 
correlation coefficients for dummy variables.  Pearson correlations cannot estimate the entire range 
of correlations (plus/minus one) because the distribution is limited.   
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Table 9: Tetrachoric Correlations22 
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RPS 1.0
PBF 0.8 1.0
Vehicle 
Emissions
0.8 0.8 1.0
Netmeter 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.0
Mercury 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.0
Ecycling 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0
Green 
Public Bldg
0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Lead 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
UST 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0
Ground- 
water
0.4 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 1.0
Radon 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.0
EJ 
Program
0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 1.0
 
Not surprisingly, the energy-related policies (RPS, PBF, Netmetering, and Green 
Public Buildings) are highly correlated.   There are some interesting correlations across 
policies.  For example, groundwater quality policies are highly correlated with other 
policies that are developed to address groundwater pollution: mercury abatement and 
electronics recycling.  There is a strong correlation between underground storage tank 
                                                          
22 Correlations above 0.5 are in italics.  Correlations between 0.5 and 0.7 are considered moderate positive 
correlations.  Correlations above 0.7 are italics and outlined in a black line.  Correlations between 0.7 and 
0.9 are considered high positive correlations; those above 0.9 are very high positive correlations.  
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policies and lead abatement policies.  These are both policies that address older buildings 
and sites.   Groundwater policies are perfectly correlated with vehicle emissions and PBF.  
I am not sure why groundwater quality policies would be so closely correlated with vehicle 
emissions and PBF.  
 
Factor Analysis  
Correlations can show whether policies have some type of relationship, but 
further analysis is needed to evaluate what that relationship looks like.  I used factor 
analysis to determine the relationship among policies and develop the indices.  The results 
of the factor analysis supported a general relationship among these policies.  All policies 
load on the first factor indicating that there is an underlying environmental factor within 
each policy. 23  The policies fall into four primary factors (see Table 10 below).  The model 
is statistically significant (chi2 (66) = 4,193.66) at the p<0.0001 level.   The first factor 
explains over 35 percent of the variance and combined the first four factors explain over 
65 percent of total variance.  
 
  
                                                          
23 I used 0.32 as a cutoff to include a variable as loading on a factor for the unrotated matrix.  For 
evaluating the rotated factor matrix, I used 0.50.  The unrotated matrix is included in Appendix G. 
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Table 10: Factor Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.277 2.938 0.356 0.356 
Factor2 1.338 0.233 0.112 0.468 
Factor3 1.106 0.240 0.092 0.560 
Factor4 0.865 0.079 0.072 0.632 
Factor5 0.787 0.044 0.066 0.698 
Factor6 0.743 0.062 0.062 0.760 
Factor7 0.681 0.103 0.057 0.816 
Factor8 0.578 0.053 0.048 0.865 
Factor9 0.525 0.126 0.044 0.908 
Factor10 0.399 0.035 0.033 0.942 
Factor11 0.364 0.026 0.030 0.972 
Factor12 0.337 . 0.028 1.000 
 
I rotated the factor matrix in Table 11 to make the relationship between the 
policies and factors clearer.   The first factor includes PBF, RPS, Vehicle Emissions, Mercury 
bans, net metering, electronics recycling, and green building codes for public buildings.  
There is something unique among these policies that warrants further investigation.  
These policies all relate to pollution from individuals (many dispersed sources) rather than 
large factories (few concentrated sources).  I used these seven policies to create a 
separate summative index, called the Dispersed Pollution Sources Index. 
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Table 11: Rotated Factor Matrix 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
RPS 0.703 0.239 0.194 0.411 
PBF 0.572 0.085 0.421 0.488 
Vehicle Emissions 0.744 -0.082 0.083 0.432 
Net Metering 0.530 0.189 0.340 0.568 
Mercury 0.670 0.113 0.253 0.474 
Ecycling 0.719 0.150 -0.040 0.459 
Public Green Buildings 0.815 0.199 0.000 0.297 
Lead 0.134 0.824 0.149 0.282 
UST 0.109 0.848 -0.060 0.266 
Groundwater 0.047 0.246 0.636 0.533 
Radon 0.104 -0.053 0.792 0.359 
EJ program 0.395 0.323 0.168 0.711 
 
Factor 2 includes policies that address pollution on buildings and grounds 
including UST policies and lead abatement policies.  Factor 3 includes radon abatement 
certification and groundwater quality programs.  To help understand how the policies are 
loading, I graphed the first two rotated factor below in Figure 14. 
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Figure 12: Rotated Loading Factors (Factor 1 and Factor 2)  
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The third factor includes groundwater quality and radon abatement.  These 
policies seem to be clustered together because they are somehow different than the 
other policies.  These policies are tied closely to natural resources – water and land (radon 
is related to rock formations).  These two policies also tend to include other agencies 
(health, natural resources) and relate to the geography and resources of a state.    While 
all the policies load on the first factor, the policies above in the graph that are clustered 
together on the right all load the heaviest and are all second and third generation 
pollution problems and many relate to climate change.  Finally, environmental justice is 
not clustered with any other policies and does not load on any other factor.  Of all the 
variables, environmental justice has the highest uniqueness value (see table 9) of over 70 
percent.  While this policy is an environmental policy - it is also a unique type of policy. 
Factor 2 
Factor 1 
Factor 3 
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Policy Adoption Index 
The Policy Adoption Index includes all 12 policies listed in Table 6 above.  The 
Cronbach Alpha for this index is 0.8097, indicating a strong relationship across these 
policies.   Second and third generation pollution problems often require innovative and 
collaborative management programs because they span multiple media and multiple 
sources.   
 
Figure 13: Environmental Innovation Index 
 
 
States that have adopted the most policies tend to be coastal states and 
traditionally liberal states.  However, there are few states that score high on the index, 
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which are not generally thought of as environmental or liberal states, including, Utah and 
Indiana.  All states have adopted at least one of these policies. 
 
Dispersed Sources Pollution Policies Index 
The Dispersed Sources Pollution Index includes seven policies adopted in the last 
20 years to address second and third generation pollution problems from large numbers 
of dispersed sources and includes: PBF, RPS, net metering, ecycling, mercury bans, vehicle 
emissions, and green building standards for public buildings.   The Cronbach Alpha for this 
index is 0.8372, indicating a strong relationship across these policies Figure 14 below 
shows which states have adopted the most of these policies.  
 
Figure 14: Dispersed Sources Pollution Policies Index 
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Those states that have adopted the most policies tend to be the coastal and more 
liberal states, including California, New York, and Illinois. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables can be divided into four categories: environmental 
severity variables, system resources variables, demand variables, and decisional system 
variables. Summary statistics for each variable are listed in Table 11.  The following section 
describes these variables in more detail. 
 
Environmental Severity 
Environmental Severity variables measure the environmental quality within a 
state using two pollution variables and three resource variables.    In general, the 
environmental literature has found a level of matching between polices and 
environmental quality – that environmental policies are adopted in response to perceived 
environmental problems (Daley & Garand, 2005; J. P. Lester et al., 1983; Lowry, 1992).   In 
those studies that have included a measure of agency structure, the results have been 
mixed (A. Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Hoornbeek, 2011; J. Lester, 1980; J. P. Lester et al., 1983).   
According to Lombard and Lester (1990), the pollution severity argument is that increased 
industrialization increases pressure for environmental policy responses.  Those studies 
that have found a positive relationship between problem severity and policy adoption.  
However, the results depend on the measure of problem severity.  Studies that include a 
direct measure of pollution levels or environmental quality find a positive relationship, 
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while studies with an indirect measure generally find a negative relationship (A. Bacot & 
Dawes, 1996; J. Lester, 1986; Sapat, 2004). 
The two pollution variables used in this analysis are indirect measures of 
environmental pollution.  The first pollution variable is total releases (air, water, land) 
from the Toxic Release Inventory data from the USEPA (Toxic Release Data).   The Toxic 
Release Date is measured as 10 million pounds per person. It is expected that states with 
higher quantities of toxic releases will adopt more of the environmental policies.  
However, in two studies that have included TRI release data and agency structure, higher 
quantities of TRI releases reduces the likelihood of policy adoption (A. Bacot & Dawes, 
1996; Hoornbeek, 2011).   In addition, a measure of the total vehicle miles travelled within 
a state is included as an estimate of air pollution within that state (Vehicle Miles).  Vehicle 
Miles is measured as thousand vehicle miles per person.  It is expected that as number of 
vehicle miles increases, policy adoption will also increase, especially because so many of 
these policies are related to air emissions and climate change.  
The following resource variables are included in the model:  water area, surface 
water usage, and groundwater usage.24  Water area of each state measure the percent of 
a state that is covered with surface water.  The model also includes a measure of Surface 
Water Usage and Groundwater Usage, both in billion gallons per day, to capture resource 
demand of states.   States with greater water area and higher reliance on surface and 
groundwater will be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  
                                                          
24 As described in the previous chapter, I have divided the Environmental Severity variables into two 
categories: policy problem (pollution measurement) and the type and quantity of environmental resources 
in a state (water, land, etc). 
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System Resources Variables 
The system resources included in this model capture the wealth of the population 
and the wealth and resources available to the state government.  Socioeconomic and 
demographic factors can have an indirect influence on state agency design by providing 
constraints and resources to the state.   Larger (Size and Population) states with greater 
wealth (Per Capita Income) should be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  Size 
of states is measured in ten-thousand square miles.  Population is measured in number 
of people in ten-thousands.  Per Capita Income is measured in thousands.  More Urban 
states should also be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  In addition, states with 
higher levels of debt (Fiscal Health), should be less likely to adopt new environmental 
policies.  Fiscal Health is measured as annual revenues minus expenditures in millions.  
Studies that have included system resource and agency structure variables have found 
differing influence of system resources.  Bacot and Dawes (1997) found that state fiscal 
health had no statistically significant effect on policy adoption.  However, Hoornbeek 
(2011), found that per capita income and population increased the likelihood of state NPS 
policy activism. 
 
Demand Variables 
Demand variables measure the demand from constituency and interests. 
Constituency pressure is measured using a Citizen Ideology index.  This index ranges on a 
scale from zero to 100 with the higher scores indicating a more liberal citizenry (W. D. 
Berry et al., 1998).  It is expected that more liberal states would adopt more 
environmental policies. Interest group demand is measured as the percentage of gross 
125 
 
state product (GSP) of three relevant interests: manufacturing, mining, and agriculture.   
These three groups are directly affected by pollution control legislation.  It is expected 
that as the reliance on one of these industries increases, states will be less likely to adopt 
environmental policies.   Environmental interest demand is measured as Sierra Club 
members per 1000 residents per state (Sierra Club). It is expected that states with higher 
membership levels will be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  Previous studies 
have found that environmental interests have a statistically significant effect on policy 
adoption; while industry interests do not (A. Bacot & Dawes, 1996; Hoornbeek, 2011). 
 
Decisional Systems Variables 
Decisional system variables measure the strength of the governor’s office, 
capacity of the legislature, the political orientation of the government and the agency 
structure.  The strength of the governor’s office (Governor Power) is an institutional score 
of governor’s overall power.  This measure includes an average of scores for tenure 
potential, appointment powers, budgetary power, and veto power.  States with more 
powerful governors will likely be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  Legislative 
professionalism is measured by the Squire Index, which includes three variables: legislator 
pay, staff per legislator, and total days in session.   States with more professional 
legislatures should be more likely to adopt environmental policies.  The political 
orientation of the decision system is measured as Government Ideology. It is expected 
that more liberal governments are more likely to adopt environmental policies.    
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Agency Structure 
This paper uses the generally accepted typology of state agencies-- Mini-EPA, 
Super-Agency, and Health-- to measure agency structure.  Proponents of each structure 
find characteristics of each that make their structure the most effective in promoting 
environmental quality and health.  While it is expected that there will be a relationship 
between the agency type and type of environmental policies adopted, it is unclear which 
type of agency will most affect the overall Policy Adoption Index.  Based on the literature, 
it is expected that states with their pollution control functions in the department of health 
will be less innovative.   
 
Advisory or Rulemaking Board 
Many states (33) have an environmental board or commission that either serves 
in an advisory role or in a rulemaking role or to hear appeals (Board).   The Board variable 
is a dichotomous variable where states that have an appeals, advisory, or rulemaking 
board (1) or have no such board (0).  These boards, generally appointed by the governor 
and confirmed by the senate, include citizen representatives, experts, and sometimes 
government officials.  These boards or commissions vary across states, as is clear in Table 
12 below.  It is expected that states with a board will be less likely to adopt environmental 
policies.  These boards often include members of the affected industries and therefore 
would be more cautious in adopting regulations. 
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Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies 
State Advisory Commission Members Terms Appointment 
Advisory or 
Rulemaking 
Alabama 
Environmental 
Management 
Commission 
7 6-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Arkansas 
Pollution Control and 
Ecology Commission 
13 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
California 
Air Resources Board 11 N/A 
Appointed by 
Governor  
Rulemaking 
Water Resource Board 5 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Colorado 
Water Quality Control 
Commission 
9 3-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Air Quality Commission 9 3-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Solid & Hazardous 
Waste Commission 
9 3-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Connecticut 
Council on 
Environmental Quality 
9 8-year 
5  by Governor 
2 by the Senate  
2 by the House. 
Advisory 
Florida 
Environmental 
Regulation Commission 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Illinois25 Pollution Control Board 5 3-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Indiana 
Environmental Rules 
Board 
16 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Iowa 
Environmental 
Protection Commission 
9 4-year  
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by senate 
Rulemaking 
Kentucky 
Environmental Quality 
Commission (EQC) 
7 4-year  
Appointed by 
Governor 
Advisory 
Maine 
Environmental 
Improvement 
Commission 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by legislature 
Rulemaking 
 
  
                                                          
 
25 The Illinois Pollution Control Board is an independent agency, separate from the Illinois Environmental 
Protection Agency, whereas the rest of the rulemaking and advisory boards are connected to the 
environmental agency.  Wyoming Environmental Quality Council also functions as an independent agency. 
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Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies (continued) 
State Advisory Commission Members Terms Appointment 
Advisory or 
Rulemaking 
Massachusetts 
Water Resources 
Commission 
13 3-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Advisory 
Minnesota 
Legislative-Citizen 
Commission on 
Minnesota Resources 
(LCCMR) 
17  
 
4-year 
5 by the Governor,  
1 by the Senate 
1 by the House. 
Advisory 
Mississippi 
Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
7 7-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Missouri 
Clean Water 
Commission 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by senate 
Rulemaking 
Air Conservation 
Commission 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by senate 
Rulemaking 
Hazardous Waste 
Management 
Commission 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by senate 
Rulemaking 
Solid Waste Advisory 
Board 
25 3-year 
Appointed by Director 
of Department of 
Natural Resources 
Advisory 
Safe Drinking Water 
Commission 
9 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by senate 
Rulemaking 
Montana 
Board of Environmental 
Review 
7 N/A 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Clean Air Act Advisory 
Committee  
N/A N/A N/A Advisory 
Solid Waste Advisory 
Committee 
11 N/A N/A Advisory 
Water Pollution Control 
Advisory Council 
11 N/A 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Advisory 
Nebraska 
Environmental Quality 
Council 
17 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Legislature 
Rulemaking 
Nevada 
State Environmental 
Commission 
11  N/A 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
New Jersey  Clean Air Council 18 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Advisory 
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Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies (continued) 
State Advisory Commission Members Terms Appointment 
Advisory or 
Rulemaking 
New Mexico 
Water Quality Control 
Commission 
14  4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Environmental 
Improvement Board 
7 5-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
North Carolina 
Environmental 
Management 
Commission 
15 4-year 
Appointed by the 
Governor, the Senate 
Pro Tempore & the 
Speaker of the 
House. 
Rulemaking 
Ohio 
Environmental Review 
Appeals Commission 
(ERAC) 
3 6-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Appeals 
Oklahoma 
Environmental Quality 
Board 
13 5year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Oregon 
Environmental Quality 
Commission 
5 4-year  
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Pennsylvania 
Environmental Quality 
Board 
20 N/A 
Members state 
agencies, legislature, 
and Citizens Advisory 
Council 
Rulemaking 
Citizens Advisory 
Council 
20 3-year 
The Governor, 
Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, & 
President Pro 
Tempore of the 
Senate each appoint 
6 members 
Advisory 
Environmental Hearing 
Board 
5 6-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Appeals 
South Carolina 
Board of Health & 
Environmental Control 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking/
Appeals 
South Dakota 
Water Management 
Board 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Board of Water & 
Natural Resources 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Advisory 
Board of Minerals & 
Environment 
9 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
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Table 8: State Adoption of Environmental Policies (continued) 
State Advisory Commission Members Terms Appointment 
Advisory or 
Rulemaking 
 Tennessee 
Air Pollution Control 
Board 
14 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Underground Petroleum 
Storage Tank & Solid 
Waste Disposal Board 
14 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Board of Water Quality, 
Oil, & Gas 
12 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Texas 
Commission on 
Environmental Quality 
3 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate. 
Rulemaking 
Utah 
Water Quality Board 9 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Air  Quality Board 9 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Drinking Water Quality 
Board 
9 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Waste Management & 
Radiation Control Board 
12 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
Virginia 
Waste Management 
Board 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Water Pollution Control 
Board 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
Air Pollution Control 
Board 
7 4-year 
Appointed by 
Governor 
Rulemaking 
West Virginia 
Air Quality Board 7 5-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Appeals 
Surface Mine Board 7 5-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Appeals 
Environmental Quality 
Board 
5 5-year 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Appeals 
Wyoming10 
Environmental Quality 
Council 
7 
4-
years 
Appointed by 
Governor, confirmed 
by Senate 
Rulemaking 
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Many of the states with rulemaking boards originally housed their pollution 
control functions in independent boards prior to consolidation of functions into one 
department. 
Table 13 below lists the summary statistics for the explanatory variables and the 
expected influence on state scores on both policy adoption indices (Policy Adoption Index 
and Dispersed Pollution Sources Index). 
 
Table 13: Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Expected 
Direction Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Environmental Severity Variables     
TRI (total release per 
population) 
(+) 32.005 109.258 0.267 1,450.000 
Vehicle Miles 
 (miles/year/population) 
(+) 9.990 1.808 5.091 18.296 
Water area (%) (+) 0.076 0.092 0.001 0.662 
Surface water usage 
 (billion gallons per day) 
(+) 6.358 5.961 0.089 35.777 
Groundwater usage  
 (billion gallons per day)  
(+) 1.511 2.467 0.025 15.395 
      
System Resources Variables      
Urbanization (%) (+) 0.713 0.148 0.322 0.950 
Per capita income (per $10,000) (+) 29.041 9.241 11.685 59.687 
Population (per 10,000) (+) 5.654 6.173 0.453 38.000 
Size of a state (sq mile) (1000s) (+) 74.225 94.902 1.231 665.384 
Fiscal Health (per $1,000,000) (+/-) 1.098 7.570 -140.703 66.998 
      
Demand Variables      
Manufacturing (%) (-) 0.150 0.066 0.018 0.315 
Mining (%) (-) 0.029 0.061 0.000 0.397 
Agriculture (%) (-) 0.018 0.020 0.001 0.126 
Sierra Club (per 1000 residents) (+) 1.944 1.181 0.292 8.113 
Citizen ideology (+) 50.707 15.051 8.450 95.972 
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Table 13: Summary Statistics (continued) 
Variable 
Expected 
Direction Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Decision System      
Adoption of Super-Agency 
Structure 
(+/-) 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Adoption of Mini-EPA Structure (+/-) 0.489 0.500 0 1 
Adoption of Health Structure (+/-) 0.131 0.338 0 1 
Adoption of other type of 
Structure 
(-) 0.016 0.124 0 1 
Board/Commission (+/-) 0.540 0.499 0 1 
Government ideology (+) 50.540 27.001 0 99.167 
Governor power (+) 3.448 0.426 2.300 4.700 
Unified Government (+) 0.448 0.498 0 1 
Legislative professionalism (+) 0.196 0.128 0.027 0.659 
Legislative turnover (-) 0.214 0.278 0.000 2.161 
      
 
Model 1: Policy Adoption Index Results 
Overall, the theory of policy adoption is supported by the model, meaning the 
environmental quality, system resources, demand for policies, and decisional system all 
influence state adoption of environmental policies.  In general, as well, the model 
supports conclusions from previous studies of environmental policy adoption that more 
liberal, wealthier states are more likely to adopt environmental policies.  The results, 
summarized in Table 14 below, support the model of policy adoption.  While none of the 
agency structure variables was statistically significant, the presence of a board reduced 
the likelihood of adoption of these policies. 
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Table 14: Summary of Environmental Policy Adoption Index Results26 
 Total Policy Index 
Specific Measure Coefficient 
Robust Standard 
Error 
    
Constant -8.699  7.439 
    
Environmental Severity    
Toxic Inventory Release (total release per 
population) 
-0.003 
** 
0.001 
Vehicle Miles  -0.394 *** 0.140 
Water Area 0.026  1.739 
Groundwater usage 0.216  0.186 
Surface water usage -0.044  0.066 
    
System Resource Variables    
Fiscal Health (per $100,000) -0.007 * 0.004 
Urban Percentage (%) 0.093  10.505 
Per Capita Income (per $1000) 0.235 *** 0.030 
Population 0.381 ** 0.160 
Area 0.027 * 0.014 
    
Demand Variables    
Manufacturing (% GDP)  -0.094 * 5.450 
Mining (% GDP) -0.139 *** 3.031 
Agriculture (% GDP) 0.025  9.131 
Sierra Club Membership (per 1000 people) 0.139  0.227 
Citizen ideology -0.001  0.007 
    
Decisional System Variables    
Mini-EPA Structure 0.460  0.540 
Health Structure 0.407  0.648 
“Other” structure 0.021  0.517 
Board/Commission -1.370 ** 0.680 
Government Ideology 0.009 *** 0.004 
Unified Government 0.066  0.133 
Governor Power Index 0.303  0.335 
Legislative Professionalism -1.954  1.550 
Legislative Turnover -0.239 *** 0.089 
 
                                                          
26 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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The model explains 95 percent of the variance of the policy index and overall 
supports the model of policy adoption described in the previous chapter.  Of the 
Environmental Severity variables, the toxic release inventory, vehicle miles, and water 
area variables are statistically significant.  States with greater toxic releases and more 
vehicle miles travelled are less likely to adopt these environmental policies.  The water 
area of a state had the most significant effect on the Environmental Policy Adoption Index, 
with a one-percentage increase in water area resulting in an increase in the expected 
index of 2.57.  States with more water as a percent of the total area are more likely to 
adopt these policies.   The System Resources that are statistically significant include per 
capita income, population, and size of state.  Larger, wealthier states are more likely to 
adopt these environmental policies.   An increase in population of one unit increases the 
index by 0.381.  The Demand variable that is statistically significant is mining as a percent 
of GDP.  States with greater reliance on mining are less likely to adopt these policies.  Of 
the Decision System variables, the presence of a rulemaking or advisory board, 
government ideology, and legislative turnover were statistically significant.  States with a 
board or commission reduce their expected index by 1.370.  
 
Discussion 
In general, the results of the Environmental Innovativeness Index support the 
theory of policy adoption, but they fail to identify an effect of agency structure..  This 
section includes a general discussion of the results, while highlighting areas where the 
model could be improved.  Variables measuring each aspect of the Model of Policy 
Adoption (described in Chapter 6) were statistically significant.   
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Environmental severity 
As discussed above, environmental severity can be defined by environmental 
quality and as a resource to protect.  The measure included in these models, total toxic 
releases to land, air, and water was statistically significant and negative.  This result is 
surprising, but may be explainable.  The TRI measures large “smokestack” industry 
releases, while these policies are directed at addressing more dispersed sources of 
pollution.  States that have large pollution releases may be focusing on developing policies 
to address those releases, rather than the second and third generation pollution sources 
included in this model.  Bacot and Dawes (1997) found that TRI releases positively 
influenced state environmental expenditures, but negatively affected state 
environmental activism rankings (states that were more environmentally active as 
measured by an index, will have lower levels of releases).    In addition, Hoornbeek (2011) 
also found that TRI had a negative effect on non-point source policy activism.   It is also 
possible that states with higher pollution levels face higher industry pressure and 
economic concerns to reduce regulation.  
The Vehicle Miles variable had a similar negative impact on policy activism.  This 
result was unexpected, given many of the policies relate to air emissions.  If states were 
responding to the level of environmental severity in the state, the relationship should be 
positive.   When examining the data more closely, those states that have the highest 
vehicle miles per person are larger, more rural states, such as Wyoming, Mississippi, and 
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North Dakota.   Likely, this variable is not exactly capturing levels of environmental 
pollution.   
 
System resources 
As expected, generally states with more system resources are more likely to adopt 
environmental policies.  This result is consistent with the environmental policy literature.  
Larger, wealthier and more populous states are more likely to adopt environmental 
policies.   
 
Demand 
Only one demand variable is statistically significant: mining.  States with a greater 
reliance on mining were less likely to adopt these policies.  The mining industry result is 
consistent with the literature that has found that states with a greater dependence on 
polluting industries will be less likely to adopt more aggressive or innovative policies.   
 
Decisional system 
One element of the decisional system of a state did have a statistically significant 
influence on policy adoption.  The presence of an advisory or rulemaking board had a 
statistically significant negative effect on policy adoption.   These boards often include a 
diverse group of individuals, including representatives from industry, who may influence 
the types of policies adopted by the agency.  The board may just increase caution within 
the agency and state itself.   
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The surprising result is that the agency structure itself did not have a significant 
effect.  My model differs from other models, in that I separate out Mini-EPA and Super-
Agency, but also I have included a category for other, which includes those states that 
housed their pollution functions across a number of agencies.  In addition, the policies 
chosen may be less likely to be influenced by agency structure, since they address second 
and third generation problems. 
The variables measuring political uncertainty, legislative turnover and unified 
government, were not statistically significant.   The power of the governor’s office and 
legislative professionalism were not statistically significant.  Lester (1980), found that 
states with a more professional legislature were more likely to adopt environmental 
policies, while Hoornbeek (2011) found no statistically significant impact on policy 
adoption. 
 
Model 2: Dispersed Sources Index Results 
As with the Policy Adoption Index Model, this model also supports the 
Environmental Policy Adoption Model (described in Chapter 6).  Elements of 
environmental quality, system resources, demand for policies, and the decisional system 
all influence state adoption of these seven dispersed sources policies.  The results are 
summarized in Table 15 below. 
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Table 15: Summary of Dispersed Sources Index Results27 
 Dispersed Sources Policy Index 
Specific Measure Coefficient Standard Error 
    
Constant 8.026 * 4.447 
    
Environmental Severity    
Toxic Inventory Release (total release per 10 
million) -0.002 
* 
0.001 
Vehicle Miles  -0.692 *** 0.086 
Water Area 0.031 *** 1.154 
Groundwater usage -0.011  0.144 
Surface water usage -0.090  0.058 
    
System Resource Variables    
Fiscal Health (per $100,000) -0.007 * 0.004 
Urban Percentage (%) -0.094  6.201 
Per Capita Income (per $1000) 0.201 *** 0.019 
Population 0.244 * 0.135 
Area 0.004  0.008 
    
Demand Variables    
Manufacturing (% GDP)  -0.050  4.084 
Mining (% GDP) -0.250 *** 3.182 
Agriculture (% GDP) 2.495  5.542 
Sierra Club Membership (per 1000 people) 0.119  0.173 
Citizen ideology 0.006  0.006 
    
Decisional System Variables    
Mini-EPA Structure 0.134  0.299 
Health Structure -0.108  0.331 
“Other” structure 0.611 * 0.347 
Board/Commission -1.217 *** 0.344 
Government Ideology 0.010 *** 0.002 
Unified Government 0.119  0.091 
Governor Power Index 0.106  0.199 
Legislative Professionalism 0.236  1.532 
Legislative Turnover -0.026  0.061 
 
                                                          
27 *Significant P≤0.10 **Significant P≤0.05 ***Significant P≤0.01 
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The model explains 86 percent of the variance of the Dispersed Pollution Sources 
Index.  Of the Environmental Severity variables, the TRI, vehicle miles, and water area 
variables are statistically significant.  Again, water area has the most significant effect on 
the index score with a one-percentage increase in water area resulting in an increase of 
the Dispersed Pollution Sources Index of 0.031.  States with more vehicle miles travelled 
and greater toxic releases are less likely to adopt dispersed pollution source policies. 
States with greater quantity of water are more likely to adopt these policies.  The System 
Resources that are statistically significant include PCI and population.  Larger 
(population), wealthier states are more likely to adopt these policies.   Mining as a percent 
of GDP is the only Demand variable that is statistically significant.  A one-percentage 
increase in mining as a percent of GDP results in a decrease of the Dispersed Pollution 
Sources Index by 8.866.   Of the Decision System variables, adoption of the “Other” 
structure, the presence of a rulemaking or advisory board, government ideology were 
statistically significant.  Liberal states government are more likely to adopt these policies.  
However, states with a board or commission and an “Other” structure are less likely to 
adopt these policies.   States with a board or commission have 1.217 lower expected 
Dispersed Pollution Sources Index score. 
 
Discussion 
In general, the results of the Dispersed Pollution Sources Index support the theory 
of policy adoption.  This section includes a general discussion of the results, while 
highlighting areas where the model could be improved.  While many of the same factors 
affected adoption of these specific policies, there were some clear differences in the 
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results between this model and the Policy Adoption Index model.  Political characteristics 
of a state were much more influential in adoption of these policies than in the Policy 
Adoption Index.  
 
Environmental severity 
As in the Policy Adoption Index model, the level of toxic releases and the number 
of vehicle miles travelled in a state had a statistically significant effect on policy adoption 
and none of the resource variables were statistically significant.  States with higher 
number of vehicle miles and higher toxic releases were less likely to adopt polices 
included in this index.   This finding is consistent with the literature, in that states with 
higher level of pollution tend to have lower policy adoption (A. H. Bacot & Dawes, 1997).   
 
System resources 
As in the Policy Adoption Index model, wealthier, more populous states are more 
likely to adopt environmental policies.  However, the physical size of the state does not 
affect the adoption of these policies.  These results are consistent with the environmental 
policy adoption literature.   As in the first model, states with poorer fiscal health were less 
likely to adopt these policies.  This result is also consistent with the literature.  
 
Demand 
The only demand variable that was statistically significant was mining as a percent 
of GDP.  States with a greater reliance on mining were less likely to adopt these policies, 
as was found in the Policy Adoption Index.   However, while manufacturing was 
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statistically significant in the first model, it does not have a statistically significant effect 
on the adoption of the policies in the Dispersed Pollution Sources Index.   Surprisingly, 
given the type of policies included in this index, the ideology of the citizenry does not have 
a statistically significant impact on adoption of the policies.  
 
Decisional system 
The decisional system of a state did have a statistically significant influence on 
policy adoption.  As with the Environmental Innovativeness Index, the presence of an 
advisory or rulemaking board had a statistically significant negative effect on policy 
adoption.   However, states with an “Other” structure were more likely to adopt these 
policies.  This result is a little difficult to interpret because “Other” generally means that 
the pollution functions are not housed in a single agency.  Texas and California are good 
examples of this “Other” structure as they did not consolidate their functions into a single 
agency until the 1990s.   States with more liberal governments are more likely to adopt 
environmental policies overall, which again seems logical. 
 
Conclusion 
Does agency structure affect policy adoption? Ultimately, this analysis shows that 
bureaucratic structure matters.  Organizational theorists argue that structure defines the 
goals pursued and policy choices preferred.  This section highlights a few key points from 
the analysis, highlights where the model could be improved, and identifies future 
research to build on the analysis in this paper. 
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Advisory/Rulemaking Board 
One of the most interesting results, was the significant influence that an advisory or 
rulemaking board can have on policy adoption.  None of the previous studies of 
environmental agency structure included a measure of the presence of a board.  The 
literature on the role of boards and commissions on policy adoption at the state level is 
very limited and non-existent in environmental policy literature.   However, other studies 
of structure have found that this type of a board can affect agency outcomes (Knott & 
Payne, 2004; Meier, 1980; Mitchell, 1997).   Often these boards are created as a way to 
protect a political priority against future uncertainty (Volden, 2002).   Meier (1980) found 
that departmental regulatory agencies tend to be more supportive of regulation than 
independent regulatory commissions.  Agencies have larger budgets and more 
decentralization than a regulatory commission.   Therefore, they are more flexible to 
adopt new policies.  In addition, studies have found that boards can tend to serve 
particular interests (Mitchell, 1997).  Depending on the members of the board, a board 
could be influenced by interests that are resistant to policy adoption.  In higher education 
literature, states with  more centralized boards have lower tuition and overall costs (Knott 
& Payne, 2004).  In addition, just having to find an agreement among the diverse interests 
represented on the board could be challenging, leading to no new policies being adopted.  
These boards vary significantly across states, with some having more power to manage 
the agency and others acting strictly in a support capacity.  The diversity of these boards 
and the influence over time would be a very interesting area for future research.  Many 
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of these boards began as stand-alone agencies and their role and place in the hierarchy 
has changed over time  
 
Agency Structure 
Based on these analyses, the structure of an agency does not significantly affect adoption 
of these environmental policies.  The only structure variable that had a statistically 
significant affect was the “Other” structure.    This result is interesting, given that previous 
studies found that both Mini-EPA and Super-Agency structures facilitated policy adoption 
(A. Bacot & Dawes, 1996).   It would be interesting to see what effect structure has on 
more traditional first-generation pollution policies, such as air or water emissions levels. 
 
Environmental Severity 
The two environmental severity measures had an opposite effect on policy 
adoption than was expected.  States with more vehicle miles driven (and assumed higher 
levels of vehicle emissions) and higher levels of toxic releases (air, land, and water) were 
less likely to adopt these policies.  It is unclear if this result is because the variable is not 
the best measure of the type of environmental pollution problems these policies are 
developed to address, or if states with higher levels of pollution are less likely to adopt 
innovative policies.  States with higher levels of pollution could be less likely to adopt 
innovative policies due to economic pressure from industry groups.  
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Improvements to Analysis 
This empirical model could be improved with additional variables, better 
measures of certain variables, and a more detailed typology of agency structure.  In 
addition, the model only measures internal characteristics of a state, and does not 
account for horizontal or vertical influences on state policy adoption.  The models capture 
between 78 and 88 percent of the variation in the indices; it is likely that external 
influences would capture that missing variation.   Future analysis could use event history 
models to examine each individual policy to evaluate the role of diffusion in adoption of 
these policies.  
 
Variables 
While the model performed relatively well, there are a few variables that could be 
improved upon to better measure the characteristics of a state in the model.   Those 
variables include environmental quality, environmental group pressure, and citizen 
political preference for environmental policy.  
 Environmental Quality:  Finding a consistent, relevant measure of environmental 
quality for this time period is a challenge.  The TRI and vehicle measure was 
negatively significant in the models.  Perhaps a measure that addresses the type 
of pollutants these policies are addressing would enhance the model.  
 Environmental Group Pressure:  As stated above, the Sierra Club membership 
variable is only capturing one aspect of environmental group participation, and 
inclusion of member data from additional national or local groups would better 
capture this characteristic of the Demand. 
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Typology 
The model relies on the generally accepted typology in the literature for 
environmental agency structure.  However, this typology may not be the most accurate 
way to capture agency structure.  This typology does not completely account for the role 
of a rulemaking board, may oversimplify the diversity of the Super-Agency category, and 
may not reflect the competing priorities within the agencies.  I have added the presence 
of an advisory or rulemaking board into the model, an addition that no previous study has 
included.  A more accurate typology would label agencies with a rulemaking board as a 
type of hybrid-agency because of the strength of the board.  The way my model currently 
captures the board combines advisory and regulatory boards together.  I assume that 
each type of board would have a different impact on policy adoption.   The “Super-
Agency” category can include combined functions of agriculture, energy, or natural 
resources which all could have different impacts on policy outcomes.  Both Massachusetts 
and Connecticut have added a division of energy to their Super-Agency in the past five 
years.   
While the USEPA, has divisions focused on air quality, radiation protection, 
hazardous waste prevention, solid waste, and water quality (includes drinking water, 
surface water, coastal water, and groundwater), states’ Mini-EPA agencies can include 
additional functions.  For example, while the Montana Department of Environmental 
Quality regulates mines in that state, the Iowa Department of Agriculture regulates mines 
within its borders.  Figure 15 below lists the state agencies that can house some or all of 
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related functions.  The various functions related to environmental protection and the 
state agencies that house these various functions.   
 
Figure 15: Types of Agencies and Functions 
 
 
Some of these functions in the diagram are environmental protection functions, 
while others are related to environmental protection and often combined in super 
agencies.  The initial focus of state governments was on air quality and water quality.  
However, as these agencies matured, new issues arose, and the federal government 
passed more environmental laws, the focus began to expand.  Each state has combined 
these functions into its own state structure based on its goals and needs.   
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH PROSPECTS 
“They (political institutions) arise out of a politics of structural choice in which the winners 
use their temporary hold on public authority to design new structures and impose them 
on the polity as a whole. These structures are simply vehicles by which they pursue their 
own interest, often at the expense of losers” (Moe, 1990a). 
 
Rational organizational theorists argued that public bureaucracies should be 
designed efficiently to meet the regulatory mission of the agency (Gulick, 1937; Taylor, 
1911; Weber, 1922).   However, as Moe (1990a) argued, in practice, the design of public 
bureaucracies is a political exercise to achieve political goals.   This dissertation set out to 
answer two main questions in terms of the design of state pollution prevention agencies: 
1. How are the agencies designed? 
2. What is the impact of that design on policy adoption? 
Following the introduction and historical overview, the dissertation is designed 
around answering the two main questions above.  Chapter 3 develops a theory of state 
administrative agency adoption based on organizational and political literature.    
Chapters 4 and 5 empirically test this theory to understand why states adopted a 
comprehensive environmental agency and then more specifically why a state would 
adopt either a Super-Agency or Mini-EPA structure.   Chapter 6 develops a theory of state 
adoption of environmental policies and Chapter 7 uses that theory to empirically examine 
what role agency structure plays in environmental policy adoption.  This conclusion 
reviews the general findings of the dissertation, policy implications of the findings, and 
limitations of the analyses and potential future research directions. 
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Dissertation Summary 
Bureaucratic structure does matter.  Because structure affects agency outcomes, 
the design of agencies is a political exercise.  Governors and legislators have designed 
state environmental agencies to either aggressively reduce pollution within a state, or 
“balance” pollution prevention with economic and recreational interests within a state.  
In addition, in accordance with organizational theory, state environmental and health 
agencies responded to changes in the organizational environment.  As states faced 
greater administrative responsibilities from the USEPA and from the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, the conflicting missions required an organizational change.   Finally, 
environmental programs were redesigned as part of a larger push to create a more 
professional, competent and efficient state government.   Table 16 below provides a 
summary of policy adoption by state, agency structure type, and year that state 
consolidated their pollution control functions outside of the department of health.  In 
addition, the table lists what percentage of the total index each individual type of policies 
comprises.  
 
Table 16: Summary of Policy Adoption, Agency Structure, and Consolidation Year 
State Structure 
Structure 
Adopted Innovation Index 
Maine Mini-EPA 1972 12 
New Jersey Super-Agency 1970 12 
Pennsylvania Mini-EPA 1970 12 
Oregon Mini-EPA 1969 12 
Virginia Mini-EPA 1993 11 
New Hampshire Mini-EPA 1987 11 
Washington Super-Agency 1970 11 
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Table 16: Summary of Policy Adoption, Agency Structure, and Consolidation Year 
(continued) 
State Structure 
Structure 
Adopted Innovation Index 
New York Super-Agency 1970 10 
North Carolina Super-Agency 1971 10 
California Mini-EPA 1991 10 
Connecticut Super-Agency 1971 10 
Illinois Mini-EPA 1970 10 
Indiana Mini-EPA 1986 10 
Minnesota Mini-EPA 1967 10 
Utah Mini-EPA 1991 10 
Vermont Super-Agency 1969 10 
West Virginia Mini-EPA 1989 9 
New Mexico Mini-EPA 1991 9 
Rhode Island Mini-EPA 1978 9 
Colorado Health N/A 9 
Hawaii Health N/A 9 
Maryland Mini-EPA 1987 9 
Massachusetts Super-Agency 1975 9 
Texas Mini-EPA 1993 9 
Wisconsin Super-Agency 1967 9 
Delaware Super-Agency 1969 8 
Michigan Super-Agency 1973 8 
Florida Mini-EPA 1969 8 
Iowa Super-Agency 1972 8 
Montana Super-Agency 1995 8 
Ohio Mini-EPA 1972 8 
Missouri Mini-EPA 1974 7 
South Carolina Health N/A 7 
Tennessee Super-Agency 1991 7 
Arkansas Mini-EPA 1971 6 
Georgia Super-Agency 1972 6 
Louisiana Mini-EPA 1979 6 
Oklahoma Mini-EPA 1993 6 
North Dakota Health N/A 5 
Alabama Mini-EPA 1982 5 
Arizona Mini-EPA 1987 5 
Kentucky Super-Agency 1972 5 
South Dakota Super-Agency 1973 4 
Idaho Mini-EPA 2000 4 
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Table 16: Summary of Policy Adoption, Agency Structure, and Consolidation Year 
(continued) 
State Structure 
Structure 
Adopted Innovation Index 
Kansas Health N/A 4 
Mississippi Mini-EPA 1978 4 
Nevada Super-Agency 1973 4 
Alaska Mini-EPA 1971 2 
Wyoming Mini-EPA 1973 2 
 
Looking at the data in the table above, of those states that adopted 10 or more 
policies, approximately 56 percent use the Mini-EPA structure and adopted that structure 
prior to 1975.   There are also two states with their pollution prevention functions within 
the department of health that have adopted at least 10 of the policies. 
 
Policy Implications 
There are two primary policy implications of the research in this dissertation:  
aspects of bureaucratic structure matters and its design is influenced by more than 
efficiency or politics.    While the political pressure to respond to environmental pollution 
did drive states to consolidate their pollution control functions into a single agency, 
additional administrative pressures also strongly influenced agency design.    While 
initially, many governors pushed for a single agency as a political statement in support of 
environmental protection or political control over unaffiliated boards (Haskell & Price, 
1973), many agencies also developed out of statewide restructuring efforts.   
 
 The structures of state environmental agencies did not have a statistically 
significant impact on policy adoption.  However, the more consistent influence on policy 
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adoption was the presence of an advisory or rulemaking board.  This board is a significant 
influence on policy adoption across agency types and seems to reduce policy adoption.   
While the analysis does not differentiate between rulemaking and advisory or inclusion 
of politicians versus experts on the board, the role of this board should not be 
underestimated.   
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The empirical analysis provide interesting insight into the development of 
bureaucratic structure at the state level and the impact that structure has on policy 
adoption.  However, there are a few primary limitations and areas where the analysis 
could be enhanced and expanded upon in the future. 
The analyses are limited by the lack of consistent, reliable measure of many of the 
primary variables for the entire time period.  It is difficult to ascertain how environmental 
quality has impacted state adoption of environmental agency structure, and whether 
states that faced high levels of pollution were more or less likely to adopt a 
Comprehensive Structure.   In addition, while anecdotally we know that the growth in 
membership and activity of environmental groups influenced state politicians, without a 
strong measure of this membership for the entire time period, this influence cannot be 
estimated.    
In addition, the dissertation relies on the accepted typology in the literature of 
Health, Mini-EPA, and Super-Agency.  However, as is clear from the impact of the 
board/commission variable, there is additional variation in structure across states that 
152 
 
may be captured more accurately in a better typology.  It may be that structure does play 
more of a role in policy adoption than is estimated using this typology.   The typology used 
in this analysis is a very high-level classification that may not capture the variety across 
states.  For example, my typology includes in the Super-Agency classification those states 
with and without a secretariat system.  It is likely these two types of Super-Agencies 
actually function very differently and the pollution department within the Secretariat 
system has much more autonomy than within the other types of systems.   
Finally, the policy adoption model is an internal determinants model and does not 
measure external influences on policy adoption.  The analysis included in Chapter 7 uses 
policy indices to measure levels of policy activism within a state.   An event history 
analyses could help capture the role of the external influences on policy adoption.  The 
trade-off between the model used here and the event history analysis is between 
capturing external influences and measuring policy adoption of specific policies and 
overall levels of policy activism.  
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APPENDIX A: STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY STRUCTURE HISTORIES 
Appendix A includes, for each state, executive branch organizational charts that summarize all 
the following agencies within each state: health, environmental, natural resources, 
conservation, welfare, energy-related, and agricultural.  In addition, this appendix includes a 
diagram that shows the flow and development of each states’ environmental pollution 
programs through the various agencies to the current structure.  Below is a key to the diagrams. 
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Alabama  
Department of Environmental Management 
 
Mission Statement 
Responsibly adopt and fairly enforce rules and regulations consistent with the statutory 
authority granted to the Alabama Environmental Management Commission (AEMC) and 
the Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) to protect and improve 
the quality of Alabama's environment and the health of all its citizens. Monitor 
environmental conditions in Alabama and recommend changes in state law or revise 
regulations as needed to respond appropriately to changing environmental conditions. 
 
History and Budget Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Mini-EPA Y N N 1982 N/A 587 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$63,437,811 $18,376,418 29.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Y 
(disposal) 
Y N N N 
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Alabama
Department of 
Environmental 
Management
Governor
Land
Department of 
Conservation & Natural 
Resources 
Department 
of Economic 
& 
Community 
Affairs
Office of 
Water 
Resources
Wild & 
Freshwater 
Fisheries
Marine 
Resources 
State Parks
State Land
Air
Water
Agriculture & 
Industries 
Commissioner
Department of 
Agriculture
Board of 
Health
State 
Committee of 
Health
Department of 
Public Health
State 
Geologist
Geological Survey
Oil & Gas Board
Public 
Utilities 
Commission
Surface 
Mining 
Commission
Department 
of Human 
Resources
  
 
 
 
Department of Public Health (1982)
Water Improvement Commission (1947)
Water Improvement Commission (1971)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1971)
Environmental Management Commission
Alabama
Department of Public Health (1971)
Department of Environmental Management (1982)
Board of 
Certification 
of Water and 
Wastewater 
Systems 
Personnel
Water Wells 
and Standards 
Board (1971)
Coastal Area 
Board 
(1976-1979)
Department of Public Health
Board of Public Health (1875)
Water Improvement Commission (1966) Department of Public HealthDepartment of Public Health (1966)
Department of 
Mental Health 
(1965)
Medicaid Services 
(1977)
Medicaid Agency 
(1981)
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Alaska  
Department of Environmental Conservation  
 
Mission Statement 
To conserve, improve, and protect its natural resources and environment and control 
water, land, and air pollution, in order to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the 
people of the state and their overall economic and social well-being. 
 
History and Budget Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Mini-EPA Y N N 1971 N/A 511 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $                 85,353,600  $              2,362,890  27.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N 
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Alaska
Department of Environmental 
Conservation
Governor
Division of 
Water
Division of Air 
Quality
Department of Fish and Game Department of Natural Resources
Department of 
Health & Social 
Services
Department of 
Commerce, 
Community, & 
Economic 
Development
Alaska 
Energy 
Authority
Regulatory 
Commission 
of Alaska
Division of 
Parks & 
Outdoor 
Recreation
Division of 
Oil and Gas
Division of 
Mining, 
Land, & 
Water
Division of 
Geological & 
Geophysical 
Surveys
Division of 
Forestry
Division of 
Agriculture
Division of 
Habitat
Division of 
Wildlife 
Conservation
Division of 
Commercial 
Fisheries
Division of 
Sport Fish
Division of 
Subsistence
Division of 
Spill 
Prevention & 
Response
Division of 
Environmental 
Health
Department of 
Administration
Oil & Gas 
Conservation 
Commission
 
 
 
 
Environmental Advisory Board (1971-1994)
Alaska
Department of Health and Welfare (1959)
Department of Environmental Conservation (1971)
Department of Health & Social Services (1971)
Water Pollution Control Board
(1949-1959)
Department of Public 
Health (1945)
Department of Public 
Welfare (1937)
Department of Juvenile 
Institutions
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Arizona 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
DEQ's goal is to lead Arizona and the nation in protecting and enhancing the 
environment and improving the quality of life for the people of our state. The agency 
helps Arizonans respect the balance between the natural world and the people who 
depend on it for sustenance, prosperity and a fulfilling quality of life. 
 
 
History and Budget Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Mini-EPA Y N N 1987 N/A 612 
 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $               129,268,000   $            15,204,000  11.8% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Arizona
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Department 
of Game 
and Fish
Department 
of Water 
Resources
Department 
of Health 
Services
Department 
of 
Agriculture
State Mine 
Inspector
State Parks 
Board
Regulated 
Storage Tanks 
Division
Solid Waste 
Management 
Division
Hazardous 
Waste Division
Air Division
Water Division
Mining 
Division
Colorado 
River 
Water 
Planning
Surface 
Water 
Division
Department 
of Economic 
Security
Department 
of Child 
Safety
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Hearing Board (1967-2005)
Water Quality Control Council (1967)
Air Pollution Control Hearing Board (1967)
Water Quality Control Council (1967)
Air Pollution Control Hearing Board (1967)
Water Quality Control Council (1967)
Arizona
Department of Health (1940)
Department of Environmental Conservation (1987)
Board of Health (1903)
Department of Health Services (1974)
Department of Health Services (1987)
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Arkansas 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
We protect, enhance and restore the natural environment for the well-being of all 
Arkansans. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Mini-EPA Y N N 1971 N/A 337 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $               102,927,734   $            18,626,685  18.1% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N 
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Arkansas
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Natural Resources 
Commission
Department of 
Health
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of 
Parks & Tourism
Economic 
Development 
Commission
Energy 
Office
Surface 
Mining & 
Reclamation 
Division
Solid Waste 
Management 
Division
Hazardous 
Waste Division
Air Division
Water Division
Water 
Resources 
Management
Water 
Resources 
Development
Conservation 
Management
Department of 
Human Services
 
 
 
Arkansas Control and Ecology Commission
Arkansas Control and Ecology Commission 
Water Pollution Control Commission (1949)
Arkansas Department of Health (1949)
Pollution Control Commission (1965)
Department of Pollution Control and 
Ecology (1971)
Department of Environmental Quality (1999)
Department of Human 
Services (1977)
Department of  Health & 
Human Services (2005)
Department of Human Services (2007)Department of Health (2007)
Department of Health 
(1965)
Department of Social 
and Rehabilitative 
Services (1971)
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California 
Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Mission Statement 
To restore, protect, and enhance the environment, to ensure public health, 
environmental quality, and economic vitality 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Mini-EPA N Y N 1991 N/A 5810 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $            4,285,033,000  N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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California
Environmental Protection Agency
Governor
Natural Resources Agency Health and Human 
Services Agency
Department of Food & 
Agriculture
Air Resources 
Board
Dept. of 
Resources 
Recycling & 
Recovery
Dept. of Toxic 
Substances
State Water 
Resources 
Board
Dept. of 
Pesticide 
Regulation
Department of 
Fish & Wildlife
State Lands 
Commission
Department of 
Conservation
Public Utilities 
Commission
Office of 
Environmental 
Health Hazard 
Assessment
Department of 
Water 
Resources
Department of 
Parks & 
Recreation
California 
Energy 
Commission
Department of 
Forestry & Fire 
Protection
 
 
 
State Water Rights Board (1956)
Water Quality Control Board
Water Resources Control Board
Air Resources Board
Resources Agency (1961)
California Water Pollution Control Board (1949)
Environmental Protection Agency (1991)
State Water Board (1913)
Air Resources Board 
(1967)
Secretary of 
Environmental Affairs 
(1981)
Department of 
Conservation
State Water Rights Board (1956)
Water Quality Control 
Board
Department of Water Resources 
(1956) 
Parks & Recreation 
Department
Fish & Game 
Department
Department of 
Social Welfare
Department of 
Mental Hygiene
Health and Welfare 
Agency (1961)
Health & Human Services  Agency (1999)
Board of Health (1870)
Department of Health 
Services 
Natural Resources Agency (2009)
Resources Agency (2009)
Department of Health 
(1949)
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Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment 
 
Mission Statement 
The mission of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment is to 
protect and improve the health of Colorado’s people and the quality of its environment. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Health Y N N N/A N/A 1276 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $               548,628,367   $          292,816,022  53% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Colorado
Department of Public Health and 
Environment
Governor
Department 
of Regulatory 
Agencies
AgricultureDepartment of Natural Resources
Department 
of Labor & 
Employment
Water Quality 
Control 
Division
Division of Oil 
& Public 
Safety
Hazardous  
Materials & 
Waste 
Management 
Division
Air Pollution 
Division
Public Utilities 
Commission
Division of 
Reclamation, Mining 
& Safety
Colorado Geological 
Survey
Colorado Oil & Gas 
Conservation
Water Conservation 
Board
State Board of Land 
Commissioners
Division of Water 
Resources
Division of Parks & 
Wildlife
Department 
of Human 
Services
 
 
 
Water Quality Control Commission (1966)
Air Quality Control Commission (1977)
Hazardous Waste Commission (1992-2006)
Solid & Hazardous Waste Commission (2006)
Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment (1993)
Water Quality Control Commission (1966)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1970-1977)
Air Quality Control Commission (1977)
Board of Health (1877)
Department of Health (1967)
Department of Human Services (1993)
Department of Social 
Services & Institutions 
(1967)
Department of 
Public Welfare
Department of 
Rehabilitation
Commission on 
Aging
Department of 
Veterans Affairs
Department of Health Care 
Policy and Financing (1993)
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Connecticut 
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
Charged with conserving, improving and protecting the natural resources and the 
environment of the state of Connecticut as well as making cheaper, cleaner and more 
reliable energy available for the people and businesses of the state.  The agency is also 
committed to playing a positive role in rebuilding Connecticut’s economy and creating jobs 
– and to fostering a sustainable and prosperous economic future for the state. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency N Y N 1971 2011 1022 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $169,630,775  $35,434,518 20.9% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 
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Connecticut
Department of Energy & Environmental Protection
Governor
Public 
Utilities 
Regulatory 
Authority
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Public 
Health
Air Management, Water 
Pollution, & Land Reuse & 
Materials Management & 
Compliance Assurance
PURA, Energy & 
Technology
Outdoor Recreation & 
Natural Resources
Bureau of Control Services
Bureau of Water
Bureau of Materials 
Management & 
Compliance 
Assurance
Bureau of Air
Bureau of Natural 
Resources
Bureau of  Outdoor 
Recreation 
Public Utilities 
Regulatory Authority
Bureau of Energy & 
Technology
Department 
of Social 
Services
  
 
 
 
Connecticut
Water Resources 
Commission (1957) 
Department of Environmental 
Protection (1971)
State Water 
Commission (1925)
Flood Control and 
Water Policy 
Commission (1939)
State Board of 
Supervision of Dams 
(1939)
Department of Energy and 
Environment (2011)
Department of Public 
Utility Control
Governor’s Office of 
Policy and 
Management
Park & 
Forest 
Commission
Commission 
on Forests & 
Wildlife 
(1925)
Shell-Fish 
Commission 
(1881)
State 
Geological & 
Natural 
History 
Survey 
Commission 
(1903)
Clean Air 
Commission 
(1969)
State Park 
Commission 
(1911)
State Board of 
Fisheries & 
Wildlife (1913)
Fish 
Commissioners 
(1867)
Commissioners 
of Fisheries & 
Game
Air Pollution 
Control 
Commission 
(1967)
Board of 
Health 
(1878)
Department of 
Health (1919)
State Board of 
Agriculture (1866)
Department of 
Agriculture (1925)
Department of Farms & 
Markets (1947)
Department of 
Agriculture (1953)
Department of 
Agriculture( 1971)
Department of 
Agriculture, 
Conservation, & Natural 
Resources (1959)
Department of 
Agriculture and Natural 
Resources (1961)
Department of 
Public Health 
(1995)
Department of Health  
Services (1979)
  
 
  
168 
 
Delaware  
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control 
 
Mission Statement 
The mission of the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control 
is to protect and manage the state's vital natural resources, protect public health and 
safety, provide quality outdoor recreation and to serve and educate the citizens of the First 
State about the wise use, conservation and enhancement of Delaware's environment. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 
Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency    
Super-Agency N Y N 1969 N/A 772 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $133,572,900  N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N 
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Delaware
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of 
Health & Social 
Services
Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Control
Office of the Secretary Office of Natural Resources
Office of Environmental 
Protection
Division of Energy & 
Climate
Delaware Coastal 
Programs
Division of Fish & 
Wildlife
Division of Parks & 
Recreation
Division of Air Quality
Division of Waste & 
Hazardous Substances
Division of Water Division of Watershed 
Stewardship
  
 
 
 
Delaware 
Water and Air 
Resources 
Commission (1966)
Department of Natural Resources & Environmental Control (1969)
Water Pollution Commission  (1951)
Air Pollution Authority (1957)
Board of Game & 
Fish 
Commissioners  
(1911)
Commission on 
Shell Fisheries 
(1953)
Atlantic State 
Marine Fisheries 
Commission 
(1941) 
State Park 
Commission 
(1937)
State Forestry 
Department 
(1927)
Recreation 
Advisory Council 
(1968)
Soil & Water 
Conservation 
Commission 
(1963)
Board of Ditch 
Commissioners 
(1951)
Delaware River 
Basin 
Commission 
(1951)
Department of Agriculture (1974) 
Council on Game 
& Freshwater 
Fish (1953)
Commission for 
the Conservation 
of Forests in 
Delaware (1925)
Board of Health (1879)
Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control (1974)
Department of Health 
& Social Services 
(1969)
Various Welfare 
Agencies
Department of 
Agriculture
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Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) protects, conserves and manages 
Florida's natural resources and enforces the State's environmental laws. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1969 1993 2822 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $1,522,137,513 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Florida
Department of Environmental Protection
Governor
Fish and 
Wildlife 
Commission
Department 
of Health
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Consumer Services
Commissioner of 
Agriculture
Public Service 
Commission
Legislative Branch
Air Resource 
Management
Environmental 
Assessment & 
Restoration
Waste 
Management
Recreation & 
Parks
Water 
Resource 
Management
Florida 
Geological 
Survey
Deputy Secretary 
Regulatory 
Programs
Deputy Secretary 
Water Policy & 
Ecosystem 
Restoration
Deputy Secretary 
Land & Recreation
State Lands
Ecosystems
Florida Coastal 
Office
Water Policy 
Director
Department 
of Children 
& Families
  
 
 
 
Department of Pollution Control 
(1972)
Department of Environmental Protection (1993)
Department of Air and Water 
Pollution Control (1969)
Air and Water Pollution Control 
Commission (1967)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1959)
Department of Environmental 
Regulation (1975)
Department of Natural Resources 
(1969)
State Board of 
Conservation (1963)
Canal Authority (1933)
Commission on Marine 
Sciences & Technology
Florida Keys Aqueduct 
Commission (1953)
Board of Parks & 
Historic Memorials 
(1935)
Outdoor Recreational 
Development Council 
(1963)
Board of Drainage 
Commissioners (1905)
Suwannee River 
Development Authority
State Board of Health (1889)
Department of Health 
(1997)
Department of Health & 
Rehabilitative Services (1969)
Department of Children 
& Families (1997)
Florida
  
 
 
172 
 
Georgia 
Department of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To sustain, enhance, protect, and conserve Georgia's natural, historic, and cultural 
resources for present and future generations, while recognizing the importance of 
promoting the development of commerce and industry that utilize sound environmental 
practices 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y (air) Y (water) N 1972 N/A 750 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$250,049,298 $46,510,538 18.6% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Georgia
Governor
State Forestry 
Commission
Department 
of Community 
Health
Department of 
Agriculture
Commissioner 
of Agriculture
Utilities Division
Public Service 
Commissioner
Board of Natural Resources
Department of Natural Resources
Coastal Resources Law Enforcement
Historic 
Preservation
Parks, Recreation, 
& Historic Sites
Environmental 
Protection
Wildlife Resources
Department 
of Public 
Health
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Board of Natural Resources (1972)
Water Quality Control Board (1964)
Georgia
Department of Natural Resources (1972)
Department of Health
Department of Human Services (1972)
Water Quality Council (1957)
Board of Health
Department of Public Health (2011)Department of Human Services (2011)
25 Conservation 
Agencies
Board of Public Welfare (1919)
Department of Public Welfare (1937)
Board of Social Security (1943)
Department of Public Welfare (1960)
Department of Family & Children (1963)
Other Welfare 
Agencies
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Hawaii 
Department of Health 
 
Mission Statement 
The mission of the Department of Health is to protect and improve the health and 
environment for all people in Hawaii. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Health Y N N N/A N/A 2596 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $929,841,910 $87,164,911 9.4% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Hawaii
Department of Health
Governor
Department of 
AgricultureBoard of Land & Natural Resources
Health 
Resources 
Administration
Environmental Health Division
Behavioral 
Health 
Division
Department of Land & Natural Resources
Hazard Evaluation & 
Emergency Response
Office of Health Care 
Assurance
Environmental 
Management
Compliance 
Assistance
Division of 
Forestry & 
Wildlife
Division of 
Boating & 
Ocean 
Recreation
State Parks
Aquatic 
Resources
Land Division
State Historic 
Preservation
Environmental 
Health Services
Environmental 
Resources
State Laboratories
Environmental 
Planning
Department of 
Human Services
  
 
 
 
Hawaii
Department of Health 
(1959)
Department of Health
Environmental Health Administration
Environmental Management Division
(1972)
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Idaho 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect human health and preserve the quality of Idaho's air, land, and water for use 
and enjoyment today and in the future. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 2000 N/A 358  
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$54,856,400 $31,637,700 57.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Department of Water 
Resources
Department of Health 
and Welfare
Department of 
Agriculture
State Board of 
Health & Welfare
Department of Parks & 
Recreation
Parks & 
Recreation Board
Governor’s 
Office of Energy 
Resources
Air Quality
Water Quality
Waste 
Management 
& Remediation
Environmental 
Management 
& Information
Utilities
Financial 
Resources
Energy 
Efficiency
Renewable 
Energy
Information 
Resources
Water 
Management
Water 
Resources 
Planning
 
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Commission (1959)
Department of Environmental Protection & Health (1972)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1959)
Board of Environmental Quality (2000)
Board of Health and Welfare 
Idaho
Board of Health (1907)
Department of Environmental Quality (2000)
Department of Public Welfare (1919)
Department of Public Health (1941)
Department of Public 
Assistance (1941)
Department of Charitable 
Institutions (1941)
Department of Health & Welfare (1974)
Department of Health & Welfare (2000)
Department of Social & 
Rehabilitation Services
Veterans Affairs 
Commission
Department of 
Corrections (1995)
Department of 
Veterans Affairs (2000)
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Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Mission Statement 
To safeguard environmental quality, consistent with the social and economic needs of 
the State so as to protect health, welfare, property, and the quality of life. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y 
Y (sanitation 
board) 
N 1970 N/A 726 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$297,178,700 $63,640,300 21.4% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Illinois
Governor
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Public 
Health
Environmental Protection Agency Department of Natural Resources
Air Land Water
Department 
of 
Commerce 
& Economic 
Opportunity
Energy Office
Water 
Resources
Coal 
Development
Mines & 
Minerals
Land 
Management
Coastal 
Management 
Program
Department 
of Human 
Services
Pollution 
Control 
Board
  
 
 
 
Illinois
Board of Health (1877)
Environmental Protection Agency (1970)
Sanitary Water Board 
(1929)
Air Pollution Control 
Board (1963)
Department of Public Health (1970)Pollution Control Board (1970)
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Indiana 
Department of Environmental Management 
 
Mission Statement 
To implement federal and state regulations to protect human health and the 
environment while allowing the environmentally sound operations of industrial, 
agricultural, commercial and government activities vital to a prosperous economy. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1986 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $121,760,282 $19,025,168 15.6% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N 
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Indiana
Governor
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Health
Department of Environmental Management Department of Natural Resources
Utility 
Regulatory 
Commission
Air Quality Land 
Quality
Water 
Quality
Fish & Wildlife
Forestry
Land Acquisition Nature Preserves
Outdoor 
Recreation
State Parks & 
Reservoirs
Historic 
Preservation
Oil & Gas
Reclamation
Water
Electricity
Natural Gas
Pipeline 
Safety
Water/ 
Wastewater
Family & Social 
Services 
Administration
  
 
 
 
Indiana
Air Pollution Control Board (1961)
Department of Health
Department of Health (1986)
Stream Pollution Control Board (1947)
Air Pollution Control Board  (1985-2013)
Water Pollution Control Board (1985-2013)
Solid Waste Management Board (1985 2013)
Environmental Rules Board (2013)
Department of Environmental Management (1986)
Board of Health (1887)
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Iowa 
Department of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To conserve and enhance our natural resources in cooperation with individuals and 
organizations to improve the quality of life for Iowans and ensure a legacy for future 
generations. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y  N N 1972 1986 1007  
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$396,347,481 $25,696,891 6.5% 
   
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Iowa
Department of Natural Resources
Governor
Department of Public 
Health
Department of 
Agriculture & Land 
Stewardship
Secretary of 
Agriculture
Environmental Services
Water Quality
Conservation & Recreation
Air Quality
Land Quality Fisheries
Forestry
Wildlife
State Parks
Land & Waters
Department of 
Human Services
 
 
 
Iowa
Department of Natural Resources  (1985/86)
Department of 
Environmental Quality 
(1972)
Conservation 
Commission (1935/36)
Iowa Geological Survey 
(1892)
Department of Water, Air, 
Waste Management (1983)
Fish and Game 
Commission (1931)
State Board of 
Conservation (1917)
Iowa Natural Resources 
Council (1949)
Energy Policy Council 
(1974)
Water Pollution Control Commission (1965)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1969)
Department of Health (1923)
Department of Public 
Health  (1972)
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Kansas 
Department of Health and Environment 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and improve the health and environment of all Kansans. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Health Y N N N/A N/A 1057 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$2,453,854,065 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Kansas
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of Health and Environment
Department of Wildlife, 
Parks, & Tourism
Division of 
Public Health
Division of Environment
Division of Health 
Care Finance
Air
Environmental 
Remediation
Waste 
Management
Water
Fisheries & 
Wildlife
Parks & 
Tourism
Kansas 
Corporation 
Commission
Energy
Utilities
Conservation
Department of 
Aging & 
Disability 
Services
Department for 
Child & Families
 
 
 
Kansas
Department of Health (1949)
Board of Health (1885)
Department of Health & 
Environment (1974)
Board of Welfare (1937
Department of Social Welfare 
(1949)
Department of Social & 
Rehabilitation Services (1973)
Department of Aging & 
Disability Services (2011)
Department for Child & 
Families (2011)
Kansas Health Policy Authority 
(2005)
Department of Social & 
Rehabilitation Services (2005)
Department of Health & 
Environment (2011)
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Kentucky  
Energy and Environment Cabinet 
 
Mission Statement 
To Protect and Enhance Kentucky’s Environment 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency  Y N N 1973 N/A  765 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$262,150,123 $69,030,513 26.3% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Kentucky
Secretary of Energy and Environment Cabinet
Governor
Cabinet 
for Health 
& Family 
Services
Department 
of Agriculture
Secretary 
of 
Agriculture
Department for 
Environmental 
Protection
Forestry
Department for Natural 
Resources
Department for Energy 
Development & 
Independence
Environmental 
Quality 
Commission
State Nature 
Preserves 
Commission
Mine Safety 
Review 
Commission
Waste 
Management
Air Quality
Water
Mine Permits
Conservation
Abandoned 
Mine Lands
Mine 
Reclamation & 
Enforcement
Mine Safety & 
Licensing
Oil & Gas
Public 
Service 
Commission
Efficiency & 
Conservation Renewable 
Energy
Biofuels
Energy 
Generation, 
Transmission, 
& Distribution
Carbon 
Management
Fossil Energy 
Development
  
 
 
 
Water Pollution Control Commission (1940s)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1966)
Kentucky
Department of Health (1934) 
Energy & Environment 
Cabinet  (2008)
Department for Natural Resources & 
Environmental Protection (1973)
Environmental & Public Protection 
Cabinet (2003)
Labor Cabinet (2008)
Public Protection 
Cabinet (2008)
Department of Environmental Protection (1972)
Department of Natural 
Resources (1964)
Department of 
Conservation (1936)
Department of Energy (1978)
Natural Resources & Environmental 
Protection Cabinet (1982)
Public Protection & 
Regulation Cabinet
Labor Cabinet
Governor’s Office for Coal 
& Energy Policy (1989)
Energy Cabinet (1982)
Cabinet for Human Resources (1972)
Department of 
Child Welfare 
(1960)
Department of 
Economic 
Security (1948)
Department of 
Human Resources 
(1973)
Cabinet for Human 
Resources (1982)
Cabinet for 
Health Services 
(1995)
Cabinet for 
Families & 
Children (1995)
Cabinet for Health & 
Family Services (2004)
ater Pollution Control Commission (1940s)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1966)
Department of Health (1934) 
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Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To provide service to the people of Louisiana through comprehensive environmental 
protection in order to promote and protect health, safety and welfare while considering 
sound policies regarding employment and economic development 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1979 1984 677  
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$114,721,953 $19,930,946 17.4% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
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Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Department 
of Health 
and 
Hospitals
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Public Service 
Commission
Department of 
Natural Resources
Department 
of Wildlife & 
Fisheries
Coastal 
Protection & 
Restoration 
Board
Commissioner 
of Agriculture
Environmental 
Services
Environmental 
Compliance
Air 
Permits
Water 
Permits
Waste 
Permits
Enforcement
Assessment
Inspection
Conservation
Coastal 
Management
Mineral 
Resources
Public Utilities
Department 
Children & 
Family 
Services
  
 
 
 
Louisiana
Department of Natural 
Resources (1976) 
Air Pollution Commission (1950s)
Department of Fish & 
Wildlife (1944)
Department of Environmental 
Quality (1984)
Stream 
Control 
Commission 
(1949)
Department of Conservation  (1918)
(originally created under different name 1910)
Forestry 
Commission 
(1944)
Department of 
Conservation (1944)
Department of Natural 
Resources (1979)
Department of Agriculture & 
Forestry (1980s)
Wildlife & 
Fisheries 
Commission 
(1952)
Department of Natural 
Resources (1979)
Department of Health 
Department of Health & 
Human Services (1979)
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Forestry
Board of Health (1877)
Department of Health  
& Hospitals (1988)
Department 
of Public 
Welfare
Health & 
Human 
Resource 
Administration
Department of 
Social Services 
(1988)
Board of 
Public 
Welfare
Department of Children 
& Family Services (2010)
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Maine 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
To prevent, abate, and control the pollution of the air, water, and land. To preserve, 
improve, and prevent diminution of the natural environment of the state. To protect and 
enhance the public's right to use and enjoy the State's natural resources. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1972 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$74,970,812 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 
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Maine
Department of Environmental Protection
Governor
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services
Public Utilities 
Commission
Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation, & Forestry
Department of 
Marine 
Resources
Department of 
Inland Fisheries 
& Wildlife
Remediation & 
Waste 
Management
Air Quality Land & Water
Agriculture, Food, & 
Rural Resources
Parks & Lands
Forestry
Resource Information 
& Land Use Planning
  
 
 
 
Maine
Board of Environmental Protection (1972)
Department of Environmental Protection (1972)
Board of Health (1885)
Sanitary Water Board (1941-1951)
Water Improvement Commission (1951-1967)
Water & Air Environmental Improvement Commission (1967-1969)
Environmental Improvement Commission (1969)
Department of Health & Welfare (1931)
Department of 
Corrections (1981)
Land Use Regulation Commission
Department of Mental Health & 
Corrections 
Committee on Aging
Committee on Children & Youth
Governor’s Advisory Council on 
the Status of Women
Board of Certification of Water Treatment 
Plant Operators
New England Interstate Water Pollution 
Control Commission 
Wetlands Control Board
Mining Commission
Department of Human Services (1975)
Department of Behavioral & 
Developmental Services (1983)
Department of Health & Human Services (2004)
Board of Pesticides Control
Department of Health (1917)
Board of Charities & 
Corrections (1885) Department of Mental Health & 
Retardation (1939)
Department of Human 
Services
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Maryland 
Department of the Environment 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and restore the quality of Maryland's air, water, and land resources, while 
fostering smart growth, a thriving and sustainable economy and healthy communities 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y Y(WATER) N 1987 N/A 1008 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$393,005,002 $76,526,503 19.5% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Maryland
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of Environment Department of Natural Resources
Department of 
Health & Mental 
Hygiene
Air & Radiation 
Management
Land 
Management
Water 
Management
Land 
Resource
Aquatic 
Resources
Park Service
Forest Service
Wildlife & 
Heritage Service
Land Acquisition 
& Planning
Engineering & 
Construction
Chesapeake & 
Coastal Service
Boating Service 
Fisheries Service
Resource 
Assessment
Integrated Policy 
& Review
Critical Area 
Commission-
Department of 
Human Resources
  
 
 
 
Board of Natural Resources (1941)
Maryland
Department of the 
Environment (1987)
Department of Health (1910)
Board of Health (1874)
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (1969)
State Lunacy 
Commission 
(1886)
Board of Mental 
Hygiene (1922)
Department of 
Welfare (1922)
Department of Mental 
Hygiene (1949)
Conservation 
Commission (1916)
Department of Natural Resources (1969)
Conservation 
Department (1922)
Water Resources 
Commission (1933)
State Game Warden (1896)
State Geological Survey (1834)
State Geological & Economic 
Survey (1896)
State Oyster Police Force (1868)
State Fishery Force (1874)
Department of Health & 
Mental Hygiene (1987)
Department of 
Corrections
Department of Natural 
Resources (1969)
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Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs 
 
Mission Statement 
Responsible for ensuring clean air and water, the safe management of toxics and 
hazards, the recycling of solid and hazardous wastes, the timely cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites and spills, and the preservation of wetlands and coastal resources. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1969 1975, 2007 N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$247,227,000 $73,311,377 29.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 
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Massachusetts
Governor
Department 
of 
Agricultural 
Resources
Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs
Department of 
Public Health
Department of 
Energy 
Resources
Executive Office of 
Health & Human 
Services
Dept. of 
Conservation & 
Recreation
Department of Environmental Protection
Department 
of Fish & 
Game
Department 
of Public 
Utilities
Operations & 
Environmental 
Compliance
Policy & Planning
Bureau of Planning & 
Evaluation
Bureau of Resource Protection
Bureau of Waste 
Prevention
Bureau of Waste Site 
Cleanup
MassParks
Water Supply Protection
Watershed Management
Water Resources 
Energy Efficiency
Energy Markets 
Marketing and Stakeholder 
Engagement
Renewable Energy
 
 
 
Massachusetts
Water Resource Commission (1956)
Department of 
Public Health  
(1914)
Executive Office of Environment (1975)
Executive Office of Energy & 
Environmental Affairs (2007)
Executive Office of Economic 
Development (1997)
Department of Natural Resources (1953)
Executive Office of Health & Human Services (1975)
Department of 
Public Welfare 
(1919)
State Board of Charity (1863)
Department of 
Corrections (1919)
Board of Health (1869)
Department of Mental 
Diseases (1916)
Board of Health, Lunacy, & Charity (1879)
Department of Mental 
Health (1938)
Executive Office of Housing & 
Economic Development (2007)
Department of 
Agriculture (1919)
Board of Agriculture 
(1852)
Board of Commissioners on 
Fisheries (1865)
Board of Commissioners on 
Fisheries & Game (1886)
Department of Conservation (1919)
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Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality promotes wise management of 
Michigan's air, land, and water resources to support a sustainable environment, healthy 
communities, and vibrant economy. 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y Y N 1995 1995, 2009,2011 N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $504,091,800  N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Michigan
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Rural 
Development
Department of Natural Resources
Department of 
Health & Human 
Services
Department of 
Licensing & 
Regulatory Affairs
Air Quality
Department of Environmental Quality
Oil, Gas, & 
Minerals
Waste 
Management & 
Radiological 
Protection
Drinking Water 
& Municipal 
Assistance
Remediation& 
Redevelopment
Water 
Resources
Fisheries
Law 
Enforcement
Parks & 
Recreation
Forest 
Resources
Minerals 
Management
Wildlife Public Services 
Commission
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Commission (1965)
Michigan
Department of Public Health (1973)
Department of Natural Resources (1968)
Department of Natural Resources (1973)
Department of Environmental Quality (1995)
Department of 
Community Health 
(1996)
Department of Agriculture (1921)
Department of Agriculture (1973)
Department 
of Mental 
Health (1965)
Department of Social 
Services (1963)
Department of Social 
Welfare (1939)
Family Independence 
Agency (1996)
Department of Human 
Services (2005)
Department of Welfare 
(1921)
Board of State Commissioners for General 
Supervision of Charitable, Penal, Pauper & 
Reformatory Institutions (1871)
Department of Health & Human Services (2015)
Department of Natural Resources (1995)
State Council of Health (1919)
Water Resources Commission (1949)
Department of Conservation (1965)
Stream Pollution Control Commission (1929)
Department of 
Conservation 
(1921) 4 recreational commissions
Department of Natural Resources & Environment (2009)
Department of Environmental Quality (2011)Department of Natural Resources (2011)
Department of Public Health (1965)
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Minnesota 
Department of Pollution Control  
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and improve the environment and enhance human health. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y Y N 1967 N/A 941 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$216,977,000 $28,108,000 13% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N 
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Minnesota
Department of Pollution Control
Public 
Utilities 
Commission
Governor
Department 
of 
Commerce
Department 
of Health
Board of 
Water & Soil 
Resources
Department of Natural Resources
Environmental 
Analysis & 
Outcomes
Municipal
Remediation
Watershed
Industrial
Operations
Resource 
Management & 
Assistance
Enforcement
& Policy
Forestry, 
Lands, & 
Minerals & 
Ecological & 
Water 
Resources
Parks & Trails
Energy 
Resources
Department 
of Human 
Services
Department 
of 
Agriculture
 
 
 
Water Pollution Control Advisory Committee (1961-1975)
Pollution Control Agency Citizens’ Board (1967-2015)
Water Pollution Control Advisory Committee 1961
Minnesota
Board of Health (1872)
Pollution Control Agency (1967)
Board of Health (1967)
Water Pollution Control Commission (1945)
Department of 
Health (1977)
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Mississippi 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of present and future generations of 
Mississisppians by conserving and improving our environment and fostering wise 
economic growth through focused research and responsible regulation. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1978 1989 491 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$139,147,504 $34,131,941 24.5% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 
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Mississippi
Department of 
Environmental Quality
Public 
Service 
Commission
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, 
& Parks
Pollution Control
Land & Water
Geology
Inland 
Fisheries
Wildlife
State Parks
Museum of 
Natural 
Science
Department of Marine 
Resources 
Forestry 
Commission
Coastal 
Ecology
Marine 
Fisheries
Marine Patrol
Coastal 
Management 
& Planning
Department 
of Human 
Services
Department 
of 
Agriculture 
& 
Commerce
 
 
 
Mississippi
Department of Natural 
Resources (1978)
Geological Survey 
(1850)
Board of Water 
Commissioners
Air and Water Pollution 
Control Commission 
(1966)
Park Commission 
Mineral Lease 
Commission
Department of 
Environmental 
Quality (1989)
Department of 
Health (1982)
Department of 
Wildlife, Fisheries, 
and Parks (1989)
Board of Health (1877)
Board of Health (1978)
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Missouri 
Department of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect, preserve, and enhance Missouri's natural, cultural and energy resources 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1974 N/A 1694 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$558,319,893 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Missouri
Governor
Department 
of Agriculture
Department 
of Health & 
Senior 
Services
Department of ConservationDepartment of Natural Resources
Environmental 
Quality
Geological Survey State Parks
Forestry
Private Land 
Services
Resource Science & 
Wildlife
Fisheries Protection
Department 
of Social 
Services
 
 
 
Air Conservation Commission
Clean Water Commission 
Water Pollution Board (1958-1972)
Clean Water Commission (1972)
Air Conservation Commission (1965)
Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (1974)
Department of Public Health & Welfare 
(1945)
Department of Health & 
Senior Services (2001)
Geological Survey (1853)
State Park Fund (1917)
Soil & Water Districts Commission (1943)
Air Conservation Commission (1965)
Historic Preservation Office (1968)
Missouri Land Reclamation Commission (1971)
Clean Water Commission (1972)
State Environmental Improvement & Energy 
Resources Authority (1972)
Five other agencies/boards/commissions
Department of Social 
Services (1974)
Department of Social 
Services (2001)
Board of Health (1883)
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Montana 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect, sustain, and improve a clean and healthful environment to benefit present 
and future generations 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1995 N/A 366 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$62,308,434 $24,281,714 39.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Missouri
Governor
Department 
of Agriculture
Department 
of Health & 
Senior 
Services
Department of ConservationDepartment of Natural Resources
Environmental 
Quality
Geological Survey State Parks
Forestry
Private Land 
Services
Resource Science & 
Wildlife
Fisheries Protection
Department 
of Social 
Services
 
 
 
Air Conservation Commission
Clean Water Commission 
Water Pollution Board (1958-1972)
Clean Water Commission (1972)
Air Conservation Commission (1965)
Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (1974)
Department of Public Health & Welfare 
(1945)
Department of Health & 
Senior Services (2001)
Geological Survey (1853)
State Park Fund (1917)
Soil & Water Districts Commission (1943)
Air Conservation Commission (1965)
Historic Preservation Office (1968)
Missouri Land Reclamation Commission (1971)
Clean Water Commission (1972)
State Environmental Improvement & Energy 
Resources Authority (1972)
Five other agencies/boards/commissions
Department of Social 
Services (1974)
Department of Social 
Services (2001)
Board of Health (1883)
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Nebraska 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect Nebraska's air, land, and water resources 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1971 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$74,612,962 $18,205,000 24.4% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Nebraska
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Secretary of 
Health 
Services & 
Human 
Services
Public 
Service 
Commission
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Natural 
Resources
Board of 
Geologists
Game & 
Parks 
Commission
Power 
Review 
Board
Oil & Gas 
Conservation 
Commission
Air Quality
Waste 
Management
Water 
Quality
  
 
 
 
Environmental Control Council (1971)
Water Pollution Control Council (1957)
Nebraska
Department of Environmental Control (1971)
Department of Health (1933)
Department of Health (1971)
Board of Health (1891)
Department of Health (1918)
Environmental Control Council (1971)
Department of Environmental Quality (1992)
Board of Charities & 
Corrections (1900)
Department of Public 
Welfare (1919 - 1931) 
Bureau of Pardon & 
Paroles
Racing Commission 
Board of 
Commissioners of State 
Institutions (1912)
Board of Control 
(1920)
Department of Public 
Institutions (1961)
Department of Public 
Welfare (1962)
Department of Social 
Services (1983)
Department of Aging 
(1982)
Commission on Aging 
(1971)
Department of 
Corrections (1973)
Department of Health 
(1971)
Health & Human Services System (1997)
Racing Co ission 
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Nevada 
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To preserve and enhance the environment of the state to protect public health, sustain 
healthy ecosystems and contribute to a vibrant economy 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1977 N/A 643 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$110,206,047 $19,837,088 18.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Nevada
Governor
Department 
of Health 
Services & 
Human 
Services
State Board 
of 
Examiners
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department of Conservation & Natural Resources
Department 
of Wildlife
Colorado 
River 
Commission
Commission 
on Mineral 
Resources
Public 
Utilities 
Commission
Environmental 
Protection
Forestry
State ParksState Lands
Water Resources
Conservation 
District Program
Nevada Natural 
Heritage Program
State Historic 
Preservation Office
  
 
 
 
State Commission of Environmental Protection (1971)
Nevada
State Environmental Commission (1973)
Department of Health, Welfare, & Rehabilitation (1967)
Department of Conservation & Natural Resources (1973)
Welfare Department (1949)
Department of Health & Welfare (1963)
Department of Health & Human Resources (1973)
Board of Health (1893,1911,1919)
Department of Health (1939)
Board of Relief, Work Planning, & 
Pension Control (1935)
Department of Conservation & Natural Resources (1957)
Office of State 
Engineer
Division of 
State Parks & 
Monuments
Oil & Gas 
Conservation 
Committee
Other 
conservation 
departments
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New Hampshire 
Department of Environmental Services 
 
Mission Statement 
To help sustain a high quality of life for all citizens by protecting and restoring the 
environment and public health in New Hampshire 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1986 N/A 881 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$284,051,893 $79,224,612 27.9% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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New Hampshire
Department of Environmental Services
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture, 
Markets, & 
Food
Department of 
Health & 
Human 
Services
Department of Resources & 
Economic Development
Department of 
Fish & Game
Air Resources Waste Management Water
Parks & 
Recreation
Travel & 
Tourism 
Development
Economic 
Development
Forests & 
Lands
 
 
 
Water Supply & Pollution Control Commission (1965)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1967)
New Hampshire
Water Supply & Pollution Control Commission (1965)
Office of Waste 
Management (1981)
Department of Environmental Services (1987)
Air Resources 
Commission (1979)
Solid Waste 
Management Board
Water Pollution Commission (1955)
Department of Health & Human Services (1984)
Solid Waste 
Management 
Council (1986)
Department of Agriculture
Department of 
Agriculture 
Department of Charities 
& Corrections (1895)
Board of Public Welfare 
(1929)
Board of Health (1881)
Department of Health 
(1944)
Department of Health & Welfare (1962)
Department of Health & Human Services (1987)
Department of 
Agriculture,  
Markets. & Food
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New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
Protection of the air, waters, land, and natural and historic resources of the State to 
ensure continued public benefit 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1970 N/A 827 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$34,622,000 $8,150,000 23.5% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of 
Health
Sustainability & Green Energy
Natural & Historic Resources
Land Use Management
Water Resources Management
Environmental Management
Site Remediation Programs
Compliance & Enforcement
Department of 
Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Commission (1954)
New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (1970)
Department of Health (1915)
Department of Health (1970)
Department of 
Conservation & Economic 
Development  (1948)
Department of 
Economic 
Development (1945)
Department of Conservation  
& Development (1915)
Department of 
Conservation (1945)
Department of Shell Fisheries 
(1915)
Department of Environmental Protection & 
Energy (1991 – 1994)
State Beach Erosion 
Commission (1949)
Fish and Game 
Council (1945)
Department of Environmental Protection (1995)
Board of Health (1877)
Department of Health & Senior Services 
(1996)
Department of Human Services (2012) Department of Health (2012)
Department of 
Human Services 
(1977)
Department of 
Institutions & 
Agencies (1919)
Department of 
Children & 
Families (2006)
Department of 
Human Services 
(2006)
Department of 
Corrections 
(1977)
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New Mexico 
Department of Environment 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and restore the environment and to foster a healthy and prosperous New 
Mexico for present and future generations. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1991 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$127,578,000 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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New Mexico
Department of Environment
Governor
Department 
of Agriculture
Department 
of Health
Public 
Regulatory 
Commission
Department of Energy, Minerals, & Natural 
Resources 
Commissioner 
of Public 
Lands
Resource 
Protection
Environmental 
Health
Environmental 
Protection
Energy 
Conservation & 
Management
State Forestry
Mines & 
MineralsOil Conservation
State Parks
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Water Quality Control Commission (1978)
Environmental Improvement Board (1978)
Council on Environmental Quality (1971-1973)
New Mexico
Department of Environment (1991)
Department of Health  (1991)
Department of Health (1919)
Department of Welfare (1921)Department of Health (1935)
Health and Social Services Department (1967)
Health and Environment Department (1977)
Environmental improvement Agency (1970)
Water Quality Control Commission (1967)
Department of Welfare (1921)
Department of Hospitals & Institutions
Health and Social Services Department (1967)
Department of Human Services (1977)
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New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation 
 
Mission Statement 
To conserve, improve, and protect New York's natural resources and environment and 
to prevent, abate, and control water, land, and air pollution, in order to enhance the 
health, safety, and welfare of the people of the state and their overall economic and 
social well-being. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1970 N/A 2946 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
 $922,000,000 $81,198,000 9% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 
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New York
Department of Environmental Conservation
Governor
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Markets
Department of 
Health
Department of 
Public Service
Water Resources
Natural Resources
Air Resources, Climate 
Change, & Energy
Public Protection & 
Regional Affairs
Office of Remediation & 
Materials Management
NYC Resiliency & 
Sustainability
Department of 
Family 
Assistance
Department of 
Labor
Parks, 
Recreation, & 
Historic 
Preservation
  
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Board (1957)
Water Pollution Control Board (1950)
New York
Department of Environmental 
Protection (1970)
Forest Preserve of New 
York State (1885)
Fisheries, Game, and 
Forest Commission 
(1895)
Department of 
Conservation (1911)
Parks, Recreation, and 
Historic Preservation (1970)
Water Resources Commission (1960)
Natural Beauty 
Commission (1966)
Water Storage Commission 
(1902-1903)
Water Supply Commission 
(1905)
River Improvement 
Commission
Water Power Commission 
(1921)
Water Control Commission 
(1922)
1926
Department of ConservationDepartment of Agriculture 
& Markets (1926)
Department of Health (1901) 
Department of Agriculture 
and Markets (1970)
Department of Health (1970)
Board of Health (1880)
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of 
Food & 
Markets
Department of 
Weights & 
Measures
Department of Farm 
& Markets (1917)
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North Carolina 
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect North Carolina's environment and natural resources. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency N Y N 1967 1971 1226 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$102,196,685 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities  
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
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North Carolina
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources
Governor
Dept. of Health Services & Human 
Services
Commissioner 
of Agriculture
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Consumer Services
Natural Resources Environment
Marine Fisheries
Zoological Park
Museum of 
Natural Science
Aquariums
Parks & 
Recreation
Coastal 
Management
Water 
Infrastructure
Ecosystem 
Enhancement 
ProgramAir Quality
Energy, Minerals, 
& Land 
Management
Water Resources
Waste 
Management
  
 
 
 
North Carolina
Department of Health (1967)
Board of 
Health 
(1877)
Department of Health  & Human Services (1997)
Department of Human Resources
Department of Social 
Services (1968)
Board of Charities & 
Public Welfare (1917)
Board of Public 
Charities (1869)
Geological Survey 
(1823)
Geological and 
Economic Survey 
(1905)
Department of 
Conservation & 
Development 
(1925)
16 other 
boards/ 
commissions/ 
agencies
Community Development Programs
Wildlife Resources 
Commission
NC Zoological 
Park (1969)
Department of Environment, Health, & Natural Resources (1989)
Department of Natural & Economic Resources (1997)
Department of Health (1971)
Department of Mental 
Health (1963)
Department of Natural & Economic Resources (1971)
Department of Natural Resources & Community Development (1977)
Board of Water & Air Resources (1967)
Air Control Advisory Council (1967)
Department of Health (1931)
Department of Water 
Resources (1959)
Department of Water & Air Resources (1967)
Stream Control Advisory Committee (1945-1951)
Stream Sanitation Committee (1951)
Department of Health (1931)
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North Dakota 
Department of Health 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and enhance the health and safety of all North Dakotans and the 
environment in which we live. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Health N/A N/A N N/A N/A 354 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$180,827,743 $116,763,623 64.6% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N 
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North Dakota
Governor
Department of Health
Public 
Service 
Commission
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Parks & 
Recreation
Water 
Commission
Game & Fish 
Department
Industrial Commission
Board of 
Higher 
Education
North 
Dakota 
State 
University
State 
Forester
Forest 
Service
Emergency 
Preparedness 
& Response
Community 
Health
Medical 
Services
Environmental 
Health
Health 
Resources
Oil & Gas 
Research 
Website
Pipeline 
Authority
Renewable 
Energy 
Program
Department 
of Mineral 
Resources 
Geological 
Survey
Oil & Gas 
Division
Department 
of Human 
Resources
  
 
 
 
Water Pollution Control Board
Air Pollution Control Advisory Council
Water Pollution Prevention Agency (1967)
Air Pollution Control Advisory Council 
Water Pollution Control Board
Air Pollution Control Advisory Council
North Dakota
Department of Health (1923)
Board of Health (1890)
Department of Health & Consolidated Laboratories (1987)
State Laboratories 
Department (1907)
Department of Health (1995)
State Water Commission 
(1937)
State Water Conservation 
Commission (1937)
Office of the State Engineer 
(1905)
State Water Commission 
(1983)
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Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect the environment and public health by ensuring compliance with 
environmental laws and demonstrating leadership in environmental stewardship. 
 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y Y N 1972 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$199,606,723 $35,310,223 17.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency
Governor
Department  
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Public 
Utilities 
Commission
Air Pollution Control
Environmental & Financial 
Assistance
Drinking & Groundwater
Environmental Response & 
Revitalization
Environmental Services
Materials & Waste 
Management
Surface Water
Department of Natural Resources
State Parks
Watercraft
Wildlife
Natural Areas 
& Preserves
Forestry
Soil & Water 
Resources
Recycling & 
Litter 
Prevention
Mineral 
Resource 
Management
Geology
Department 
of Jobs & 
Family 
Services
  
 
 
 
Water Pollution Control Board (1951)
Air Pollution Control Board 1967)
Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (1972)
Department of Health (1917)
Department of Health (1972)
Board of Health (1886)
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Oklahoma 
Secretary of Energy and Environment 
 
Mission Statement 
To enhance the quality of life in Oklahoma and protect the health of its citizens by 
protecting, preserving, and restoring the water, land, and air of the state, thus fostering 
a clean, attractive, healthy, prosperous and sustainable environment. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y Y N 1993 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$81,624,000 $28,579,000 35.1% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Oklahoma
Department of 
Environmental Quality
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture, 
Food, & 
Forestry
Air Quality
Land 
Protection
Water 
Quality
Water Resources Board
Secretary of Energy & Environment
Water 
Quality 
Programs
Planning & 
Management
Financial 
Assistance
Department 
of Wildlife 
Conservation
Energy 
Resources 
Board
Oklahoma 
Mining 
Commission
State Parks
Department of 
Tourism and 
Recreation
Travel 
Promotion
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Water Resources Board 
(1955)
Water Resources Board (1955)
Environmental Quality Board (1993)
Air Pollution Council (1963)
Oklahoma
Department of Environmental Quality (1993)
Department of Health (1907)
Department of Health  (1993)
Secretary of Energy & Environment (1999)
Water Quality Coordinating Committee (1965)
Wildlife Conservation 
Commission
Corporation Commission
Department of Health 
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of Industrial 
Development
Pollution Control Coordinating Board
Department of Pollution Control 
(1968)
Board of Health (1907)
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Oregon 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
To be a leader in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing the quality of Oregon's air, land, 
and water. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1969 N/A 723 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$344,128,505 $28,600,660 8.3% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N 
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Oregon
Department of 
Environmental 
Protection
Governor
Health 
Authority
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Energy
Department 
of Fish & 
Wildlife
Department 
of Forestry
Department 
of Geology 
& Mineral 
Industry
Department 
of Land 
Conservation
Columbia 
Gorge 
Commission 
Operations
Environmental 
Solutions
State Parks 
& 
Recreation
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Board of Health (1903)
Oregon State Sanitary Authority (1938)
Environmental Quality Commission (1969)
Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality (1969)
Board of Health (1969) 
Department of Human Resources (1971)
Department of Public Welfare
Department of Children’s Services
Department of Mental Health
Department of Corrections
Department of Employment
Department of Vocational Rehabilitation
Department of Human Services (1999)
Health Authority (2009) Department of Human Services (1999)
Oregon Youth 
Authority (1996)
Department of 
Corrections (1987)
Department of 
Employment 
(1993)
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Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect Pennsylvania's air, land and water from pollution and to provide for the 
health and safety of its citizens through a cleaner environment. We will work as partners 
with individuals, organizations, governments and businesses to prevent pollution and 
restore our natural resources. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1970 1995 N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$697,142,000 $193,050,000 27.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department of Conservation & Natural Resources 
Waste, Air, Radiation 
& Remediation
Water Management
Active & Abandoned 
Mine Operations
Oil & Gas 
Management
State Parks
Topographic & 
Geologic Survey
Facility Design & 
Construction
Forestry
Recreation & 
Conservation
Department 
of General 
Services
Energy 
Management 
Office
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Environmental Quality Board (1971)
Sanitary Water Board (1923)
Air Pollution Control Commission (1959)
Pennsylvania
Department of Agriculture 
(1895)Department Health (1905)
Department of Environmental Protection (1995)
Department of Environmental Resources (1970)
Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (1995)
Department of Forest and 
Waters (1901)
Department of Mines and 
Mineral Industries (1956)
Department of Labor and 
Industry (1913)
Governors Office: 
State Planning Board 
(1955)
Department of Agriculture (1970)
Department of 
Forests Water Supply 
Commission
Bureau of 
Topographic & 
Geologic Survey
Department of 
Agriculture 
(1895)
Department of 
Mines (1903)
Bureau of Mines
Office of Factory 
Inspector (1889)
Department of Labor and Industry (1970)Department Health (1970)
State Planning 
Board (1934)
Department of 
Commerce 
(1939)
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Rhode Island 
Department of Environmental Management 
 
Mission Statement 
To preserving the quality of Rhode Island's environment, maintaining the health and 
safety of its residents, and protecting the natural systems upon which life depends 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y N N 1978 N/A 399 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$103,811,527 $3,185,964 3.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N 
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Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management
Governor
Executive Office for Health & 
Human Services
Bureau of Environmental ProtectionBureau of Natural Resources
Air Resources
Agriculture & 
Resource 
Marketing
Coastal 
Resources
Criminal 
Investigation
Fish & Wildlife
Forest 
Environment
Law 
Enforcement
Parks & 
Recreation
Planning & 
Development
Compliance & 
Investigation
Air Emergency 
Response
Technical & 
Customer 
Assistance
Waste 
Management
Water 
Resource
Office of Energy 
Resources 
  
 
 
 
Air Pollution Board (1966)
Environmental Standards Board (1977-1990)
Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management (1978)
Department of Health (1935)
Division of Fish & Game (1935)
Department of Natural 
Resources (1965)
Department of Agriculture & 
Conservation (1935)
Department of 
Transportation (1970)
Department of Transportation (1978)
Board of Health (1878)
Commission 
of 
Shellfisheries 
(1842)
Commission 
of Inland 
Fisheries 
(1870)
Commission 
of the Birds 
(1899)Department of 
Agriculture (1927)
Board of Agriculture 
(1885)
Department of Health 
(1978)
Department of Public 
Works (1935)
Executive Office for Health & Human Services (2005)
Multiple welfare agencies
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South Carolina 
Department of Health and Environmental Control 
 
Mission Statement 
To promote and protect the public and the environment. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Health Y Y N 1970 1973 3400 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$593,900,859 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N 
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South Carolina
Governor
Board of Health & Environmental Control
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Natural Resources Board 
Department of Natural Resources
Department of Health & Environmental 
Control
Ocean and Coastal 
Resource Management
Public Health
Environmental Affairs
Air Quality
Environmental Health 
Services
Land and Waste 
Management
Water
Health Regulation
Client Services
Preventative Services
Office of Public 
Health Preparedness
Conservation 
Education & 
Communication
Land, Water, & 
Conservation
Law Enforcement
Marine
Wildlife & Freshwater 
Fisheries
Parks, 
Recreation, 
& Tourism
Budget and 
Control 
Board
Energy 
Office
Government 
Affairs
Public 
Service 
Commission 
Department 
of Health & 
Human 
Services
Department 
of Social 
Services
  
 
 
 
Pollution Control Authority (1965)
Board of Health & Environmental Control (1973)
South Carolina
Pollution Control 
Authority (1970)
Board of Health (1970)
Department of Health & Environmental Control (1973)
Board of Health
Water Pollution Control Authority (1950)
Board of Health (1879)
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South Dakota 
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect public health and the environment by providing environmental monitoring 
and natural resource assessment, technical and financial assistance for environmental 
projects, and environmental regulatory services; all done with reduced red tape, 
expanded e-government functions, and exceptional customer service to promote a 
prosperous economy while protecting South Dakota's environment and natural 
resources for today and tomorrow. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1973 1991 181 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$23,300,008 $7,876,965 33.8% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
  
235 
 
South Dakota
Governor
Department of Environment & Natural Resources
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Department 
of Game, 
Fish, & Parks
Drinking Water
Air Quality
Groundwater 
Quality
Surface Water 
Quality
Water Rights
Geological Survey
Water & Waste 
Funding
Feedlot Permit
Minerals & Mining
Waste 
Management
Public 
Service 
Commission 
Financial & Technical AssistanceEnvironmental Services
Petroleum 
Release 
Compensation 
Fund
Watershed 
Protection
Department 
of Social 
Services
Department 
of Health
  
 
 
 
Water Management Board (1955)
Board of Water & Natural Resources (1973)
Board of Minerals & Environment (1981)
Water Management Board (1955)
South Dakota
Department of Health (1946)
Department of Natural 
Resource Development
Department of Environmental Protection (1973)
Water Management Board (1955)
Board of Water & Natural Resources (1973)
Board of Minerals & Environment (1981)
Department of Water and Natural Resources (1979)
Water Management Board (1955)
Board of Water & Natural Resources (1973)
Board of Minerals & Environment (1981)
Department of Environment & Natural Resources (1991)
Board of Health (1891)
Department of 
Health (1973) 
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Tennessee 
Department of Environment and Conservation 
 
Mission Statement 
To enhance the quality of life for citizens of Tennessee and to be stewards of our natural 
environment by: protecting and improving the quality of Tennessee's air, land, and 
water through a responsible regulatory system; protecting and promoting human 
health and safety; conserving and promoting natural, cultural, and historic resources; 
and providing a variety of quality outdoor recreational experiences. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y Y N 1991 N/A 2780 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$387,346,200 $87,667,900 22.6% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Tennessee
Department of Environmental and Conservation
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Air Pollution 
Control
Geology
Radiological 
Health
Solid Waste 
Management
Remediation
Wildlife Resources Agency
Fish & Wildlife Commission
Wildlife & 
Forestry 
Management
Fish 
Management
Boating & Law 
Enforcement
Environmental 
Services
Engineering & 
Real Estate
Bureau of Environment Bureau of Parks & Conservation
Underground 
Storage 
Tanks
West TN 
River Basin
Water 
Resources 
Archeology
Facilities 
Management
Interpretive 
Programs & 
Education
Marketing & 
Product 
Development
Recreation 
Education 
Services
Natural AreasState Parks 
Operations
Office of Energy 
Programs
Department 
of Human 
Services
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Board (1967)
Underground Petroleum Storage Tank Board (1963)
Board of Water Quality, Oil, & Gas (1971)
Air Pollution Control Board (1967)
Underground Petroleum Storage Tank Board (1963)
Board of Water Quality, Oil, & Gas (1971)
Air Pollution Control Board (1967)
Underground Petroleum Storage Tank Board (1963)
Board of Water Quality, Oil, & Gas (1971)
Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation (1991)
Department of Health and Environment (1983)
Department of Public Health (1923)
Department of 
Conservation (1937)
Department of Health (1991)
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Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect our state's public health and natural resources, consistent with sustainable 
economic development. Our goal is clean air, clean water, and safe management of 
waste 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1993 N/A 2780 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$477,748,034 $43,100,000 9.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
  
239 
 
Texas
Commission on Environmental Conservation
Governor
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Parks & Wildlife
Compliance & 
Enforcement
Legal Services Air
Waste
Water
Administrative 
Services
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Public 
Utilities 
Commission
Health & Human Services Commission
  
 
 
 
Texas Air Control Board (1966)
Texas Air Control Board (1966)
Texas Air Control Board (1966)
Department of Health (1977)
Texas
Texas Board of 
Water Engineers 
(1913)
Texas Water Commission (1985)
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (1993)
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (2002)
Texas Water Rights 
Commission (1965)
Texas Water 
Commission 
(1962)
Texas Water 
Development Board 
(1957)
Texas Department of Water Resources (1977)
Texas Water Development Board 
(1985)
Texas Water 
Pollution Control 
Advisory Board 
(1953)
Texas Water 
Pollution Control 
Board (1961)
Texas Water Quality 
Board (1967)
Air Control Board 
(1973)
Department of 
Health (1973)
Department of Health (1909)
Quarantine Department (1879)
Department of Health & Vital Statistics (1903)
Department of Health Resources (1975)
Health & Human Services 
Commission (2003)
11 other health 
and welfare 
agencies
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Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To safeguard human health and quality of life by protecting and enhancing the 
environment. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1991 N/A N/A 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$60,484,000 $17,929,400 29.6% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N 
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Utah
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture 
& Food
Department of Natural Resources
Public 
Service 
Commission
Air Quality
Drinking Water
Environmental 
Response & 
Remediation
Solid & Hazardous 
Waste
Radiation Control
Water Quality
Forestry, Fire, & 
State Lands
Oil, Gas, & Mining
Parks & 
Recreation
Utah Geological 
Survey
Water Resources
Water Rights
Wildlife 
Resources
Department 
of Human 
Services
  
 
 
 
Water Pollution Control Committee (1967
Air Conservation Council (1967)
Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee (1979)
Air Quality Board (1991)
Drinking Water Board (1981)
Radiation Control Board 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board (1991)
Water Quality Board (2002)
Water Pollution Control Committee (1967)
Air Conservation Council (1967)
Utah
Department of Environmental Quality (1991)
Department of Health & Welfare (1967)
Department of Social Services (1969)
Department of Human Services (1990)
Department of 
Public Welfare
Other Boards & 
Agencies
Department of Health (1990)
Water Pollution Control Board (1953)
Department of Public Health
Board of Health (1898)
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Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To draw from and build upon Vermonters' shared ethic of responsibility for our natural 
environment, an ethic that encompasses a sense of place, community and quality of life, 
and understanding that we are an integral part of the environment and that we must 
all be responsible stewards for this and future generations. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y (air) N Y (water) 1969 1988, 2013 291 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$48,978,277 $10,846,407 22.1% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Vermont
Agency of Natural Services
Governor
Agency of 
Human 
Services
Department 
of 
Agriculture 
& Food
Public 
Service 
Commission
Air Quality
Department of Environmental 
Conservation
Department of Forests, Parks, & 
Recreation
Department of Fish and Wildlife
Water 
Management
Facilities 
Engineering
Watershed 
Management 
& Protection
Drinking 
Water & 
Groundwater 
Protection
Environmental 
Assistance
Geological 
Survey
Forestry
Law 
Enforcement
Wildlife
Fisheries
State Parks
State Lands
Agency of 
Agriculture, 
Food, & 
Markets
  
 
 
 
Department of Water 
Resources & Environmental 
Engineering
Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources 
(1987)
Department of Health 
(1923)
Agency of Human Services (1967)
Agency of 
Environmental 
Conservation (1969)
Department of Fish & Wildlife
Department of Forests, Parks, 
& Recreation
Board of Forests, Parks, & 
Recreation
Division of Recreation
Camel’s Hump Forest Reserve 
Commission
Northeast Forest Fire 
Protection Commission
Forest Advisory Council
Water Resources Board (1947)
Department of Public 
Welfare (1923)
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Virginia 
Secretary of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and improve the environment for the well-being of all Virginians. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA N Y N 1993 N/A 413 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$68,288,217 N/A N/A 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N 
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Virginia
Secretary of Natural Resources
Governor
Secretary of Health and Human 
Resources 
Secretary of 
Agriculture 
& Forestry
Department of 
Environmental 
Quality
Secretary of Commerce & 
Trade
Virginia 
Resources 
Authority 
Dept. of 
Mines, 
Minerals, & 
Energy
Department 
of Health
Department of 
Conservation 
and Recreation
Department of 
Fish & Game
Marine 
Resources 
Commission
Museum of 
Natural History
Air
Water
Land 
Protection & 
Revitalization
Department 
of Social 
Services
  
 
 
 
Virginia
Secretary of Economic 
Development (1986)
Secretary of Natural Resources (1986)
Water Pollution 
Control Board
Department of 
Waste 
Management
Department of 
Air Pollution 
Control 
Secretary of Commerce 
and Resources (1972)
Secretary of 
Agriculture and 
Forestry (2004)
Secretary of 
Commerce and 
Trade (2004)
Secretary of Commerce 
and Trade (1993)
Department of 
Environmental Quality 
(1993)
State Water Pollution 
Control Board (1946)
Multiple 
Boards/agencies
Marine 
Resources 
Commission
Air Pollution Control Board (1966)
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Washington 
Department of Ecology 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect, preserve and enhance Washington's environment for current and future 
generations. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA 
Y (solid 
waste) 
Y (air and 
water) 
N 1970 N/A 1676 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$503,137,000 $104,167,000 20.7% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y N N N 
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Washington
Department of Ecology
Governor
Department 
of Health
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Recreation & 
Conservation 
Office
Utilities & 
Transportation 
Commission
Parks & 
Recreation 
Commission
Department 
of Fish & 
Wildlife
Fish & 
Wildlife 
Commission
Water Resources
Water Quality
Shorelands & 
Environmental 
Assistance
Waste Resources
Hazardous Waste 
& Toxic Reduction
Environmental 
Assessment 
Program
Spill Prevention 
Preparedness & 
Response
Department 
of Natural 
Resources
Commissioner 
of Public 
Lands
Department 
of Social & 
Health 
Services
  
 
 
 
Air Pollution Control Board (1961)
Washington
Department of Ecology (1970)
Water Pollution Control 
Commission (1945)
Department of Water 
Resources (1967)
Department of 
Conservation and 
Development (1921)
Department of Natural 
Resources (1957)
Department of Social and 
Health Services (1969)
Department of Health 
(1989)
Department of Social and 
Health Services (1989)
Department of Health (1921)
Department of 
Institutions
Department of 
Welfare
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West Virginia 
Department of Environmental Protection 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect the environment while leaving room for a sustainable industry base. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA  N Y N 1991 2001 927 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$496,001,937 $141,360,552 28.5% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N 
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West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection
Governor
Department of Health 
& Human Services 
Department 
of 
Agriculture
Public 
Service 
Commission
Natural Resources
Forestry
Miner Health, 
Safety, & Training
Secretary 
of 
Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Air Quality
Land Restoration
Mining & 
Reclamation
Water & Waste 
Management
  
 
 
 
West Virginia
Division of Natural Resources 
(1961)
Department of Environmental Protection (2001)
Department of Commerce, Labor, & 
Environmental Resources (1989)
Division of Forestry (1985)
Bureau of Environmental Protection (1994) Bureau of Commerce (1994) Bureau of Employment Programs (1994)
Department of 
Commerce (2005)
Division of Labor
Division of Tourism
Division of Energy
Geological & Economic Survey
Water Resources Board 
(1964)
Department of Health 
(1815)
Air Pollution Control 
Commission (1961)
Department of Commerce, Labor, & Environmental Resources (1989)Department of Health & Human Resources (1989)
Board of Health (1881)
Department of Public Assistance 
(1931)
Board of Child Guardians (1919)
Department of Welfare (1961)
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Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect and enhance our natural resources: our air, land and water; our wildlife, 
fish and forests and the ecosystems that sustain all life.  To provide a healthy, 
sustainable environment and a full range of outdoor opportunities.  To ensure the 
right of all people to use and enjoy these resources in their work and leisure. To work 
with people to understand each other's views and to carry out the public will.  And in 
this partnership consider the future and generations to follow. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Super-Agency Y (WATER) Y  N 1966 N/A 2642 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$574,854,600 $82,536,100 14.4% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 
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Wisconsin
Governor
Department of 
Health Services
Department of 
Agriculture & 
Consumer 
Protection
Department of Natural Resources
Public Service 
Commission
Air & Waste
Land Forestry
Water
Department of 
Children & 
Families
  
 
 
 
Air Pollution Advisory Council (1967)
Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (1967)
Department of 
Resources 
Development (1966)
Conservation 
Department (1927)
Interagency Committee 
on Water Pollution 
(1927)
Department of Health
Public Service 
Commission (1931)
Hydropower Section
Forestry 
Commission 
(1891)
Department 
of State 
Forestry 
(1903)
State 
Forestry 
Board 
(1905)
Conservation 
Commission (1915)
Interstate 
Park 
Commission 
(1899)
Fish and 
Game 
Warden 
(1891)
Fisheries 
Commission 
(1874) State Board of Health 
(1876)
Department of 
Public Welfare 
(1939)
Department of Health & Social Services (1967)
Department of Health & Family Services (1996)
Department of Health (2007)Department of Children & Families (2007)
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Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality 
 
Mission Statement 
To protect, conserve, and enhance the quality of Wyoming's environment for the benefit 
of current and future generations. 
 
History and Budgetary Information 
Current Structure Environmental Programs Started Founded Reorganized Employees 
 Health 
Department 
Independent 
Board 
Independent 
Agency 
   
Mini-EPA Y N N 1973 N/A 264 
 
Operating Budget 2015/16 Federal Funding Federal Share 
$232,733,815 $151,500,197 65.0% 
 
Agency Responsibilities 
Commission 
Clean 
Air 
Clean 
Water 
Drinking 
Water 
Ground-
water 
Solid 
Waste 
Hazardous 
Waste Mining Energy Agriculture 
N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N 
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Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality
Governor
Department of 
Health
Department of 
Agriculture
Department of State 
Parks & Cultural 
Resources
Game & Fish 
Department
Abandoned Mine 
Land 
Air Quality
Water Quality
Solid & Hazardous 
Waste
Land Quality
Industrial Siting
Department of 
Family Services
  
 
 
 
Environmental Quality Council (1973)
Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality (1973)
Department of Health 
(1991)
Board of Health (1901)
Department of Health & 
Social Services (1969)
Department of Health & 
Social Services (1973)
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APPENDIX B: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
Table B-1: Federal Environmental Laws 
Statute 
Date 
Enacted 
Federal Agency 
Responsible 
Purpose/Goal 
National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) 
1969 EPA 
 Establishes the national framework 
for protecting environment. 
 To assure that all branches of 
government give proper consideration 
to the environment prior to 
undertaking any major federal action 
that significantly affects the 
environment. 
Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA) 
1970 
Department of 
Labor 
 To ensure worker and workplace 
safety 
Environmental Quality 
Improvement Act 
1970 
Council on 
Environmental 
Quality 
 Provided additional responsibilities for 
the Council on Environmental Quality 
Executive Order 12898 
on Environmental 
Justice 
1994 
Interagency 
Working Group 
(IWG) chaired by 
EPA Administrator 
and comprised of 
heads of multiple 
agencies 
 To focus federal attention on the 
environmental and human health 
effects of federal actions on minority 
and low-income populations with the 
goal of achieving environmental 
protection for all communities 
Water Pollution       
Rivers and Harbors Act 1890 
US Army Corps of 
Engineers 
(USACE) 
 To protect navigation and prohibited 
discharge into rivers without a permit. 
Water Pollution Control 
Act 
1948, 
amended 
1956, 1961 
Public Health 
Service 
 Instructed Public Health Service to 
encourage state governments to 
develop water pollution control 
programs through technical 
assistance and funding 
 Provided authority for federal 
government to research water 
pollution control issue. 
 Created federal loan program for 
states to develop wastewater 
treatment plants (1956 amendments 
changed this to grants) 
 Granted Federal Authority to address 
interstate pollution issues. 
Water Quality Act 1965 
Public Health 
Service 
 Established ambient water quality 
standards 
 Required state governments to 
establish implementation plans to 
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Statute 
Date 
Enacted 
Federal Agency 
Responsible 
Purpose/Goal 
achieve ambient water quality 
standards 
Clean Water Act (CWA) 
1972 
(amend 
1990) 
EPA 
 Restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation’s waters. 
Coastal Zone 
Management Act 
(CZMA) 
1972 
(amend 
1975, 1976, 
1978) 
EPA/NOAA  
 To control nonpoint pollution sources 
that affect coastal water quality. 
Marine Protection, 
Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act 
(MPRSA or Ocean 
Dumping Act) 
1972 EPA 
 Prohibits the transportation of 
material from the US for the purpose 
of ocean dumping 
 Prohibits the transportation of 
material from anywhere for the 
purpose of ocean dumping by US 
agencies or US flagged vessels 
 Prohibits dumping of material 
transported from outside the US into 
US territorial sea. 
Safe Drinking Water Act 1974  EPA 
 Protect human health from 
contaminants in drinking water 
Shoreline Protection Act 
(SPA) 
1988 
EPA/US Coast 
Guard 
 Prohibits the transportation of 
municipal or commercial waste within 
coastal waters by a vessel without a 
permit and number. 
Beaches Environmental 
Assessment and Coastal 
Health (BEACH) Act 
2000 EPA 
 To reduce the risk of disease to users 
of the Nation's coastal recreation 
waters. 
 Authorizes EPA to award grants to 
states and local governments to 
support microbiological testing and 
monitoring of coastal 
 To support programs to notify the 
public of potential exposure to 
disease-causing microorganisms in 
waters. 
Air Pollution    
Air Pollution Control Act 
1955, 
amended 
1961,1962 
Public Health 
Service 
 Acknowledged the existence of air 
pollution 
 Directed Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to conduct 
research and provide technical 
assistance to state and local 
government.   
 Stated clearly that air pollution was 
responsibility of state and local 
governments 
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Statute 
Date 
Enacted 
Federal Agency 
Responsible 
Purpose/Goal 
Clean Air Act  
1963, 
amended 
1965 
Public Health 
Service 
 First time term ‘clean air’ was used in 
Federal air legislation 
 Granted money to state and local 
governments to conduct research and 
develop local control programs. 
 Granted Federal authority to address 
interstate pollution issues. 
Air Quality Act 
Amendment 
1967 
Public Health 
Service 
 Required the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare to divide the 
country into Air Quality Control 
Regions. 
 Established emission standards for 
stationary source 
Clean Air Act (CAA) 
1970, 
amended 
1977,1990 
EPA 
 Regulates stationary and mobile air 
sources.  
 Establishes National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS). 
Hazardous Waste    
Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
1947 
Department of 
Agriculture 
 Established procedures for registering 
pesticides and labelling provisions. 
Lead-Based Paint 
Poisoning Prevention 
Act 
1971, 
amended 
1977,1978 
HUD 
 Provides grants to carry out 
comprehensive testing programs to 
detect the presence of and eliminate 
lead-based paint from surfaces of 
residential structures accessible to 
children. 
Federal Environmental 
Pesticide Control Act 
(FEPCA) 
1972, 
amended 
1972, 1975, 
1978 
EPA 
 Regulate sale, distribution, and 
application of pesticides 
Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) 
1976 EPA 
 Source reduction, high-technology 
treatment, and secure, long-term 
disposal of hazardous waste. 
Toxic Substances 
Control Act 
1976 
(amend 
EPA 
 EPA requires reporting, record-
keeping and testing requirements, 
and restrictions relating to chemical 
substances and/or mixtures.  Certain 
substances are generally excluded 
from TSCA, including, among others, 
food, drugs, cosmetics and 
pesticides.  
Comprehensive 
Environmental 
Response, 
Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund) 
1980 EPA 
 Provides a Federal "Superfund" to 
clean up uncontrolled or abandoned 
hazardous waste sites as well as 
accidents, spills, and other 
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Statute 
Date 
Enacted 
Federal Agency 
Responsible 
Purpose/Goal 
emergency releases of pollutants and 
contaminants into the environment 
Residential Lead-Based 
Paint Hazard Reduction 
Act 
1992 EPA/HUD 
 To develop a national strategy to 
build the infrastructure necessary to 
eliminate lead-based paint hazards in 
all housing 
Food Quality Protection 
Act  
1996 EPA/USDA 
 Amended FIFRA and FFDCA to 
increase stringency of pesticide 
regulations 
Mercury-Containing and 
Rechargeable Battery 
Management Act 
1996 EPA 
 To phase out the use of mercury in 
batteries 
 To provide for the efficient and cost-
effective collection, disposal, and/or 
recycling of materials within these 
batteries. 
Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act 
2002 EPA  Provides funding to assess and clean 
up brownfields 
The Frank R. 
Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety for the 21st 
Century Act 
2016 EPA 
 Amends TSCA to provide a 
mandatory requirement for EPA to 
evaluate existing chemicals with clear 
and enforceable deadlines 
 Provides new risk-based safety 
standard 
 Increases public transparency for 
chemical information 
 Creates a consistent source of 
funding to enforce law 
Solid Waste    
Solid Waste Disposal 
Act 
1965 
Public Health 
Service 
 Required environmentally sound 
methods for disposal of household, 
municipal, commercial, and industrial 
waste 
 Provided financial assistance to 
states to research and develop solid 
waste management plans 
Pollution Prevention Act 
(PPA) 
1990 EPA 
 Focused industry, government, and 
public attention on reducing the 
amount of pollution through cost-
effective changes in production, 
operation, and raw material use. 
Noise     
Noise Control Act  
1972 
(amend 
1978) 
EPA 
 To promote an environment for all 
Americans free from noise that 
jeopardizes their health and welfare 
Energy    
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Statute 
Date 
Enacted 
Federal Agency 
Responsible 
Purpose/Goal 
Atomic Energy Act 1947 
NRC, DOE, EPA 
(originally AEC) 
 Established the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) 
 To promote the "utilization of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes to the 
maximum extent consistent with the 
common defense and security and 
with the health and safety of the 
public 
Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA) 
1977 OSM 
 To regulate surface mining activities 
and the reclamation of coal-mined 
lands. 
Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act (NWPA) 
1982 DOE/NRC/EPA 
 Supports the use of deep geologic 
repositories for the safe storage 
and/or disposal of radioactive waste. 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 1990 EPA 
 Streamlined EPA’s ability to prevent 
and respond to catastrophic oil spills 
Energy Policy Act 2005 EPA 
 Addresses energy production in the 
US including energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, oil and gas, coal, 
etc. 
Energy Independence 
and Security Act (EISA) 
2007 EPA 
 Addresses energy production in the 
US including energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, oil and gas, coal, 
etc. 
259 
 
APPENDIX C: STATE PRIMACY INFORMATION  
State primacy information for programs delegated to states under the Clean Air Act, the 
Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the State Drinking Water 
Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Oil Pollution 
Control Act.  The data in this appendix is from a report produced by the Environmental 
Council of States (ECOS) 
 
Source of Data: Longsworth, Sarah Grace, Brendan Johns, and Carolyn Hanson) (2016). 
State Delegation of Environmental Acts.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.ecos.org/documents/state-delegations/. 
 
Key to Abbreviations in Delegation Tables 
 
Codes 
I Interim Status -- state is operating the program pending final EPA authorizations. 
IN In the process of being delegated/authorized or SIP approved. 
ND Not subject to delegation, but states may have approved program. 
P Partial Delegation/Authorization/Approval -- some parts of the programs have been 
approved but not the entire program. 
S State program -- program operated by the state, for which EPA approval is not 
applicable. 
A Approved state program or State Implementation Plan -- state's plan for meeting 
the applicable national standards. 
Y Delegated or Authorized -- the state runs the program under EPA oversight. 
N Not Delegated/Authorized/Approved 
N/A Not Applicable 
Qualifications 
1 The state has the authority to enforce some or all of these regulations; some 
approved through the SIP process, while others were delegated. 
2 EPA still maintains responsibility for audit resolution. 
3 Only the enforcement portion can be delegated. 
4 Program close-out. 
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Clean Air Act (CAA) 
 
The CAA regulates air emissions from stationary and mobile sources. It authorizes 
EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and delegate the 
following programs to states.  
 NSPS: New Source Performance Standards.  
 NESHAPS: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants.  
 PSD: Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
 Title V: Operating permits 
 NSR: New Source Review 
 
Table C-1: Clean Air Act Designations 
State NSPS NESHAPS PSD Title V NSR 
AL Y1 Y1 A Y A 
AK P P A A A 
AZ P P P Y Y 
AR Y Y SIP A SIP 
CA P P P I SIP 
CO Y Y SIP Y SIP 
CT Y Y SIP I SIP 
DE Y Y SIP S S 
DC Y P N Y N 
FL Y Y Y A A 
GA Y Y SIP Y1 SIP 
HI P P Y A NA 
ID Y P SIP Y SIP 
IL Y Y Y Y SIP 
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State NSPS NESHAPS PSD Title V NSR 
IN Y Y SIP Y1 SIP 
IA Y Y A Y A 
KS Y Y A Y A 
KY Y Y A Y A 
LA Y Y SIP Y SIP 
ME I I SIP I SIP 
MD Y Y SIP S SIP 
MA Y Y Y I SIP 
MI Y P1 A A A 
MN Y Y Y I SIP 
MS Y Y SIP Y1 NA 
MO Y Y SIP Y SIP 
MT Y1 Y1 A I A 
NE Y Y SIP Y SIP 
NV P P Y Y SIP 
NH Y1 Y1 A A SIP 
NJ Y Y Y A A1 
NM Y Y SIP Y SIP 
NY P P Y I S 
NC Y Y SIP A SIP 
ND Y Y SIP I SIP 
OH Y Y Y Y SIP 
OK Y Y SIP Y SIP 
OR P P A Y A 
PA Y Y SIP SIP 
Part 70 
Approval 
PR P P N I NA 
RI P (Title V sources 
only) 
P (Title V sources only) A ND A 
SC Y Y SIP Y1 SIP 
SD Y Y Y Y1 SIP 
TN Y Y SIP Y1 SIP 
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State NSPS NESHAPS PSD Title V NSR 
TX Y Y A Y A 
UT Y Y SIP Y SIP 
VT Y Y SIP I SIP 
VA Y Y A Y A 
WA P P P 
A, IN  
(approved, updates in 
process) 
SIP 
WI Y Y A A A 
WV Y Y SIP S S 
WY Y Y SIP Y SIP 
 
 
 
Clean Water Act (CAA) 
The CWA aims to restore and maintain the nation’s surface waters.  It is 
implemented via various regulatory programs, which delegated states are authorized to 
enforce.  
 NPDES: Nation Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
 Pretreatment 
 Sludge Management  
 SRF: State Revolving Fund 
 Section 404: Wetlands 
 
Table C-2: CWA State Delegations 
State 
Construction 
Grants NPDES Pretreatment 
Sludge 
Management SRF Wetlands 
AL Y2 Y Y N Y N 
AK Y Y Y N S N 
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State 
Construction 
Grants NPDES Pretreatment 
Sludge 
Management SRF Wetlands 
AZ Y Y Y Y 
(Water 
Infrastructure 
Finance Authority) N 
AR N Y Y N N N 
CA S Y Y N S N 
CO Y P IN IN Y ND 
CT Y Y Y N Y N 
DE Y Y N N S N 
DC N N N N N N 
FL Y P Y N Y N 
GA Y Y Y IN Y N 
HI S Y Y IN S N 
ID Y N N N S N 
IL Y Y Y S S N 
IN N/A Y N S S N 
IA S Y Y N2 Y N 
KS Y Y N N Y N 
KY Y Y Y N Y N 
LA Y2 Y Y N S N 
ME Y N N N Y N 
MD NA Y Y N S N 
MA Y N N N Y N 
MI Y Y Y 
S (also federally 
delegated) S Y 
MN Y Y Y S S N 
MS N9 Y Y N Y N 
MO Y Y Y N Y N 
MT Y2 Y N N Y ND 
NE Y Y Y N Y N 
NV S Y N N S N 
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State 
Construction 
Grants NPDES Pretreatment 
Sludge 
Management SRF Wetlands 
NH Y2 N N N Y N 
NJ Y Y Y N ND Y 
NM Y2 ND ND ND S N 
NY Y Y N N S N 
NC Y A Y N Y N 
ND Y Y N N Y ND 
OH Y Y Y N S N 
OK Y2 Y Y Y S N 
OR Y Y Y IN Y ND 
PA Y Y N Y S N 
PR N Y N N N N 
RI Y Y Y N Y N 
SC N Y Y N Y N 
SD Y Y Y N3 Y ND 
TN Y Y Y N Y N 
TX Y2 Y Y Y S N 
UT Y2 Y Y Y Y ND 
VT Y Y Y N Y N 
VA Y Y Y S Y S 
WA Y P Y Y S N 
WI Y Y Y Y S N 
WV Y Y Y N S N 
WY Y2 Y N N Y ND 
 
 
Resource Conservation and Recovery (RCRA)  
RCRA aims to assist in the development of management plans and facilities for 
solid waste, hazardous waste, and underground storage tanks that hold petroleum 
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products or other chemicals. States are delegated to oversee the following programs to 
ensure maximum protection from hazardous waste disposal and conservation of energy 
and natural resources. 
 Subtitle C: Hazardous Waste 
o Base program 
o Corrective Action 
o Mixed Waste 
o BIF: Regulation of Burning of Hazardous Wastes in Boilers and 
Industrial Furnaces 
o Toxicity Characteristic: Toxicity Characteristics Revisions 
o LDR California Wastes 
o LDR 1/3 Wastes 
o LDR 2/3 Wastes 
o LDR 3/3 Wastes: Land Disposal Restrictions for Third Scheduled 
Wastes.  
 Subtitle D: Solid Waste 
 Subtitle I: Underground Storage Tanks (UST) 
 
Table C-3: RCRA State Delegations 
State 
C/ Base 
Program 
C/ Corrective 
Action 
C/ Mixed 
Waste 
C/ 
BIF 
C/ Toxicity 
Characteristic 
C/ 
California 
LDR 
C/ LDR 1/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 2/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 3/3 
Wastes 
D/ Solid 
Waste 
I/ 
UST 
AL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y P Y 
AK N N N N N N N N N Y S 
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State 
C/ Base 
Program 
C/ Corrective 
Action 
C/ Mixed 
Waste 
C/ 
BIF 
C/ Toxicity 
Characteristic 
C/ 
California 
LDR 
C/ LDR 1/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 2/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 3/3 
Wastes 
D/ Solid 
Waste 
I/ 
UST 
AZ Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
AR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
CA Y Y Y IN Y Y Y Y IN ND N 
CO Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
CT Y N Y N N Y Y Y N Y Y 
DE Y N Y N Y Y Y N N Y Y 
DC Y N N N N N N N N NA Y 
FL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ND N 
GA Y Y Y Y Y ND Y Y Y Y Y 
HI Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y ND Y 
ID Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y S Y 
IL Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
IN Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
IA N N N N N N N N N Y Y 
KS Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
KY Y Y Y N Y N N N N ND Y 
LA Y Y Y Y Y Y I I I Y Y 
ME Y Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y 
MD Y N N N Y N N N N P Y 
MA Y N N N N N N N N Y Y 
MI Y Y Y IN Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
MN Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y 
MS Y N Y N Y Y Y N Y ND Y 
MO Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
MT Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y P Y 
NE Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
NV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ND S/Y 
NH Y Y P N Y N N N N Y Y 
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State 
C/ Base 
Program 
C/ Corrective 
Action 
C/ Mixed 
Waste 
C/ 
BIF 
C/ Toxicity 
Characteristic 
C/ 
California 
LDR 
C/ LDR 1/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 2/3 
Wastes 
C/ LDR 3/3 
Wastes 
D/ Solid 
Waste 
I/ 
UST 
NJ Y1 A Y1 Y1 Y1 Y1 Y1 Y1 Y1 S Y 
NM Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 
NY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
NC Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y ND A 
ND Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y IN Y Y 
OH Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
OK Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
OR Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y S A 
PA Y N N N N Y N N Y Y Y 
PR N N N N N N N N N IN N 
RI Y N N N N N N N N N Y 
SC Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
SD Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
TN Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y ND N 
TX Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
UT Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
VT Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y Y 
VA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A Y 
WA Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y   
WI Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
WV Y N N N N Y N N N N Y 
WY Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y IN 
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Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
SDWA regulates public drinking water supply. Many states are delegated to play 
an important role in enforcing the following programs which protect drinking water and 
its sources. 
 PWSS: Public Water System Supervision 
 Wellhead Protection Program 
 Sec. 1422 Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
 Sec. 1425 UIC 
 
Table C-4: SDWA State Delegations 
State PWSS 
Wellhead 
Protection UIC/ 1422 UIC/ 1425 
AL Y A Y Y 
AK Y ND N P 
AZ Y Y N N 
AR Y ND Y Y 
CA Y ND N Y 
CO Y SIP N Y 
CT Y SIP Y Y 
DE Y Y Y Y 
DC N N N N 
FL Y A Y N 
GA Y SIP Y Y 
HI Y A N N 
ID Y S Y N 
IL Y Y Y S3 
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State PWSS 
Wellhead 
Protection UIC/ 1422 UIC/ 1425 
IN Y Y N A3 
IA Y A N N 
KS Y A Y Y 
KY Y Y N N 
LA Y ND Y Y 
ME Y SIP Y Y 
MD Y Y Y Y 
MA Y SIP Y N 
MI Y Y N N 
MN Y Y N NA 
MS Y SIP Y Y 
MO Y Y Y Y 
MT Y Y N Y 
NE Y Y Y Y 
NV Y ND Y Y 
NH Y A Y Y 
NJ Y A Y Y 
NM Y ND Y Y 
NY Y Y N ND 
NC Y SIP Y Y 
ND Y SIP Y Y 
OH Y Y Y Y 
OK Y ND Y 
Y 
(but not to DEQ) 
OR Y A Y Y 
PA Y 
A or Y 
(EPA approved PA DEP's 
Wellhead Protection 
Program in 1999) 
N N 
PR Y N N ND 
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State PWSS 
Wellhead 
Protection UIC/ 1422 UIC/ 1425 
RI Y SIP Y Y 
SC Y SIP Y Y 
SD Y SIP N Y 
TN Y SIP N N 
TX Y A Y Y 
UT Y SIP Y Y 
VT Y SIP Y Y 
VA Y Y N N 
WA Y S Y Y 
WI Y A Y NA 
WV Y Y Y Y 
WY N A Y Y 
 
 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)  
 
TSCA addresses the protection, importation, use, and disposal of many toxic 
substances. Through delegation, states assist EPA in the oversight of various programs 
within the act. 
 MAP: Model Accreditation Plan 
 AHERA Waiver 
 Indoor Radon 
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Table C-5: TSCA State Delegations
State MAP AHERA Waiver Indoor Radon 
AL Y N ND 
AK N N N 
AZ N N N 
AR ND ND ND 
CA N N ND 
CO Y Y ND 
CT Y Y Y 
DE ND ND ND 
DC ND ND ND 
FL P N ND 
GA N N ND 
HI IN IN ND 
ID N N N 
IL Y N ND 
IN Y N ND 
IA N ND S 
KS N ND S 
KY Y Y ND 
LA N Y NA 
ME Y Y Y 
MD Y Y ND 
MA Y IN Y 
MI P N ND 
MN P N ND 
MS Y N ND 
MO Y ND S 
MT Y N ND 
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State MAP AHERA Waiver Indoor Radon 
NE Y ND S 
NV N N ND 
NH Y Y N 
NJ N/A N/A Y 
NM N N ND 
NY N N N 
NC Y N ND 
ND Y N ND 
OH S N ND 
OK N N ND 
OR S P N 
PA ND ND ND 
PR N N N 
RI Y Y Y 
SC Y N ND 
SD Y N ND 
TN N N ND 
TX Y Y ND 
UT Y Y ND 
VT Y N Y 
VA ND ND ND 
WA S P N 
WI Y N ND 
WV ND ND ND 
Y N N ND 
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Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know (EPCRA) 
EPCRA is designed to help communities plan for emergencies involving hazardous 
substances. Delegated states are authorized to implement the following programs: 
 Sec 313: Toxic Chemical Release Form 
 Sec 304 
 Sec 312 
 
Table C-6: EPCRA State Delegations 
State SEC 313 SEC 304, 312 
AL ND ND 
AK ND ND 
AZ N N 
AR N ND 
CA ND ND 
CO ND ND 
CT ND ND 
DE ND ND 
DC ND ND 
FL ND ND 
GA ND ND 
HI ND ND 
ID ND ND 
IL S S 
IN N S 
IA ND ND 
KS N N 
KY ND ND 
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State SEC 313 SEC 304, 312 
LA N ND 
ME ND ND 
MD ND ND 
MA ND ND 
MI N N 
MN S S 
MS ND ND 
MO ND ND 
MT ND3 ND 
NE ND ND 
NV ND ND 
NH ND3 ND 
NJ S S 
NM N ND 
NY N N 
NC ND ND 
ND ND ND 
OH S S 
OK ND ND 
OR ND ND 
PA ND ND 
PR N N 
RI ND ND 
SC ND ND 
SD ND ND 
TN ND ND 
TX ND ND 
UT ND ND 
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State SEC 313 SEC 304, 312 
VT ND ND 
VA ND ND 
WA ND ND 
WI S S 
WV ND ND 
WY ND ND 
 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide (FIFRA)  
 
FIFRA controls pesticide distribution, sale, and use requiring EPA registering, 
licensing, and labeling. Through delegation, states can take primacy on some parts of this 
work. 
 Sec 23: State Cooperation, Aid, and Training  
 Endangered Species 
 Worker Protection 
 Groundwater Protection  
 
Table C-7: FIFRA State Delegations 
State Sec 23(a) Sec 23(b) End. Species 
Worker 
Protection 
Groundwater 
Protection 
AL Y Y Y Y Y 
AK Y Y N Y N 
AZ N N 
Y 
(Fish and Game) 
Y 
(Industrial Commission) 
Y 
(Department of 
Agriculture) 
AR I I I I I 
CA ND ND I SIP I 
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State Sec 23(a) Sec 23(b) End. Species 
Worker 
Protection 
Groundwater 
Protection 
CO P8 P8 ND P8 ND 
CT Y Y N Y IN 
DE Y Y Y Y Y 
DC Y Y Y Y Y 
FL Y Y Y Y Y 
GA Y Y Y Y Y 
HI ND ND ND A I 
ID Y Y ND Y N 
IL Y Y ND SIP S 
IN Y Y ND Y S 
IA Y Y Y Y I 
KS Y Y Y Y I 
KY Y Y Y Y Y 
LA Y Y Y Y Y 
ME Y Y N Y Y 
MD Y Y Y Y Y 
MA Y Y N Y IN 
MI Y Y ND SIP S 
MN Y Y ND SIP S 
MS Y Y Y Y Y 
MO Y Y Y Y I 
MT Y Y P Y Y 
NE Y Y Y Y Y 
NV ND ND I SIP I 
NH Y Y Y Y Y 
NJ Y1 Y1 N/A 4 Y1 Y1 
NM Y Y Y Y Y 
NY Y Y Y Y Y 
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State Sec 23(a) Sec 23(b) End. Species 
Worker 
Protection 
Groundwater 
Protection 
NC Y Y Y Y Y 
ND Y Y ND Y ND 
OH Y Y ND SIP S 
OK Y Y Y Y Y 
OR Y Y Y P Y 
PA Y Y Y Y Y 
PR Y Y Y Y Y 
RI Y Y N Y IN 
SC Y Y Y Y Y 
SD Y Y ND Y ND 
TN Y Y Y Y Y 
TX Y Y Y Y Y 
UT Y Y ND Y ND 
VT Y Y S Y Y 
VA Y Y Y Y Y 
WA Y Y ND Y N 
WI Y Y ND A S 
WV Y Y Y Y Y 
WY S Y ND S ND 
 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 
 
OPA aims to provide standards and resources for the nation to adequately prevent 
and respond to future spills. The statute focuses on oil spills into navigable waters, and 
highlights the prevention of spills and liability for spill clean-up and damages to natural 
resources. States can acquire delegation of this work. 
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Table C-8: OPA State Delegations 
State OPA  State OPA 
AL ND  MO ND 
AK ND  MT ND 
AZ N  NE ND 
AR ND  NV ND 
CA ND  NH ND 
CO ND  NJ N/A 
CT ND  NM ND 
DE ND  NY N 
DC ND  NC ND 
FL ND  ND ND 
GA ND  OH ND 
HI ND  OK ND 
ID ND  OR ND 
IL ND  PA ND 
IN ND  PR N 
IA ND  RI ND 
KS ND  SC ND 
KY ND  SD ND 
LA ND  TN ND 
ME ND  TX ND 
MD ND  UT ND 
MA ND  VT ND 
MI ND  VA ND 
MN ND  WA ND/S 
MS ND  WI ND 
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APPENDIX D: EXECUTIVE BRANCH REORGANIZATIONS 
Table D-1: Executive Branch Reorganizations  
STATE TYPE OF STRUCTURE 
COMPREHENSIVE 
REORGANIZATION 
GOVERNOR 
POWER TO 
REORGANIZE 
  before reorg after reorg start end   
States with no major reorganization 
North Dakota traditional N/A N/A   
Texas traditional N/A N/A   
Washington traditional N/A N/A   
Mississippi cabinet N/A N/A   
            
States that underwent comprehensive reorganization prior to 1967  
Pennsylvania traditional traditional 1923 1923   
Ohio traditional traditional 1929 1929   
Indiana traditional traditional 1933 1933 Yes 
Nebraska traditional traditional 1935 1935   
Alabama traditional traditional 1939 1939   
Rhode Island cabinet cabinet 1939 1939   
New Jersey traditional cabinet 1947 1947   
Alaska n/a cabinet 1958 1958 Yes 
Hawaii n/a cabinet 1959 1959   
Tennessee cabinet cabinet 1959 1959   
New York cabinet cabinet 1960 1960   
New Hampshire traditional cabinet 1961 1961   
Nevada cabinet cabinet 1963 1963   
Minnesota traditional cabinet 1969 1969 Yes 
            
Partial Reorganization 1967-2000  
Utah traditional traditional 1967 1967   
Oregon cabinet traditional 1969 1969   
Vermont cabinet cabinet 1969 1971 Yes 
Kansas traditional traditional 1970 1975 Yes 
Arizona cabinet traditional 1971 1974   
            
Comprehensive Reorganization 1967-2000  
Michigan traditional traditional 1963 1965 Yes 
Wisconsin traditional traditional 1967 1967   
Colorado traditional traditional 1966 1968 Yes 
California traditional 
secretary-
coordinator 1967 1968 Yes 
Florida traditional traditional 1968 1969   
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STATE TYPE OF STRUCTURE 
COMPREHENSIVE 
REORGANIZATION 
GOVERNOR 
POWER TO 
REORGANIZE 
  before reorg after reorg start end   
Illinois cabinet traditional 1969 1969 Yes 
Massachusetts traditional 
secretary-
coordinator 1969 1969 Yes 
Delaware traditional cabinet 1969 1970 Yes 
Montana traditional traditional 1970 1971 Yes 
Arkansas cabinet cabinet 1971 1971 Yes 
Maryland traditional cabinet 1969 1972 Yes 
Georgia traditional traditional 1972 1972 Yes 
Virginia traditional 
secretary-
coordinator 1972 1972 Yes 
Maine cabinet cabinet 1970 1973   
South Dakota traditional cabinet 1972 1973 Yes 
Idaho cabinet traditional 1972 1974   
Kentucky traditional 
secretary-
coordinator 1972 1974 Yes 
Missouri traditional cabinet 1972 1974 Yes 
North Carolina cabinet traditional 1970 1975 Yes 
Louisiana cabinet 
cabinet/ 
traditional 1974 1977 Yes 
New Mexico traditional cabinet 1972 1978 Yes 
Connecticut traditional traditional 1977 1979   
Iowa 
secretary-
coordinator cabinet 1985 1986   
Oklahoma traditional cabinet 1986 1987   
Wyoming cabinet cabinet 1986 1987   
West Virginia traditional 
secretary-
coordinator 1988 1989   
South Carolina traditional 
cabinet/ 
traditional 1991 1993   
 
Sources used for table: 
Garnett, J. L. (1980). Reorganizing state government: The executive branch: Westview 
Press. 
Aborn, R. A., & Axelrod, C. E. (1967). State air pollution control legislation: HeinOnline. 
Andreen, W. L. (2003). The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-
State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II. Stanford Environmental Law 
Journal, 22(215-294).  
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Baity, H. G. (1939). Aspects of Governmental Policy on Stream Pollution Abatement*. 
American Journal of Public Health and the Nations Health, 29(12), 1297-1307.  
Bell, G. A. (1972). States make progress with reorganization plans. National Civic Review, 
61(3), 115-127.  
Book of the States (1959). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1958-1959, 115-121. 
Book of the States (1961). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1960-1961, 135-139. 
Book of the States (1963). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1962-1963, 137-141. 
Book of the States (1965). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1964-1965, 127-130. 
Book of the States (1967). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1966-1967, 123-128. 
Book of the States (1969). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1958-1969, 135-138. 
Book of the States (1971). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1970-1971, 141-146. 
Book of the States (1973). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1972-1973, 137-159. 
Book of the States (1975). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1974-1975, 105-115. 
Book of the States (1977). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1976-1977, 105-106. 
Book of the States (1979). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1978-1979, 167-168. 
Book of the States (1981). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1980-1981, 141-149. 
Book of the States (1983). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1982-1983, 44-46. 
Book of the States (1985). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1984-1985, 45-47. 
Book of the States (1987). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1986-1987, 47-50. 
Book of the States (1989). State Adminsitrative Organization, 1988-1989, 75-82 
Conant, J. K. (1992). Executive branch reorganization in the states: 1965–1991. Book of 
the States, 93, 64-73.  
Conant, J. K. (1992). Executive Branch Reorganization: Can It Be an Antidote for Fiscal 
Stress in the States? State & Local Government Review, 3-11.  
Currie, D. P. (1981). State Pollution Statutes. The University of Chicago Law Review, 48(1), 
27-81.  
Ehrlich, J. (1973). State Executive Branch Reorganizations. University of Virginia News 
Letter, 51(7), 25-28.  
Garnett, J. L. (1980). The State of the Art in State Executive Branch Reorganization. 
International Journal of Public Administration, 2(1), 51-79.  
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Haskins, R. L. (1969). Towards better administration of water quality control. Or. L. Rev., 
49, 373.  
Hatchard, R. E. (1962). Administration of State Air Pollution Control Programs, A Survey. 
Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association, 12(6), 282-284.  
Hines, N. W. (1966). Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part I: 
State Pollution Control Programs. Iowa L. Rev., 52, 186.  
Stein, M. (1962). Problems and Programs in Water Pollution. Nat. Resources J., 2, 388.  
Stern, A. C., & Professor, E. (1982). History of air pollution legislation in the United States. 
Journal of the Air Pollution Control Association, 32(1), 44-61. 
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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL TABLES: 
Table E-1 Unrotated Matrix Factors 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 4.27909 2.93934 0.3566 0.3566 
Factor2 1.33975 0.23507 0.1116 0.4682 
Factor3 1.10468 0.23994 0.0921 0.5603 
Factor4 0.86474 0.07824 0.0721 0.6324 
Factor5 0.78650 0.04210 0.0655 0.6979 
Factor6 0.74440 0.06717 0.0620 0.7599 
Factor7 0.67722 0.09719 0.0564 0.8164 
Factor8 0.58003 0.05346 0.0483 0.8647 
Factor9 0.52657 0.12799 0.0439 0.9086 
Factor10 0.39858 0.03270 0.0332 0.9418 
Factor11 0.36588 0.03332 0.0305 0.9723 
Factor12 0.33256 . 0.0277 1.0000 
 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(66) = 4193.63 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness 
RPS 0.7612 -0.0473 -0.0802 0.4119 
PBF 0.6696 -0.1688 0.1839 0.4894 
Vehicle Emissions 0.6375 -0.3483 -0.2079 0.4291 
Net Metering 0.6433 -0.0566 0.1226 0.5680 
Mercury 0.7061 -0.1597 -0.0116 0.4757 
Ecycling 0.6599 -0.1103 -0.3103 0.4561 
Public Green Buildings 0.7747 -0.1057 -0.3123 0.2912 
Lead 0.4761 0.6935 0.0686 0.2877 
UST 0.3879 0.7492 -0.1222 0.2733 
Groundwater 0.3612 0.1469 0.5674 0.5260 
Radon 0.3498 -0.2211 0.6853 0.3592 
EJ Program 0.5169 0.1517 0.0323 0.7088 
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APPENDIX F: SOURCES USED TO DEVELOP STATE STRUCTURE INFORMATION 
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Environmental Agencies”. Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2015. 
 “State Innovation in Renewable Energy.” Southeast Conference for Public 
Administration, Wilmington, NC, 2010. 
 “Public Participation in Environmental Issues in China.” Southeast Conference for Public 
Administration, Louisville, KY, 2009 
 Low Carbon Solid Waste Panel Discussion, Moderator, WASTECON, Reno, NV, 2007. 
 “Waste-to-Energy and Landfill Gas Recovery: Renewable Energy Sources” (with Cliff 
Koenig, Greg Gesell, Carlo Lebron, and Ed Liebsch), Energy Utility and Environment 
Conference, Tucson, Arizona, 2008. 
 “Solid Waste Carbon Planning Tool”, (with Kirk Dunbar and Dave Traeger), North 
American Waste-to-Energy Conference, Philadelphia, PA, 2008. 
 “Low-Carbon Solid Waste Systems”, North American Waste-to-Energy Conference, 
Miami, Florida May 2007 
 
Academic Awards and Honors 
 Pi Alpha Alpha – Public Affairs Honorary Society, 2000 
 
